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By applying a lens of hermeneutic phenomenology, in this study I explore how 
democratisation is experienced by the internationally funded non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The argument is based on the hermeneutic analysis of 27 
interviews with NGOs’ personnel including the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), 
directors and programme staff of the internationally funded democracy promotion 
programmes. Another 13 interviews were conducted with senior parliamentarians, 
politicians, journalists, academics and the advisors of bilateral and multilateral British 
and US development organisations. The argument presented in this thesis, is therefore 
an attempt to articulate the lived-experiences of the research participants. 
 
Adopting a contextual approach, I contend that the liberal conceptions of NGOs as well 
as their critiques in the Marxist and Gramscian traditions, give scant attention to what 
NGOs do in democratisation in their socio-political context. Existing conceptions and 
their critiques debate about what NGOs ought to do in democratisation and what they 
fail to do. Thus, they are limited to normative conceptualisation and are evaluative in 
nature. This thesis challenges this normative lens by advancing an alternative 
perspective. I suggest that contrary to the dominant academic standpoint on 
democratisation that sees NGOs as building democratic culture and institutions at grass-
root level, the internationally funded NGOs in Pakistan operate as an elitist group. For 
my argument, I call them NGelites (elite NGOs).  
 
By examining the socio-political context of democratic deficit and the roles of NGelites 
in Pakistan, I argue that democratisation now does not involve grass-root mobilisation, 
volunteerism, and ideological persuasion. It is ‘projectised’: Led by highly paid 
professionals, it is a depoliticised, bureaucratically managed and skilled activity. The 
projectised democratisation is a ‘balancing act’ by which NGelites navigate the space 
in Pakistan’s elitist political edifice. I conclude that NGOs in democratisation are 
neither good nor bad. They are not only constituted by the socio-political culture in 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
I did not enter in this research with a selected theoretical frame. My orientation to the 
research was personal and developed as I worked for Pakistan Institute of Legislative 
Development and Transparency (PILDAT) during 2004 - 2005. In this brief experience 
of promoting democracy from the professional platform of a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) – which was financially supported by the international funding 
agencies – the puzzle of whether and how do internationally funded NGOs contribute 
to democratisation first emerged. I began to question more in-depth about the nature of 
democratisation itself.  Since my motivation arose from my lived experience of working 
with NGOs, I was naturally inclined to learn through the experiences of the people 
involved in democratisation. I wanted to see their ways of seeing, engaging, assigning 
meanings to democratisation. This inclination of learning through the lived experiences, 
embedded my research firmly in the qualitative research domain. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology does not just provide the methods of investigating the lived 
experiences, it also frames my conceptual gaze. For this research, setting out this 
methodological and conceptual framework, I faced two challenges which at the time 
felt intractable. 
 
Firstly, I needed to decide whether I was observing the lived experiences of NGOs as 
organisations, or of the people involved in NGOs. Secondly, exposing and reflecting 
on my own assumptions and becoming conscious of them was not easy. To the first 
challenge, I concluded that although I am focusing on NGOs as organisations, it was 
really through exploring and analysing the perceptions, actions and behaviours of 
individuals working for them that would lead me to the lived experience of 
democratisation. Therefore, separating them from their organisation might undermine 
their individual identity which was partially constituted by their organisations. I 
assumed, that their lived experiences of democratisation were partially constituted by 
their work environment.   
 
Secondly, I became conscious of my own assumptions about NGOs and about the 
people in them with gradual interaction through interviews, writing reflective memos 
and rich descriptions during the eight months of my fieldwork. Such consciousness 
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helped me with questioning the dominant normative lenses which most academic 
literatures apply in either prescribing an axiomatic status to civil society and NGOs in 
democratisation or critiquing them against the liberal benchmarks of ‘good’ public 
institutions promoting democracy as the transformative force. Such ‘normative 
framing’ of NGOs does not help with examining the ways NGOs do things and what 
that teaches us about them. Revealing empirical contextual reality of NGOs in 
democratisation forms the rationale for my research. Thus, I began to see that the 
procedural and minimalist conceptions of democracy, constitutionalism and 
democratisation as advanced by O’Donnell and Schmitter1 within the transition theory 
paradigm could be used to analyse the transitional democracy in Pakistan.  
 
The thesis which I present, therefore, represents theoretically informed lived 
experiences of my research participants, including myself. Thus, the thesis contests the 
polarised understanding of democratisation and offers nuanced insights by showing that 
the NGOs in Pakistan are neither good nor bad: they are the product of the socio-
political environment in which they operate. From this standpoint, this thesis suggests 
that internationally funded Pakistani NGOs are increasingly becoming a part of the 
political elite. They navigate their ways into politics by engaging and supporting 
democratisation ‘from above’ and consider it as a necessary condition to sustain and 
strengthen democratic institutions. In this sense, the thesis argues that democratisation 
in Pakistan is now perceived as projectised: steered by well-paid professionals, it is a 
depoliticised, bureaucratically organised, and skilled activity. This thesis unfolds in the 
following manner.  
 
It is structured in two distinct parts. Chapters II and III form the first part of this thesis. 
Chapter II critically considers the wider theories and practices of democratisation and 
the roles of NGOs in it, while Chapter III describes and explains my research approach 
which responds to the calls for interdisciplinary approaches to researching 
democratisation, which by far, are rarely applied. In this sense, this study adopts a novel 
methodological approach. Chapters IV, V, VI and VII form the second part. In these 
chapters, I focus on researching and interpreting the lived experiences of NGOs in 
                                                 
1 O’Donnell, G., and Schmitter, P., (1986) Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions 
about uncertain democracies. Johns Hopkins University. 
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democratising Pakistan. I conclude with my reflections on the nature of democratisation 
as a contingent and unpredictable process, embedded in its context. Below I briefly 
discuss both sections and explain how this thesis presents the argument.  
 
Followed by the introduction, Chapter II explores the concepts of democracy, 
constitutionalism, civil society and NGOs as they form the basis for understanding 
democratisation. The purpose of this chapter is to situate the wider debates, and narrow 
the focus, in the context of this research, i.e. Pakistan’s perpetual democratic transition. 
In doing so, the conception of democratic transition from authoritarian rules, developed 
by O’Donnell and Schmitter is explored in detail. With regards to defining the 
fundamental conceptions of democracy, constitutionalism and civil society, I settle for 
the procedural and minimalist conceptions which give importance to establishing the 
‘procedural minimum’ of democratic governance focusing on regular elections, 
universal adult suffrage, partisan competition, associational recognition and access.  
 
After finalising my theoretical assumptions in Chapter II, I move to introducing, 
describing and justifying my research methodology in Chapter III. I discuss 
hermeneutic phenomenology by examining its epistemological, ontological and 
axiological orientations and style of writing. I outline reasons for constructing the 
narrative in an evocative, reflexive and personalised manner. I also elaborate research 
methods with an emphasis on bracketing common sense; conducting interviews; 
producing thick descriptions and illuminating the essences through themes and 
interpretation and present an autobiographical tale about how and why I became 
interested in this research. The aim is to justify the suitability of hermeneutic 
phenomenology for this research. 
 
Chapter IV is a beginning of my empirical section. It sets out the context of democratic 
deficit and resilience which shapes the roles of NGOs in Pakistan. I describe and 
analyse the history and practices of democratisation in Pakistan in four distinct ‘waves’: 
‘testing democracy’ (1947-1958), ‘idealising democracy’ (1972-1977), ‘personalising 
democracy’ (1989-1998) and ‘re-consitutionalising democracy’ (2008-).  Categorised 
as periods of time with a focus on the key political events and actors, these waves 
capture the history of Pakistan’s struggle in establishing democracy over seventy years.  
Chapter V begins to discuss that over the years, there has been a gradual shift in NGOs’ 
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approaches to democratisation in Pakistan. It illuminates how that shift has come about 
and explores the meanings of the terms: ‘fight’, ‘movement’, ‘distorted process’, and 
‘projectised democratisation’. I conclude this chapter by discussing how NGOs moved 
away from pro-actively advocating for a democratic political system against the odds 
of dictatorship in the 1980s, to implementing neatly designed and lucratively funded 
projects for instituting a democratic system from the late 1990s onwards. I also suggest 
in this chapter that though the research participants agree that democratisation - as a 
process – does not (anymore) involve dissent, fight or a movement for democracy, their 
opinions differ on what constitutes the projectised democratisation: its nature and 
purpose. In Chapter VI, I unpack this theme and illuminate the environment in which 
NGOs operate and how this circumscribes their roles in democratisation in distinct 
ways. In Chapter VII, I conclude the thesis by bringing together the theoretical 
discussions and empirical insights and discussing the theoretical, methodological and 






Chapter II: NGOs in democratisation 




What might we understand by ‘democratisation’ (as a process) and ‘NGOs’ (as actors)? 
How do the conceptions of ‘democracy’, ‘civil society’ and ‘constitutionalism’ 
underscore the dual concerns of this study? In this chapter, reviewing the literature on 
theories and practices of democratisation, I respond to these questions, discuss the key 
concepts and engage with the academic debates on NGOs in democratisation. It is 
imperative to gain deeper insights into the nature and role of civil society in general, 
and NGOs in particular, in theories and practices of democratisation. Through this in-
depth review and understanding of the literature, lacunae in the existing 
conceptualisations of NGOs in democratisation will emerge and the problematique of 
the nature of democratisation, democratic deficit and NGOs in it, would become 
intelligible.   
 
In this chapter I consider a range of theories and definitions encompassing the 
literatures on democratisation, civil society, constitutionalism, international 
development, democratic theory, elite theory and political philosophy. However, for 
the purposes of brevity and relevance in the context of Pakistan, where I have 
undertaken my inquiry, I gradually narrow the focus on debates in democratic 
transitions.1  
                                                 
1 There are distinct theoretical approaches to democratic transition. For a critical literature review, see 
Guo, S., (1999) Democratic Transition: A Critical Overview. ISSUES AND STUDIES-ENGLISH 
EDITION-, 35, pp.133-148.  
On the ‘waves of democratisation’, see Huntington, S.P., (1991) The third wave: Democratization in the 
late twentieth century. University of Oklahoma press.  
On the Structural Approaches to democratic transition, see Przeworski, A., (1991) Democracy and the 
market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge University 
Press; Lipset, S.M., (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political 
legitimacy. American political science review, 53(1), pp.69-105; Almond, G. and Verba, S., (1963) The 
civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five countries. Princeton University Press.  
On the Strategic Choice and Institutional Approaches, see O’Donnell, G., and Schmitter, P., (1986) 
Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. Johns Hopkins 
University; and Karl, T.L., (1990) Dilemmas of democratization in Latin America. Comparative politics, 
23(1), pp.1-21.  
 19 
Following the scoping of varieties of definitions, I settle for democracy, 
constitutionalism and democratisation as understood in their minimalist procedural 
conceptions. NGOs in this thesis are considered as part of the wider civil society. They 
aim to promote democracy by shaping government policy and legislation; are officially 
established; registered within the state law; run by employed staff (urban professionals 
or expatriates); well-supported either by domestic or international funding; and are 
often relatively large and well-resourced as compare to other civil society groups. 
  
Next, I explore the relation between NGOs and democratisation. Staying within the 
debates on democratic transitions, I move beyond theoretical discussions to include 
empirical literature on democratic transitions from the global South. The purpose here 
is to draw insights from elsewhere to broaden the scope of the debate and develop the 
argument that a contextual approach to studying NGOs in democratisation is vital. In 
so doing, I contend that both the liberal conceptions of democratisation and their 
critiques are framed within the ‘normative’ conceptions of democracy which either 
prescribe or evaluate NGOs and their roles in democratisation against the liberal 
benchmark of a ‘good’ civil society. Such framing of NGOs does not help us to reflect 
upon the ways NGOs do things and what that teaches us about them. In this sense, the 
nature of internationally funded democratisation and the roles of NGOs in distinct 
spheres remain hidden. Therefore, to understand what NGOs in democratisation 
actually do, one needs to study them in their contexts. This contextual and 
methodological focus must leave aside normative framing of either appreciation or 
critical evaluation of NGOs against liberal benchmarks of democracy and civil society.   
 
Finally, I articulate the theoretical contribution of this thesis. Informed by the lived 
experiences of NGOs in democratisation in the context of Pakistan, I highlight gaps in 
the existing democratic transition literature and its emphasis on the ‘resurrected’ civil 
society. With a particular reference to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transition theory I 
argue that contrary to how the roles of NGOs (within the wider civil society) are 
conceptualised as generating norms for liberalisation; condemning and exposing 
                                                 
There are other models. For a detailed discussion on theories and models of democratisation, see Teorell, 
J., (2010) Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–2006. 
Cambridge University Press.  
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regime’s corruption; and creating a general climate “of intense ethical rejection of the 
(outgoing) authoritarian regime,”2 NGOs with international financial and ideological 
support in democratic transitions may in fact emerge as the elite of civil society. Yet 
similar to the ways in which bourgeoisie political and economic elite act in democratic 
transitions, NGOs may also – for vested interests – support the political elite and push 
the processes of transition by advocating for a less radical and more procedural 
transition. I call them NGelites (a portmanteau of elite-NGOs). I then bring insights 
from elite theories in sociology to begin to comprehend the nature of NGOs as elite 
actors. 
 
I conclude by reflecting on the usefulness of an interpretive and contextual approach to 
studying democratisation which enabled me to see and acknowledge the phenomenon 
of democratisation as it revealed itself in the lived experiences of NGOs and other 
concerned actors. I also outline the importance of this approach for further research on 
democratisation. 
 
Theories and Practices   
The complexity of global and local trends in democratisation, with their differences and 
commonalities, reveals its strongly political nature.3 On the one hand democratisation 
is profoundly dependent on the state and activism of its citizens, political participation, 
liberalisation and constitutionalism. On the other hand, democratisation corresponds to 
and is affected by global social and political developments. As a result, varieties of 
democracy – norms and practices – are developing.4 Such complexity and dynamism 
between theory and practice call for equally complex interdisciplinary academic 
perspectives and methodologies combining political, legal, historical, cultural, and 
social anthropological approaches to inform and expand the existing theories of 
democratisation and democracy.5 There have also been growing demands for studying 
                                                 
2 O’Donnell and Schmitter (n 1) p52.  
3 Munck, G.L., (2011) Democratic theory after transitions from authoritarian rule. Perspectives on 
Politics, 9(2), pp.333-343. 
4 Diversity in the models of democracy makes the concept a ‘norm’ or an ‘ideal’ and essentially a 
contested and ‘value-laden’ project. See Arblaster, A., (2002) Democracy. Open University Press, 
Buckingham, Philadelphia.  
5 Přibáň, J., (2012) Varieties of transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science, 8, pp.105-121. 
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democratisation from an ethnographic perspective which focuses on how it is 
experienced by the main actors themselves.6  
 
To be sure, there is no dearth of quantitative and qualitative studies to inform theories 
and practices of democratisation. However, the key concerns remain: Why do some 
countries become democracies and others do not? Why and how do some countries 
consolidate democracy while others revert toward authoritarianism? How might we 
understand the democratic deficit and authoritarian trends in countries which oscillate 
between democratic and authoritarian forms of government? These and similar 
concerns with regards to conditions for a transition from some form of authoritarianism 
to democracy are an investigation of the overarching question of ‘What explains 
democracy?’7  
 
In the context of Pakistan, the conundrum of democratic deficit (encompassing the 
questions above) remains unresolved.8 Recurrent reversals of democratic governments 
to long-term military dictatorships have marked the country in the category of states in 
which democratisation does not move from transition to consolidation. As one of the 
largest and by far the most strategically influential countries, in Pakistan, the “damage 
done to democratic institutions and norms, state capacity, public services, and civil 
society……has been too great.”9 Diamond argues that Pakistan’s descent into a 
‘potentially failed’ state must be carefully examined “for it starkly depicts the problems 
of governance and state capacity that threaten many third-wave 
democracies…………”10 It is also important to note however that the nature of 
democratic deficit in Pakistan is not just the recurrence of ‘reversals’ to military 
dictatorships; it is the ‘oscillation’ between democratic and autocratic rules.11 This 
                                                 
6 Teorell (n 1) p156. 
7 Munck (n 3). In this sense, questions of democratisation are essentially the inquiry of an ever-evolving 
nature of democracy as a normative ideal. Democratisation becomes a struggle about the very nature of 
democracy. On this debate, see Luckham and White. (1996), quoted in Burnell, P., ed., (2010) 
Democratization through the looking glass. Transaction Publishers. p11. 
8 See Chapter IV which discusses democratisation in Pakistan for a detailed discussion.  
9 Diamond, L.J., (2000) Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future? Journal of Democracy, 11(3), pp.91-
106.  
10 Ibid. p94. Samuel Huntington first developed the conception of ‘waves’ to study the developments in 
democratisation. He suggests that a wave of democratisation is a transition from nondemocratic to 
democratic regime that occurs within a specified period of time. A reverse wave is when transition to 
democracy reverts to nondemocratic rule. See Huntington, S.P., (1991) Democracy's third wave. Journal 
of democracy, 2(2), pp.12-34. 
11 See Chapter IV which discusses democratisation in Pakistan. 
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suggests a desire for democracy even when state institutions are weak and conditions 
for democracy are failing. In this sense, the ‘pre-determined’ structure-oriented 
explanations for democratic deficit might not reveal much about the situation in 
Pakistan. One needs to also stress on the political ‘actor-oriented’ aspects in 
undertaking a systematic analysis. In view of this dual focus on structure and actors, I 
see the relevance of the transition theory developed by O’Donnell and Schmitter in 
early 1980s.12 They begin with the ‘structure-actor centric’ approach and argue that in 
transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, ‘democratisation from above’ as 
pacted democratisation is premised on the compromises between political elite. 
Accountability of the political elite (including the outgoing military rulers) is avoided 
and building autonomous institutional arrangements are discouraged. Yet democracy is 
established ironically by undemocratic means. Throughout this chapter, I will refer to 
these approaches and will gradually narrow my analysis to contribute to their theory 
with reference to the roles of NGOs and civil society in transition from authoritarian 
rule. Thus, a focus on transition theories in the context of Pakistan, is justified. 
 
Coming back to academic debates on democratisation, there have been growing claims 
that the scholarship on democratisation is facing an impasse – “the democratisation 
bandwagon bogged down in the quick sands of so-called hybrid or semi- or pseudo-
democratic regimes.”13 Moreover, despite the continued financial and ideological 
support provided by Western democracy promotion and development programmes to 
the emerging and neo-democracies,14 the rise of ‘illiberal democracies’15 is particularly 
troubling. This raises another concern about democracy promotion: should democracy 
                                                 
12 O’Donnell and Schmitter (n 1). 
13 Hinnebusch, R., (2006) Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An 
overview and critique. Democratization, 13(3), pp.373-395.p373. 
14 To borrow the term by Schmitter. See Schmitter, P.C., (2012) Ambidextrous democratization and its 
implications for MENA. Manuscript, Florence: European University Institute. Available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/SPS/Profiles/Schmitter/AmbidextrousDemocratizat
ion.pdf, accessed May, 14, 2016. 
15 Zakaria, F., (1997) The rise of illiberal democracy. Foreign affairs, pp.22-43; See also Burnell, P. and 
Youngs, R. eds., (2009) New challenges to democratization. Routledge. Burnell and Youngs state that 
according to the Freedom House Annual Survey for 2007 the total number of democracies reached a 
plateau (121 democracies) but that levels of freedom were starting to erode. p2. 
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be promoted or supported where it does not exist?16 Answers to this and the previously 
listed questions remain elusive.17  
 
Among other mechanisms in democratisation,18 the role of civil society is believed to 
be central to the success of democratisation. Civil society (NGOs included) is 
considered as the ‘crucial arena’19 for the development of democratic institutions and 
democratic culture of tolerance, compromise, and moderation; of ‘uncoerced human 
action’20; and a buffer against the intrusion of state.21 But as the skepticism grew on 
approaches to democratisation, the role of civil society in democratisation is also being 
questioned.22   
 
These preliminary observations stress the diversity and complexity of theories and 
practices of democratisation. As I seek explanations behind the conundrum of a 
perpetual democratic deficit in Pakistan, the nature of democratisation and the roles of 
NGOs in it, this diversity and complexity call for critical reflections on the underlying 
conceptions of democracy, constitutionalism and civil society. It is important to define 
these conceptions for this study. I now turn to defining democracy, constitutionalism, 
civil society, democratisation and NGOs within it. 
  
Conceptual Boundaries  
In this thesis, rather than choosing a single theoretical framework for doing empirical 
research, I draw on a wide range of theories of democracy, constitutionalism, civil 
                                                 
16 Bridoux, J. and Kurki, M., (2014) Democracy promotion: a critical introduction. Routledge. p1 
17 Burnell and Youngs (n 14) assert that the failures of democratisation must push scholars to think harder 
about the relevance of Western-derived analytical frameworks and models of democracy in diverse 
societies. p5. 
18 Burnell, P.J. and Calvert, P. eds., (2004) Civil society in democratization. Psychology Press. 
Approaches to democracy promotion with foreign assistance includes use of force, political and 
economic conditionalities and democracy assistance to the states and civil society to promote democracy.   
19 Plattner, M.F. and Diamond, L.J., (1994) Rethinking civil society. Journal of Democracy, 5(3), pp 4-
17. p3. 
20 Walzer, M., (1991) The civil society argument. Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 94(1). Pp 1-11. p1. 
21 Cohen, J.L. and Arato, A., (1994) Civil society and political theory. MIT press. 
22 This debate is discussed in the later part of this chapter. However, for prompt reference for the critique 
on the role of civil society in democratisation see Howell, J. and Pearce, J., (2001) Civil Society and 
Development: A Critical Exploration. Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner; Ottaway, M. (2005) Civil Society 
in Burnell, P., Randall, V. and Rakner, L. eds., Politics in the developing world. Oxford University Press; 
Fine, R. (1997) in Fine and Rai, S. eds. Civil society: Democratic perspectives. Taylor & Francis US; 
and Grugel, J., (2000) Romancing civil society: European NGOs in Latin America. Latin American 
Politics and Society, 42(2), pp.87-107. 
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society and democratisation. The usage of a single conceptual framework proved 
inadequate in conducting this research. Given that I wanted to study lived experiences 
of the people involved in NGOs in democratisation, each conceptual framework, I 
noticed during the process of this study, to a great extent, ‘structured’ their personal 
accounts and excluded certain vital realms of the experiences, which I was seeking to 
understand. Thus, this thesis has benefited from a wide range of conceptual discussions 
without getting inhibited by their structuring tendencies. It is in this sense an 
interdisciplinary study.  
 
Below, I discuss the concepts of democracy, constitutionalism and civil society with 
reference to the debates in democratisation. I consider a range of theories and 
definitions encompassing the literatures on political philosophy, democratic theory, 
constitutionalism and democratisation. In the end, I settle for definitions of democracy, 




Dahl posits that in discussing democratisation – either as transition from authoritarian 
rule or consolidation of democratic practices and institutions – we might well ask what 
we mean by democracy. “What is the transition to?”23 In response, he observes that 
there is no single meaning or theory of democracy – only theories. This makes 
democracy a contested concept – “a norm or ideal by which reality is tested and found 
wanting.”24 
  
Democracy is also one of the most durable ideas in politics; transformative in nature, it 
has been evolving ever since its earliest formulation in ancient Greece. From the Greek 
articulation of ‘demo-kratia’, democracy is understood as a system of governing that 
must not warrant arbitrary rule of one person or a few to the rest.25 In other words, 
‘popular power’ must rest with the people. Arblaster asserts that popular power is that 
                                                 
23 Dahl, R.A., (2005) Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city. Yale University Press. 
p2. 
24 Arblaster (n 4) p7.  
25 Held, D., (2006) Models of democracy. Polity; Terchek, J. R. and Conte, C. T. (eds.) (2001) ‘Theories 
of Democracy’, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
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‘single thread of meaning’ which lies beneath the varied conceptualisations of 
democracy.26 Beyond this single thread of meaning, however, disagreements prevail. 
Held argues that there has been plenty of scope for disagreement. For example, who are 
to be considered ‘the people’? How are ‘the people’ expected to participate? What is 
the scope of the ‘rule’? How is it to be exercised? What kind of people can qualify to 
rule? What structures must be agreed upon for the governments to rule and for the 
governed to consent?27 
  
Over the years, theoretical groupings have developed to respond to these questions. 
They converge around two main categories. A minimalist conception of representative 
democracy was originally outlined by Joseph Schumpeter offering a procedural notion 
in which democracy is a system of government in which citizens choose their political 
leadership in periodic elections.28 Dahl subsequently developed it as ‘polyarchy’ which 
also focuses on a system of electoral competition but additionally gives citizens the 
opportunities to formulate their preferences and express them to other citizens.29 On the 
other hand, a maximalist or substantive conception of participatory democracy is based 
on wider participation of the people and necessitates economic equality and social 
justice.30  
 
Converging the elements of both minimalist and maximalist conceptions, ‘liberal 
constitutional democracy’ emerged as the most resilient conception of democracy.31 
Liberalism as a political philosophy is committed to the idea of individual rights and 
                                                 
26 Arblaster (n 4) p9. 
27 Held (n 25) p1. 
28 Schumpeter, J.A., (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: G. Allen & Unwin ltd. 
29 Robert Dahl, P., (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. Yale University Press. In Polyarchy 
elections alone direct policies. Competition amongst individuals or groups of individuals brings up the 
most desirable government. Dahl’s theorisation offers a dual dimension to rank democracies: open 
competition and inclusive suffrage. Polyarchy is a political system in which these dual conditions are 
sufficiently met. Dahl uses the term ‘democracy’ in which the dual conditions are perfectly met hence 
‘democracy is the ideal type’.  
On procedural democratic theories, see Doorenspleet, R. and Kopecký, P., (2008) Against the odds: 
Deviant cases of democratization. Democratization, 15(4), pp.697-713 
30 Terchek and Conte (n 25). In its ‘broader’ or ‘richer’ conceptions, democracy as a system of 
governance strives to be inclusive of the public will by going beyond the standard mechanism of public 
engagement such as periodic elections. The broader conceptions live under the rubric of classical 
consensus-based doctrine which emphasise on having a ‘common good’ which the public would relate 
to acting rationally.   
31 Burnell, Randall, and Rakner (n 22); Held (n 25).  
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considered democracy as means to securing them.32 It advocates for a constitutional 
state, private property and the competitive market economy as the central mechanisms 
for coordinating individuals’ interests. It stands for free, fair, and regular electoral 
competition and accountability of government to the people. Preservation of the rule of 
law; separation of powers between the branches of government; independent judiciary; 
and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property are the 
hallmarks of liberal constitutional system of government.33 As it evolved over the years, 
concerns of justice and equality alongside liberty and freedom were added to the 
conceptions of liberal-democratic societies.34 
 
Constitutionalism  
Inherent in the idea of liberal constitutional democracy is the conception of ‘positive 
constitutionalism’. Katz and Murphy assert that ‘positive constitutionalism’ calls for 
citizens’ right to political participation and applying limits to government’s authority 
even if that government ‘perfectly’ mirrors the popular will.35 It demands adherence not 
merely to any given constitutional text or order for a system of government, but to 
principles that respect human dignity and is binding to both private citizens and public 
officials. This conception of constitutionalism wars with totalitarianism and most forms 
of authoritarian government. Joseph Raz advances the argument to its extreme giving 
prominence to the institution of courts over legislatures to protect individuals’ rights.36 
Considered as ‘precondition’ of liberal societies, constitutional review (making and 
                                                 
32 John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville developed liberal democracy in its richer understanding 
and stressed on taking democracy beyond mere representation to improving the conditions of 
associational life of citizens. Liberalism, in its earliest articulation sought to restrict the powers of both 
the Church and the absolute monarchs and defined a ‘uniquely private sphere’ – freeing civil society 
(personal, family and business life) from political interference. See Held (note 25). However, the notions 
of the ‘consent of the governed’ and the ‘value of the popular institutions’, introduced by John Locke 
were considered minimalist. See Terchek and Conte (n 25). See also Hardin, R. (2003) Liberalism, 
constitutionalism, and democracy. Oxford University Press. 
33 Ibid.  
34 For example, Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness offers a framework of a liberal-democratic society 
which speaks to the needs of its most vulnerable citizens, assigns basic rights and duties, and determines 
division of social benefits. See Rawls, J., (1971) A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press. 
35 Katz, S.N., (2000) Constitutionalism and civil society. The Jefferson Lecture, delivered at the 
University of California, Berkeley, April, 25. p5, italics added.  See also Murphy, W.F., (2009) Designing 
a Constitution: Of Architects and Builders. Tex. L. Rev., 87.  
36 Raz asserts that “the existence of norm-creating institutions, though characteristics of modern legal 
systems, is not a necessary feature of all legal systems, though the existence of certain types of norm-
applying institution is.”  Joseph Raz, (1979) quoted in Waldron, J., (1995) The Dignity of Legislation. 
Md. L. Rev., 54, p.633.   
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interpretation of a constitution) is thus a general phenomenon under liberal democracy 
practiced today.37 However the debates about the site of constituent power, 
constitutional authorship, the stakeholders involved, representation and competence, 
are fraught with fierce disagreements between those who give prominence to the courts 
over legislatures and others who consider parliament, as an elected representative 
institution, to be the location of ultimate decision making authority.38 Jeremy Waldron 
in particular supports the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.39 He asserts that 
disagreements on matters of policy and ethics as well as about the basic questions of 
political structure and individual rights need a sovereign decision-maker, which he 
believes is the majoritarian legislature and not the courts.  
 
Linked to the question of site of constituent power, Arato and Pruess posit that 
democratic legitimacy or constituent authority must neither be reduced to popular 
power nor to mere legality.40 They argue that in order to put limits to the exercise of 
political power, an autonomous civil society with plurality of ideas and interests, 
creativity and innovation could become a driving force of the idea of progress 
associated with the idea of constitutionalism. Arato goes further to suggest a model of 
consensus based multi-stage constitution making and interpretation process.41 One 
                                                 
37 See for comprehensive discussion on the concept, Arato, A., (2000) Civil society, constitution, and 
legitimacy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Note that constitutionalists are divided on the question of 
who decides what limitations apply on the exercise of political authority and how to organise a polity.  
38 Walker, N., (2010) Constitutionalism and the incompleteness of democracy: An iterative relationship. 
Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheory, (39) 3. Despite prominence of positive constitutionalism and the role of 
judiciary in it, constitutionalists are increasingly sceptical about ascribing a significant role for judges 
and jurists for the fear of ‘juristocracy’. See for instance Waldron, J., (1999) Law and disagreement. 
OUP Oxford; and Blokker, P., (2012) Dilemmas of Democratisation from Legal Revolutions to 
Democratic Constitutionalism? Nordic Journal of International Law, 81(4), pp 437-470.  
39 Waldron opines that people ought to govern themselves, and democracy entails this privilege of self-
governance. In doing so, democracies must respect individual rights and liberties; any disagreements 
that may arise in this endeavour, i.e. the questions of justice and morality, ought to be resolved 
democratically. See Waldron, J., (1995) The Dignity of Legislation, 54. Maryland Law Review, 2, 
pp.633-665, p640; and Waldron, J., (2009) Constitutionalism: A skeptical view., in Thomas Christiano 
and John Christman (eds.), Contemporary debates in political philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Also note that historically, constitutionalism and democracy have been interpreted as essentially 
opposed. See Loughlin, M. and Walker, N., (2007) The Paradox of Constitutionalism. Online publication 
2008, p1.  
For a discussion on the dual sources of legitimation, see Habermas, J., (2001) Constitutional democracy: 
a paradoxical union of contradictory principles?. Political theory, 29(6), pp 766-781.   
40Arato, A., (2010) Democratic constitution-making and unfreezing the Turkish process. Philosophy & 
Social Criticism, 36(3-4), pp.473-487. Preuss, U.K., (2006) Perspectives on post-conflict 
constitutionalism: Reflections on regime change through external constitutionalization. NYL Sch. L. 
Rev., 51, p467. 
41 Arato (n 40) p7. 
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possible approach to achieving such consensus is the idea of ‘convention of civil 
society’. It would consist of an entirely different set of members than the parliament. 
However, parliament would still be responsible to pass the proposals put forward by 
the convention. These discussions of involving civil society in constitutional 
deliberations are premised on the idea of ‘democratic constitutionalism’ in which “laws 
must always be open to criticism, negotiation, and modification of those who are 
subjects of them as they follow them.”42 Democratic constitutionalism seeks non-
imperial ways of organising and modifying constitutional democracy from within. 
Similarly Shiviji, Owusu and An-Na‘im argue for ‘adaptation and indigenisation’ and 
‘domestication’ of constitutional politics in the context of democratisation and 
constitutionalism in Africa.43 Furthermore, Habermas’ Discourse Theory offers a 
sophisticated process to make law legitimate by forming a ‘dialogical consensus’ of an 
association of citizens who are both the authors and addressees of the law.44 Thus for 
the purpose of this study, understanding the role of civil society in constitutionalism, 
particularly democratic constitutionalism, is imperative to understanding the nature of 
democratisation. These theoretical debates help with understanding and situating the 
roles of NGOs in constitutional deliberations, interpretations, and in legislating for civil 
and political rights in societies in transition to democracy.  
 
Conceptions of democracy and constitutionalism are also contested in Islamic political 
thought. Since the empirical investigations in this thesis explore the nature of 
democratisation in Pakistan which is an Islamic Republic, these debates beg 
consideration. There are contrasting debates on Islamic conceptions of political 
governance with the Western conceptions of democracy and constitutionalism.45 On the 
                                                 
42 Tully, J., (2008) The imperialism of modern constitutional democracy. in Loughlin, M. and Walker, 
N. eds., The paradox of constitutionalism: constituent power and constitutional form. Oxford University 
Press. Published online (January 2009) p20. 
43 An-Naʽim, A.A., (2008) Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of shariʽa. Harvard 
University Press; Owusu, M., (1997) Domesticating democracy: Culture, civil society, and 
constitutionalism in Africa. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 39(1), pp.120-152; Shivji, I.G. 
ed., (1991) State and Constitutionalism: an African debate on democracy. Sapes Trust. 
44 Habermas, J., (1996) Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and 
democracy. MIT Press. See also Habermas, J., (2001) Constitutional democracy: a paradoxical union of 
contradictory principles? Political theory, 29(6), pp 766-781. 
45 For debates on the history of Islamic conceptions of constitutionalism, see Arjomand, S.A., (2007) 
Islamic constitutionalism. Annu. Rev. Law Soc. Sci., 3, pp.115-140. Arjomand reviews a significant 
range of historical variation going back to the late 19th century with the drafting of the Tunisian 
Constitution of 1861 and the Ottoman Constitution of 1876. He argues that in its initial phase, Islam and 
Shari’a were considered as limitations to the government and particularly on lawmaking. The subsequent 
phase of the ideological Islamic constitutionalism, considered Islam and Shari’a as the ‘basis’ of the 
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one hand – democracy and constitutionalism are understood as compatible with the 
principles of Islamic state. Conversely, there is a conviction that the only constitution 
for the Islamic states is the Quran and the Sunnah of the prophet and therefore the 
Western notions of liberal constitutionalism are fundamentally incompatible. Al-
Hibri46 and Kamali47 for instance argue for compatibility in relation to the procedure 
for selecting the head of Islamic state and securing popular legitimacy within the 
Islamic practice of baya, and with reference to the sources of law in Islam – Quran, 
Sunnah and other sources of Shari’a – that are mostly open to interpretation by the 
institutions of mojtehads and shura founded on the principle of consultation among the 
wise-ones. In this understanding, “government is essentially civilian, elective, and 
consultative and the religion also does not stand in the way of progress, science and 
civilization.”48 Similarly the ‘mashruta mashru’a’ or ‘Shari’a permissible’ 
constitutionalism, puts firm limitations on the government and legislation of the 
autocratic governments.49  
 
In contrast, Kedourie asserts, “the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of 
governmental legitimacy, the idea of representation, or elections, of popular suffrage, 
of political institutions being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, 
of these laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the 
secularity of the state, of society being composed of a multitude of self-activating 
groups and associations – all of these are profoundly alien to the Muslim political 
                                                 
constitutions.  And the third phase of the post-ideological constitutionalism is witnessing the return of 
Islam and Shari’a as a limitation.  
See also Ali, S.S., (2016) Modern challenges to Islamic law. Cambridge University Press. 
46 Al-Hibri, A.Y., (1992) Islamic constitutionalism and the concept of democracy. Case W. Res. j. Int'l 
L., 24, p1.  
47 Kamali, M.H., (2012) Constitutionalism in Islamic Countries., in Grote, R. and Röder, T.J., (2012) 
eds., Constitutionalism in Islamic countries: between upheaval and continuity. Oxford University Press. 
48 Muhammad., (2002) quoted in Kamali (n 47) p22. 
49 Kamali (n 47). On progressive approaches to this comparison, see El Fadl, K.A., (2004) Islam and the 
Challenge of Democracy: A" Boston Review" Book. Princeton University Press. Fadl discusses the 
challenge of understanding Islam and democracy as concepts and practice. He asserts that there are both 
interpretive and practical possibilities in the tradition of Islamic political thought that could be developed 
into a democratic system. For example, the problem of divine sovereignty and its clash with democracy, 
when debated as a political system, would point to the fact that Quran itself does not specify a particular 
form of government. It does however outlines a set of social and political values that must be practiced 
in any Muslim polity.  
See also An-Naʽim (n 43). An-Na'im takes a critical-reformist stance on understanding of 
constitutionalism from an Islamic perspective. An-Na'im challenges the current calls for the re-
enactment of the Medina state and considers it inappropriate to seek to implement those historical models 
in the present context of governance with legitimacy.   
 30 
tradition.”50 With these beliefs, most modern Islamist movements including Jammat-e-
Islami in South Asia are openly suspicious of Western style democracy and secularism, 
with some describing it as sinful and against the will of God.51  
 
Syed Abul A'la Maududi’s conception of an Islamic state is particularly relevant to 
Pakistan. As the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the largest Islamic political 
organisation at the time of the Partition, his thought greatly influenced the early 
constitution-making in Pakistan. Maududi’s ideology of an Islamic state was based on 
‘theo-democracy’ which repudiated national sovereignty or sovereignty of people, 
replacing it with the sovereignty of Allah and vicegerency (khilafat) of men.52 This 
conception was developed as an antithesis of secular Western democracy.53 Thus, in 
the first (and subsequent) constitution(s) of Pakistan, sovereignty of the state is declared 
as residing in Allah with Quran and Sunnah forming the basis of all laws.54 In this 
sense, governments are only legitimate if they fulfilled the requirements of shari’a.  
 
During the 1980s, Zia-ul-Haq as the President of Pakistan, established the Federal 
Shariat Court to determine the conformity of laws with Quran and Sunnah and 
nominated the judges of the court himself. With such observations, it can be argued that 
political governance in Pakistan is contrary to the Western notions of liberal 
constitutional democracy. However, stating this, is not straight forward. In Pakistan, 
and in many other Muslim states (especially in post-colonial societies with the history 
of Western-style governance and administrative structures) the strictly Shari’a based 
constitutional architecture, is simply absent in practice. Ali argues that the Muslim 
world has largely been selective in applying Islamic law.55 Consequently, the diversity 
                                                 
50 Kedourie, E. (1994) pp5-6 quoted in Tessler, M. and Altinoglu, E., 2004. Political culture in Turkey: 
Connections among attitudes toward democracy, the military and Islam. Democratization, 11(1), pp.21-
50. p26.  
51 Haqqani, H., (2013) Islamists and democracy: Cautions from Pakistan. Journal of Democracy, 24(2), 
pp.5-14. p7. Wahhabi scholars perceive man-made constitution as un-Islamic. 
52 Maududi, S.A.A., (1976) Political theory of Islam. Islamic Publications, Lahore. 
53 Ibid. Maududi argued that the essence of theo-democracy is where the ruler is answerable to God on 
the one hand and on the other to his fellow caliphs (men) who have delegated their authority to him. 
Thus a ‘limited’ democracy is established in which not even the entire Muslim community has the 
authority to change an explicit command of God.  
54 Binder, L., (1963) Religion and politics in Pakistan. University of California Press. The Objective 
Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan in 1949 stated that “sovereignty over the 
entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone” and that “Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives 
in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the Holy Quran and the Sunna.” See pp 142-143. 
55 Ali (n 45) p44. 
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in Muslim states’ practices in application of Islamic law in domestic spheres, makes it 
an uneven and plural phenomenon – in this sense, it would be ‘closer to reality to talk 
of Islamic constitutionalism(s)’ as a multifaceted practice.56 In a similar albeit 
progressive vein, An-Na'im observes that such plurality in approaches to the application 
of Shari’a allows most Muslim states to accommodate equality of human rights and 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex or religion.57 Many Muslim states today 
are parties to the international human rights treaties and openly express commitment to 
the values of constitutionalism and civil rights.58  
 
In Pakistan, the colonial legacy has led to the development of a complex constitutional 
path, combining an essentially secular framework of law that drew on British Common 
Law and the new ideological force of Islamic jurisprudence.59 Contrary to An-Na'im’s 
progressive observations on the plurality in the application of Shari’a, Waseem 
critically argues that the Constitution of Pakistan characterises contradictory strands of 
religious constitutional provisions which undercut various other provisions for example 
concerning equality between genders and religious communities.60 Thus the two 
frameworks contradict each other. In fact, the Islamic ideology has historically provided 
an ever-expanding ‘supra-constitutional’ source of legitimacy to the usurpers of 
democratic governance.61 Lau asserts that the legal system and politics in Pakistan have 
been historically ‘infused with appeals to Islam’.62 Lau’s research further examines the 
role of the judiciary in infusing Islam in the legal system of Pakistan.63 He asserts that 
contrary to the common perceptions that Islamisation of laws was introduced by Zia-
ul-Haq in the 1980s, a number of court rulings since 1947 reveal that in fact, 
                                                 
56 Ibid. p49.   
57 An-Naʽim (n 43). 
58 Ibid. In this regard, An-Na'im calls for the implementation of internal Islamic law reform in these 
states to address the general constitutional concerns which “contributes to the process of legitimizing 
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Islamisation of laws has been a ‘judge-led process’ as the courts consciously strove to 
‘indigenise’ and ‘Islamise’ the legal system soon after the end of the colonial rule.64 
Thus, arguably, the application of Islamic law in Pakistan was arbitrary, and yet, 
ideologically driven in response to the elite-led secular politics of that time.65 Over the 
years, the arbitrary nature of Islamisation of laws continued. However, it would be 
simplistic to observe that the political and legal systems in Pakistan have been contrary 
to the Western notions of liberal constitutional democracy and preferred Shari’a. In 
fact, the practice on the ground continues to rest on political impulses – preferring 
Islamisation at certain political junctures and discarding it in favour of preserving the 
rule of law and representative democratic governance, at other occasions. 
 
Notwithstanding these contested debates about constitutional democracy, global trends 
in the spread of liberal constitutional democracy looked promising in the mid-twentieth 
century with the abandonment of authoritarianism in Latin America and the end of the 
Cold War with many post-communist countries attempting to democratise.66 Fukuyama 
called it ‘The End of History’ in which liberalism had defeated all other ideologies and 
forms of organising political and economic institutions.67 Liberal capitalist democracy 
was promoted and required by international development agencies including the United 
Nations’ agencies, the World Bank, and the European Union (EU).68 With this 
perceived triumph in the political and economic spheres, a distinct practice was 
instigated to make the ‘less fortunate’ or underdeveloped countries fit for 
development.69 Liberal and constitutional democracy, was believed to be the vehicle 
                                                 
64 Ibid.  
65 Lombardi, C.B., (2009). Can Islamizing a legal system ever help promote liberal democracy: A view 
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69 Carothers, T., (2002) The end of the transition paradigm. Journal of democracy, 13(1), pp.5-21. 
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through which development could be achieved.70 Democratisation became the task, 
which, many of the ‘fortunate’ countries in the West took upon themselves to deliver.71  
 
Democratisation 
Democratisation as a process, thus, sought to develop and preserve 'democratic 
institutions' and a 'democratic culture' which arguably leads to sustainable economic 
development.72 To democratise non-democratic states, Diamond, Linz and Lipset 
understood ‘democracy’ as:  
A system of government that meets three essential conditions: 
meaningful and extensive competition, among individuals and 
organised groups (especially political parties)……; a highly 
inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and 
policies….; and a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of 
expression, freedom of press, freedom to form and join organisations 
– sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and 
participation.73 
 
Understood in this manner, democratisation was premised on the conceptions of liberal 
constitutional democracy in its maximalist understanding. However, implicit to this 
understanding was the assumption of a polity aware of and able to express their civic 
rights.74 Already in Latin America and Africa, the newly inducted democracies of the 
‘third wave of democratisation’ were witnessing democratic erosion.75 A persistent 
failure to ‘export’ parliamentary governance systems of the West to democratising 
countries in the South, had meant that many retained multi-partyism and elections but 
could not be considered ‘liberal’ as political freedoms for all citizens and basic civil 
liberties were consistently curtailed by the governments in power.76  
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See also Fowler, A., (1993) Non‐governmental organizations as agents of democratization: An African 
perspective. Journal of International Development, 5(3), pp.325-339; and Faúndez (n 65). 
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For the advocates of liberal constitutional democracy, the trend towards ‘pseudo 
democracy’ was striking.77 Carothers critiqued the third wave of democratisation in 
which most of the democratising countries were neither dictatorial nor headed to 
democracy – they actually entered a ‘political grey zone’ and suffered from serious 
democratic deficit.78 Zakaria called it ‘the rise of illiberal democracy’ where elections 
were held but were hardly free and fair; harsh restrictions were imposed on speech, 
assembly and even dress; and media was restricted and in some countries directly 
threatened by the elected governments; “[d]emocracy is flourishing; constitutional 
liberalism is not.”79 For example across Africa, democratisation was merely confined 
to establishing political democracy – of elections and granting some civil and political 
rights; the process did not involve African peoples demands for economic 
empowerment, better living standards, and social welfare.80 
 
In search for reasons behind the surge of illiberal democracies, Santos asserted that 
Western modernity and global technological advancements, together, had failed to 
deliver on the promises of universal liberty, equality, and peace.81 The ‘proposal of 
democracy’ and the processes of democratisation were essentially ‘hegemonic’ and 
implied a “restriction of broad forms of participation and sovereignty in favour of a 
consensus on electoral processes to form governments.”82 Similarly, Tully argued that 
the imperialism of modern constitutional democracy had meant that in many post-
colonial democracies, the consent of the people was ‘manufactured’ by a sovereign or 
a group of few people, making their non-constitutional actions appear constitutional in 
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order to gain legitimacy.83 The resulting inequalities, extreme poverty, dispossession, 
irresponsible foreign control, and destructiveness have been greater under post-colonial 
imperialism than under colonialism. Later in this chapter, I will review the critical 
empirical literature on failures of democratisation in the global South to illustrate this 
point further. Suffice to observe here, that the normative conceptions of liberal 
constitutional democracy and the related processes of democratisation, fell short of 
explaining the reasons behind the persistent failure to ‘export’ parliamentary 
governance systems of the West to democratising countries in the South.84 
 
Responding to the rise in democracies’ failures in the global South, in 1980s an 
elaborated effort to understand the unexpected political outcomes of ‘transitions’ in 
Latin America began in the Woodrow Wilson Centre.85 A group of scholars including 
Juan Linz, Gullermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, Alfred 
Stepan and Adam Przeworksi laid the foundations of examining the challenges to 
transition to democracy from authoritarian rule.86 Having reviewed the varied 
conceptions of democracy and constitutionalism with regards to democratisation, in the 
context of democratic deficit in Pakistan, I subscribe to the transition theory offered 
particularly by O’Donnell and Schmitter.87 I believe that their theorisation of pacted 
democratic transitions offers much needed insights to understand the prolonged 
challenges to democratisation in Pakistan. In the following paragraphs, I provide an 
overview of their theory. In so doing, I define democracy, constitutionalism and 
democratisation having procedural, contingent and uncertain nature. Furthermore, I 
acknowledge Shaw’s phenomenology of democracy. 88 He states that the ‘essence of 
democracy’ is that it constitutes decisions. In this sense, “the power of democracy 
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comes from the vote not being the decision”89 whereas democracy aligns with 
governance as a practice. 
 
Acknowledging ‘political democracy’ as a desired goal, O’Donnell and Schmitter build 
on Dahl’s earlier work on polyarchy and emphasise on obtaining a ‘procedural 
minimum’ as its necessary elements.90 Informed by their empirical research in Latin 
America, they refer to procedural minimum as “[s]ecret balloting, universal adult 
suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, 
and executive accountability…”91 Transition is understood as the interval between the 
dissolution of the old regime and the installation of a new regime.92 If successful, 
authoritarian regime will be on one end of the spectrum and a democratic regime on the 
other.93 In such a transition from authoritarian regime to political democracy, change is 
‘rapid’, ‘uncertain’, and ‘unpredictable’.94 It is also ‘contingent’ to social cleavages, 
level of economic development, size of the country, international economic 
significance, previous form of autocracy, geo-strategic location, and mode of 
transition.95 The extent to which substantive elements of administrative accountability, 
judicial review, public financing for parties are observed, is considered as ‘less 
essential’.96 In this process of transition, the rules and procedures initially stay in the 
“hands of authoritarian rulers…….. [some of whom belong to the outgoing autocratic 
regime and who] retain their discretionary power over arrangements and rights……… 
[but will gradually]………… modify their own rules in the direction of providing more 
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secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups.”97 Thus, liberalisation is 
characterised as ‘liberalised authoritarianism.’98  
 
O’Donnell and Schmitter assert that the opening of liberalised ‘spaces’ in turn will have 
a ‘multiplier effect’ as sporadic peoples’ movements will surface to demand citizens’ 
rights. These liberalised spaces, however, must not be an immediate threat to the 
transforming regime which firmly holds to its ‘arbitrary and capricious’ governmental 
power. The crucial thing to note is that none of these stages have any ‘necessary or 
logical sequence’ to them and even more significantly, ‘progressions in these domains’ 
are indeed reversible.99  
 
According to this theory, the transition phase is thus ruled by ‘polito-cracy’ in which 
some politicians govern.100 The authoritarian ruling elite, as the key actors, have deep 
internal divisions about how to deal with rapid change and shifting political interests. 
On the spectrum of hard-liners and soft-liners, the ruling elite, for their vested power 
interests, settle their differences and recognise mutually-agreed upon goals. They then 
consider the long-term consequences of their actions. It is important to note that during 
transition to political democracy, “liberalisation and democratisation may not occur 
simultaneously” nor should they be considered as ‘synonyms’.101 Liberalisation, is a 
matter of degree and is not measurable according to any common or set scale.  
 
With this procedural minimum conception of political democracy, which in early stages 
of transition “restricts the application of the citizenship principle to public institutions 
of governance,”102 O’Donnell and Schmitter refer to democratisation as:  
the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either 
applied to political institutions previously governed by other 
principles (e.g., coercive control, social tradition, expert judgement, 
or administrative practice), or expanded to include persons not 
previously enjoying such rights and obligations (e.g., nontaxpayers, 
illiterates, women, youth, ethnic minorities, foreign residents), or 
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extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to 
citizen participation (e.g., state agencies, military establishments, 
partisan organisations, interest associations, productive enterprises, 
educational institutions, etc.) 
 
Democratisation is therefore, also a matter of degree.103 However, there are two key 
dimensions to democratisation in early transition phase which characterise it: firstly, 
the ruling elite will impose conditions that restrict party competition and electoral 
choice; and secondly it will ‘design’ mechanisms to avoid accountability to popularly 
elected representatives by establishing autonomous institutional arrangements that cater 
for their needs and are out of reach for elected representatives. Schmitter and Karl argue 
(in a much later work) that though transitions to political democracy can take different 
modes including reform and revolution as ‘democratisation from below’; and pacted 
and imposed as ‘democratisation from above’, the latter seems to be more common.104  
 
Democratic transition, is thus, an uncertain and contingent matter. It is a process in 
which political actors keep the political control to themselves. Breaking with the former 
structure-determined and the subsequent actor-oriented theories of democratisation, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s work on democratisation is considered as both ‘structure-
actor centric.’105 In other words, processes of democratic transition, shape up due to 
dynamic interaction between the ‘pre-determined’ macro-societal conditions including 
history, and the purposive (goal-oriented) action of the political actors.106  
 
A constitutionalisation of, and constitutionalism in, a transition regime also needs 
attention. Firstly, during the transition phase of acquiring political democracy, drafting 
of constitutions as “efforts to establish a single, overarching set of “meta-rules”…” are 
important but only to the extent of the process by which decisions are collectively made, 
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ratified and implemented.107 Schmitter asserts, however, that in specifying and 
enforcing a hierarchical relation between the governing elite, constitutions are “rarely 
successful” in rendering these regimes coherent.108 Consequently, constitutional norms 
remain vague and least prescriptive.109 Secondly, constitutionalism – as giving 
substance to political demands and the rights of citizens – is a matter for eventual 
democratic consolidation. 
 
The Woodrow Wilson Centre scholarship, with a particular reference to ‘Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule’, offers empirically informed theorisation on the nature and 
processes of democratic transitions. Though the study of transition, i.e. ‘transitology’ 
abstains from indicating what kind of democracy is to emerge,110 the struggle in 
transitions is to establish a minimum procedural political democracy in which political 
actors – primarily the political elite – establish liberalised authoritarianism and open up 
controlled and limited spaces for individual or group action. Likewise, 
constitutionalisation is important to the extent by which decisions are collectively 
agreed and implemented amongst the ruling elite. With such prominence accorded to 
processes, I would argue that the consequence of transition – i.e. acquiring procedural 
political democracy – is included in the action itself. In other words, the process or act 
of democratisation – first and foremost – is premised to realising the political 
democracy in its minimalist and proceduralist nature. Conversely, where democratic 
transitions from authoritarian rule aim at achieving maximalist models of liberal 
constitutional democracy as the consequence, they may fail, revert to authoritarianism, 
or oscillate between dictatorship and representative democracy. In this sense, 
democracy, constitutionalism, and democratisation from authoritarian rules must be 
seen as having procedural, uncertain and contingent nature. I subscribe to this view in 
the context of understanding the nature of democratisation in Pakistan. 
  
Similar to the debates on the conceptions of democracy, constitutionalism and 
democratisation, conceptions of civil society and NGOs with regards to 
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democratisation are also varied and contested. I now turn to discussing these 
conceptions to define NGOs for this research. 
 
Civil society  
At the onset of the third-wave of democratisation the concept and agency of ‘civil 
society’ witnessed a revival from a relatively vague concept to becoming a significant, 
even exemplary concept in the policy and practice of development through 
democracy.111 Conceptualised within liberal traditions of Montesquieu, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Tocqueville, Larry Diamond defines civil society,  
as the realm of organised social life that is open, voluntary, self-
generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the 
state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules...112  
 
Robert Putnam’s idea of social capital is influenced by Tocqueville as he contends that 
preservation of democratic institutions and citizen’s capacity for self-government 
correlates with historical traditions of associational life.113 Walzer argues that the civil 
society is the sphere of ‘uncoerced human association’ where people associate with 
each other as they realise their natures as social beings.114 Thus, the existence of a 
vibrant civil society has been considered to be a prerequisite to facilitating and 
strengthening democracy. In the transition theory of O’Donnell and Schmitter, civil 
society is defined in terms of self-organisation, distinction from state authority and 
private economic activity, capacity to stand for the common interest and action, and 
working within mutually accepted civic rules.115 In this sense, even though democracy 
and democratisation are conceptualised in the minimal procedural manner, the 
conception of civil society is comparable with its conceptions in liberal democratic 
theories. 
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Having said that, there are still wide-ranging conceptions and meanings of civil society 
within liberal democratic and constitutional theories.116 White asserts that the term 
“means different things to different people and often degenerates into muddled political 
slogan.”117 On the spectrum of conceptions, there are those who are sceptical over its 
potential and reject it as a fraud, and those who are faithful, privileging the concept and 
agency as a normative ideal and a potential locus for social change. Fine proposes a 
third way: “one that recognises the validity of the concept of civil society without 
romanticising it and without abstracting it from its social or historical ground.”118 Along 
the same lines, Howell and Pearce propose “The Alternative Genealogy” of rethinking 
civil society.119 They acknowledge the history and value of mutual support and 
solidarity in human societies but also consider civil society as the site of conflict rather 
than of universal harmony. They argue that inequality of class and social differentiation 
is embedded within civil society, whereas social, political and economic contestations 
are visible in the forms and functions of various kinds of civil society groups. Critically 
analysing the concept and agency of civil society in the context of India, Chandhoke 
argues that civil society should be seen as an ‘ambiguous’ source of democratic 
activism; in the structures of power, it may be closely tied-up with the state and emerge 
as a deeply fractured domain of social associations.120  For the purpose of this thesis, I 
concede to these assertions. I will reiterate to these points later in this chapter. 
 
The idea of civil society – in its present ‘autonomous’ understanding – gained currency 
in the age of enlightenment.121 From Roman times to the late eighteenth century, the 
term had been used to mean organised political society or the state society.122 The late 
eighteenth century saw a shift in the use of the term when ‘civil society’ was understood 
as a distinct sphere, separate from the political or ‘partisan’ activity.123 Hegel (1770-
1831) and Tocqueville (1805-1859) understood it as a ‘middle ground’ between private 
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life and the political sphere of the state.124 This middle ground mainly comprised of the 
emergent middle classes who owned private property and influence in commerce.  
 
Karl Marx (1818-1883) conceptualised civil society as having an uncivil character and 
being unconscious of its ‘incomplete freedom’.125 For Marx, civil society is 
manipulated by the state for its own political interests. It represents the interests of the 
dominant bourgeoisie who also occupy spaces in the state. Thus, civil society is not 
‘autonomous’. It also contributes to social and political inequality.126 Sensitive to 
Hegel’s conception of ‘middle ground’, Gramsci (1891-1937) argued that civil society 
develops between the economic structure of private interests, and the state with its 
coercive and legislative authority.127 However, unlike Hegel and in Marxian spirit, 
Gramsci conceived of civil society as also forming the ‘outer earthworks’ of the state. 
It comprises the ruling classes (political and economic elite) who maintained their 
‘hegemony’ or dominance in society not by coercion or revolution, but by creating 
consensus through public opinion and culture.128 To challenge such ‘hegemonic’ acts 
of the ruling classes and to free civil society from their influence, Gramsci specifies an 
important role for the intellectual groupings of the working class. Therefore, for both 
Marx and Gramsci, the sphere of civil society is far from neutral to the state or to 
economic spheres. It is inherently political and violent.  
 
The modern conceptions of civil society (especially relevant to democratisation) 
consider it as functioning in an idealised counter-image to the coercion of state; “it is 
an embodiment of social virtue confronting political vice: the realm of freedom versus 
the realm of coercion, of participation versus hierarchy, pluralism versus conformity, 
spontaneity versus manipulation, purity versus corruption.”129 White argues that such 
sloganeering reduces the value of the concept of civil society as a social scientific 
concept. He asks, “can we disperse this ambiguity (of diverse understandings) and come 
up with a serviceable notion of ‘civil society’ which will enable us to explore its 
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implications for the establishment and maintenance of democratic political system?”130 
In response, he suggests that instead of resolving the definitional problems by adopting 
a restrictive notion of civil society, it makes more sense to adopt a practical approach 
which captures its breadth albeit sensitive to the underlining idea which is common to 
most current uses. In this sense, civil society, 
… is an intermediate associational realm between the state and family 
populated by organisations which are separate from state, enjoy 
autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by 
members of society to protect or extend their interests or values.131 
 
Furthermore, a consideration of myriad of factors encompassing the sphere of civil 
society in practice (different in different contexts) may offer a better understanding of 
its place as either obstructing or facilitating democratisation.132 At this point, I would 
revert to the earlier discussion on the ‘third way’ and ‘The Alternative Genealogy’ for 
civil society. In agreeing with these approaches, I also argue that in understanding the 
nature (or agency) of civil society, one should domesticate it in its context; 
romanticising civil society as necessarily an axiomatic force or a site of universal 
harmony and abstracting it from its social or historical grounds, will hide more than 
reveal about its contested nature in a particular political context.133 The domestication 
of civil society in its context does not mean ignoring the external factors. The context 
is equally shaped by internal as well as external influences and transnational structures 
of power including the practice of international aid and associated conditionalities.134 
Thus, civil society’s role in democratisation ought to be seen as constrained by both 
internal and external social, economic and political intricacies. In fact, the ambiguity of 
the concept of civil society should be considered its strength, for it invites much needed 
empirical investigations of its roles in democratisation. 
 
                                                 
130 Ibid. p379. 
131 Ibid. p379. 
132 Ibid. 
133 For a comprehensive literature review on de-romanticising the notion of civil society and NGOs in 
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To be fair to Hegel – who is considered to be the ‘representative theorist’ of 
contemporary liberal articulations of civil society135 – his theorisation of the concept 
has not been given a thorough attention. Fine argues that Hegel fundamentally considers 
civil society operating in the sphere of contradictions.136 For Hegel, civil society is 
neither good nor bad. In between the opposites of the political power of state and 
market’s power of commerce, and complexity between their relationship, civil society 
“affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical 
corruption common to both.”137 Understanding civil society as operating in the sphere 
of contradictions, I also concede with Katz who argues that civil society and 
constitutionalism are best understood empirically as processes rather than 
abstractions.138 Hence, the challenge in thinking about civil society is to avoid a 
‘normative trap’ and to approach it as an analytical category.139 In other words, the 
mainstream Western liberal notions of civil society and their normative expectations 
should not jeopardise contextualised understandings of actually existing civil groups 
that are heterogeneous. 
 
Finally, since the focus of this thesis is on NGOs, a succinct but critical discussion on 
the ‘term’ and ‘form’ deserves attention. There are many terms (with abbreviations) for 
associations that encompass civil society. These include non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs); community based organisations (CBOs); voluntary sector 
organisations (VSOs); not-for-profit organisations; grass-roots organisations or groups; 
third sector organisations; media groups; trade unions; street committees and 
neighbourhood groups; and of course, civil society organisations (CSOs). Whether the 
concept of civil society includes social movements, religious groups, political parties 
and trade unions; and could the term ‘civil society’ be considered as an umbrella term, 
are but few ambiguities fiercely debated amongst academics as well as policymakers. 
 
                                                 
135 Fine (n 22). 
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ambivalent, not of condemnation. Hegel proposed to preserve civil society by reconciling its 
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Non-Governmental Organisations 
Should NGOs be considered the heart of civil society, is another contested debate in 
academic and policy literature. One response is ‘not really’.140 Properly understood, 
civil society is a much broader concept.141 However, it is a fact that democratisation 
programmes, especially the ones funded and supported by international agencies or 
states tend to be fascinated with NGOs, especially advocacy groups.142 This might not 
be considered a right approach to representation. Ottaway argues that in countries that 
do not have established democratic institutions, “the voice of NGOs adds an element 
of pluralism to the political system, and the distortions created by this imperfect form 
of representation may be an acceptable price for such a broadening of the political 
process.”143  
 
Conceding with Ottaway, for the purposes of this research, I focus on NGOs and 
consider their roles in democratisation in a narrow sense: i.e. NGOs, as part of the wider 
civil society, aim to promote democracy by shaping government policy and legislation. 
Their voices add pluralism in the political system which otherwise lacks democratic 
institutions and wider participation. NGOs are recognised for advancing public interest 
and related causes including human rights, minorities and women’s issues. NGOs are 
engaged in election monitoring; legislative strengthening and accountability support; 
anti-corruption research; citizenship education, and other “good things” that contribute 
to promoting democracy.144 NGOs act as vehicles to reaching informal networks, 
broadening the avenues for participation and engagement of local voices. As 
organisations, NGOs are officially established; registered within the state law; run by 
employed staff (urban professionals or expatriates); well-supported either by domestic 
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or international funding; and are often relatively large and well-resourced as compare 
to other civil society groups.145 
 
Such a narrow choice does not, in any way, undermine the value and contribution of 
social movements, grass-roots resistance against tribal coercion, street level 
committees, ethnic and religious groups, students’ groups, and others in promoting 
democratic culture and institutions. Nor does this underestimate the work of 
development organisations filling gaps in the provision of goods and services to local 
communities. The roles of political parties and lobby groups are also acknowledged but 
fall outside the focus of this research. I am aware of the risk that organisations chosen 
in this way might not represent the wider civil society. But as Tester argues, the study 
of NGOs will have significant insights into the nature of the civil society, or for that 
matter, the society as a whole.146 In other words, researching NGOs in democratisation 
will illuminate the aspects of the wider civil society and its varied roles in 
democratisation; it will also provide insights about the society generally. 
 
To conclude so far, I have settled in favour of procedural and minimalist conceptions 
of political democracy and constitutionalism for examining the challenges to 
democratisation from authoritarian rules. Conceding with O’Donnell and Schmitter, I 
understand that democratic transitions are uncertain and contingent to myriad of 
factors. Thus, democratisation is also reversible to authoritarianism. I have also 
conceded that civil society – including NGOs – is neither good nor bad. Diverse and 
heterogeneous, civil society and NGOs, operate in the sphere of contradictions, 
therefore must be understood empirically as processes rather than abstractions. And 
finally, I have argued for narrowing the focus for this research to studying NGOs, as 
part of the wider civil society.  
In the next section, I endeavour to bind the above discussion on conceptual 
underpinnings of democratisation and NGOs into a tangible and empirical exploration 
of the roles of NGOs in democratisation. Focusing on the global South, I briefly review 
the critical literature on the ‘real cases’ of democratic transitions. In much of this 
                                                 
145 In understanding NGOs as such, I have followed Mercer’s definition of NGOs. See Mercer (n 133) 
p6. 
146 Tester (n 126). 
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literature, liberal approaches to democratisation are criticised for being ignorant of the 
local socio-political ‘contexts’. I try to understand the premise on which such criticisms 
are based. In turn, I develop my own critique of the critical literature.  
 
Theoretically framing the context and the actor  
The Global South 
In a critique to the transition theories, Carothers argues that the assumptions on which 
transition theories were developed could not be more removed from the realities of 
democratisation.147 For instance, the assumption that political elite, civil society and 
other bourgeoisie follow a sequence of events to progress democratic transitions was ill 
founded. Empirically, in most neo-democracies, these actors never conform to the 
technocratic ideal of sequencing their approaches. Instead there are chaotic processes 
of political change that go backwards and sideways as much as forward, and thus 
irregular. He also states that contrary to transition theories’ actor-centric approach, in 
many neo-democracies institutional legacies from predecessor regimes affect the 
political outcomes. In this sense, explanations of democratisation ought to be sensitive 
to the ‘structure-based’ theorisation.148 Carothers’ suggestion to democracy-aid 
practitioners and policymakers is to ‘let go’ of the optimistic assumptions of transition 
theories and instead formulate a more open-ended query of “What is happening 
politically?”149 He advises that instead of following a “check-list” or a template of ideal 
institutional forms, key political patterns of each democratising country should be the 
focus of analysis and policy decisions.150  
 
I agree with Carothers. Empirical realities do reveal the specifics of political context in 
a given democratising country. I also concede with Carens who argues in favour of 
adopting a contextual approach to political theory.151 Such approach does not grant a 
normative priority to the ‘way’ we do things; rather it “imposes an obligation to reflect 
                                                 
147 Carothers (n 69) p15. 
148 Ibid. p16. 
149 Ibid. p18. 
150 Ibid. p19. 
151 Carens, J.H., (2004) A contextual approach to political theory. Ethical theory and moral practice, 
7(2), pp.117-132. 
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upon the way we do things and what they teach us.”152 In this sense, we pay attention 
to the ‘real cases’ that are more complex and ultimately more illuminating.153 We 
highlight nuances by identifying gaps, revising, and challenging existing theories and 
possibly constructing new ones. We also become aware of the conflicts between 
theories and practices.154 And finally, I take on board Saward’s ‘proceduralist’ and 
‘reflexive’ approach which regards “political principles, mechanisms and institutions 
as open to constant change and adjustment of their meaning and importance”.155 
 
Following is a brief review of critical literature on the ‘real cases’ of democratic 
transitions in the global South. Based on the lessons learnt elsewhere and making links 
with the empirical investigations in this thesis, the next and final section of this chapter 
will aim at making a theoretical contribution to the conceptions of NGOs in 
democratisation. I will highlight the nuances of NGOs’ roles with a contextual focus on 
how ‘they do things’ and what ‘that teaches us’ about them and the nature of 
democratisation. I will also suggest revisions in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transitology 
with regards to its understanding of civil society. 
 
Whilst the critique of international aid as imperialistic and hegemonic in the context of 
democratisation have been briefly discussed above, it is worth elucidating at this point 
that democracy promotion – financially and politically supported by developed 
countries in the West – has been a reality for many neo-democracies. Democracy 
promotion is an umbrella term for a variety of forms of democracy facilitation including 
the use of force, political conditionalities and democracy assistance for the civil society 
from the developed democracies to underdeveloped neo-democracies or autocracies.156 
Furthermore, since the wake of the September 2001 attacks in the US and the 
subsequent declaration of the global ‘war on terror’, a closer interaction between aid, 
foreign policy and security agendas of the international funding agencies has led to ‘the 
securitisation of aid’.157 Thus, the politics of democracy promotion – and of 
democratisation – is inherently infused with power inequalities between the ‘donors’ 
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and ‘recipients’ of aid and assistance. Nevertheless, Bridoux and Kurki argue that 
democracy promotion is also a practice in which openings to democratic participation 
and resistances can be found.158 I concede with this assertion in my research and abstain 
from categorically rejecting the idea and practice of democracy promotion – and 
democratisation – without counting its merits, albeit critically, in the context of 
developing countries where democracy is still desired by many. 
 
As I have already observed, according to liberal theories of democratisation, civil 
society and NGOs have been understood as necessary agents for bringing about 
democratic change. Post 1980s, the institution of state was criticised on the grounds of 
lack of accountability and representativeness, militarism and authoritarianism, 
corruption, distorting liberal market forces, protecting uncompetitive national 
industries, and the creation of large-scale state monopolies.159 Instead of the support for 
states, the international donors embraced NGOs as partners in a shared agenda of 
democratisation, political participation and service delivery.160 International 
organisations’ financial support and assistance for NGOs multiplied during 1980s and 
1990s providing direct funds for improving and promoting human rights and 
democracy.161 For example, National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was created 
in 1983 in the United States as quasi-autonomous NGO to provide support for NGOs 
in neo-democracies across the world. Alongside NED, United States Development 
Agency (USAID), National Democratic Institute (NDI), Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), Department for International 
Development (DFID); United Nations (UN), and World Bank including many other 
established democracies today have distinct programmes and funds for supporting 
NGOs that are dedicated for the advancement and consolidation of democracy.162  
 
Much of the academic critique on NGOs in democratisation is directed at their 
unrepresentative and undemocratic nature; elite-led and personalised leadership; 
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technocratic and professional urban set-ups; apolitical service provision; and the extent 
of their independence from donors’ and states’ influences. For example, in examining 
NGOs as agents of democratisation in African context, Fowler argues that NGOs were 
‘progressively created and used’ by the political and bureaucratic elite for their vested 
political interests and therefore did not make any significant impact on democratic 
transformation.163 In Bangladesh,164 Pakistan,165 and Africa,166 NGOs supported by 
Western donors for democratisation are found to have little to no links with grassroots 
groups. They are not membership based organisations and therefore operate as ‘closed 
structures’. In the case of Bangladesh, most NGOs lack internal democratic decision-
making structures and their autonomy is heavily compromised by the pressures of the 
political elite.167 In Pakistan, NGOs are charged with lack of legitimacy or having little 
to no representative claim on behalf of the wider civil society or the public.168 In African 
context, Marcussen suggests that local NGOs are neither democratic nor representative 
of grass-roots institutions.169 Kamat argues that the international funding is deliberately 
directed to ‘operational NGOs’ that operate within localities but are not organisations 
of the poor.170  
 
It has also been argued that the proliferation of donor funded large-scale 
democratisation and development programmes have ‘engineered’ NGOs’ 
professionals, who are much like the civil servants with contacts and access to 
information in capital cities where donor agencies and foreign embassies congregate.171 
My own research has seen a similar situation in Pakistan.172 Consequently, the urban 
NGOs phenomenon has been developed at the expense of the development and 
sustainability of wider civil society as many more local community based groups and 
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NGOs in small cities have either lost financial support and rolled back their 
development and human rights projects or closed down permanently. Mercer argues 
that it is ironic to observe that as donors attempt to ‘scale-up’ the impact of their work, 
to handle more (foreign) funding and take on greater roles in service provision, they are 
simultaneously forcing NGOs to loosen their connections to their grassroots 
constituencies.173 In fact, instead of strengthening the civil society, these NGOs may 
actually serve to weaken civil society and restrict freedoms for the citizens. Similarly, 
Kamat opines that the partnership between NGOs and economic institutions that fund 
them, such as the World Bank, has separated NGOs from their original mandate of 
organising the poor against the state and elite interests; the “democratisation that NGOs 
represent is thus more symbolic than substantive.”174 
 
NGOs are also found to reflect other social inequalities along class, gender, religious, 
tribal and ethnic divisions. In Afghanistan, Hill argues that USAID’s focus on 
developing a democratic culture through NGOs was ‘inherently flawed.’175  
Afghanistan’s Muslim and tribal identity, (torn with a prolonged conflict) could not 
possibly absorb liberal democracy and its associated roles for NGOs in a short-term and 
top-down manner employed by the USAID. As a result, identity divisions permeated 
the processes of state-society imbalance leaving the state institutions vulnerable to 
violent identity-based conflicts.176  
 
Apolitical nature of NGOs in democratisation is also critically observed. Often these 
NGOs are found to be driven by donors’ service provision and highly bureaucratised 
agenda at the expense of political activities. For instance, in Bangladesh, NGOs are 
increasingly adopting formal procedures required by donors and developing the 
conservativism by opting for less maverick processes that are usually characteristic of 
state agencies.177 This leads to a complete compromise and abandonment of their early 
pioneering vision. In Macedonia, though NGOs have been lauded for their support in 
empowering citizens, particularly marginalised groups, in raising awareness about their 
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rights and (to some degree) contributing to progressive legislation, overall, they have 
had no impact or influence on informing public policy and holding the state 
responsible.178  
 
In India, Arundhati Roy forcefully condemns international funding for democratisation 
resulting in the NGOisation of the civil society:    
Why should these agencies (e.g. World Bank, USAID, and others) 
fund NGOs? Could it be just old-fashioned missionary zeal? Guilt? 
It’s a little more than that. NGOs give the impression that they are 
filling the vacuum created by a retreating state. And they are, but in 
a materially inconsequential way. Their real contribution is that they 
defuse political anger and dole out as aid or benevolence what people 
ought to have by right. They alter the public psyche. They turn people 
into dependent victims and blunt the edges of political resistance. 
NGOs form a sort of buffer between the sarkar and public. Between 
Empire and its subjects.179  
 
The above critique on the roles and nature of NGOs in democratisation is premised on 
mainly qualitative empirical research on the ‘real cases’ of democratising countries. 
India, though an established democracy, also seemed to share the concerns about NGOs 
and their roles in democratisation.  
 
In my view, while these critiques illustrate the contextual nuances of the roles of NGOs 
in democratisation, they are nonetheless framed within the ‘normative’ conceptions of 
democracy and civil society. Using Marxian and Gramscian articulations, critics either 
prescribe or evaluate internationally funded NGOs and their roles against the liberal 
benchmark of a ‘good’ civil society. In doing so, they list NGOs’ deficits. To me, these 
evaluative critiques are the critiques of the liberal idea or conception(s). They do not 
help with reflecting upon the way NGOs do things and what that teach us about them. 
In this sense, the nature of internationally funded democratisation and the roles of 
NGOs in distinct spheres remain hidden. NGOs might not be playing roles by the liberal 
ideals, but they are still doing something. That something is often missed out.  
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I understand that in order to capture what NGOs in democratisation actually do, we 
must look for a methodological focus which would leave aside normative framing of 
either appreciation or critical evaluation of NGOs against liberal benchmarks of 
democracy and civil society. The hermeneutic phenomenological research 
methodology in my research responds to this concern. In the context of Pakistan, I 
illuminate the nature of internationally funded NGOs in democratisation as urban, elite, 
technocratic, depoliticised and therefore leading ‘projectised’ democratisation. Yet, a 
deeper exploration unravels that NGOs are ‘all these things’ because (a) they reflect 
social divisions and historical developments in Pakistan’s politics, and (b) because in 
such context, this might be their way to influence local patriarchal and autocratic elite-
led politics. By becoming elite themselves, they have a better chance to play their part 
in politics. In other words, NGOs in democratisation are not only constituted by their 
context – i.e. political history and culture, they also constitute it by developing reflective 
responses to it.180 In this sense, I find myself situated within Gidden’s theory of 
structuration, whereas the ‘duality of structure’ connects structure and action – “this 
means that people make society, but are also constraint by it.”181 Action and structure 
complement each other and therefore cannot be analysed separately.   
 
Framing NGOs in democratisation in this manner, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
‘structure-actor centric’ approach to analysing transitions from authoritarian rules 
complements Gidden’s theory of structuration. With regards to NGOs and civil society, 
I see complementarities with Hegel’s conception of civil society as ‘a contested space’; 
Marx’s inherently political civil society having an ‘incomplete freedom’; and 
Gramsci’s ‘hegemonic’ civil society which maintains its dominance in society not by 
coercion but by creating consensus through public opinion and culture. In my study, I 
found that in transitions from authoritarian rule, NGOs emerge as the elite of civil 
society to occupy a ‘middle ground’ between the wider civil society and political elite. 
I call them NGelites (a portmanteau of elite-NGOs). In this sense, I bring novel 
contextual insights into the conceptualisations of NGOs in democratisation. In the next 
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and final section, I begin to develop the conception of NGelites. I articulate how my 
understanding of NGelites contests with O’Donnell and Schmitter’s articulation of the 
‘resurrected’ civil society.182 In the end, through the lens of elite theories in sociology, 
I learn that NGOs in democratisation in Pakistan, possess many characteristics of elites. 
Thus, a theoretical contribution of this empirical thesis, is offered. 
 
NGOs as NGelites  
 
O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that in transitions from authoritarian rule to political 
democracy, a select set of actors including personnel from the outgoing military elite 
(hardliners and soft-liners) and the emerging political and economic elite will seek to 
define (or redefine) new rules for the exercise of power based on mutual guarantees for 
their vested interests.183 However, “[i]ronically, such modern pacts move the polity 
toward democracy by undemocratic means.”184 The new power group will agree not to 
harm or threaten each other, configure institutions and rules of governance, and more 
importantly the authority of the military (as outgoing rulers) ought to be given a 
‘defused but not disarming’ status; it will have a “creditable and honorable role in 
accomplishing (but not setting) national goals; and they must be made more impervious 
to the enticement of their interest by democratic means.”185 Some of these ‘pacts’ will 
be negotiated by way of agreeing a constitutional framework. Alongside these 
negotiated and contingent compromises between the power elites, “a generalized 
mobilisation is likely to occur”, which O’Donnell and Schmitter describe as the “the 
resurrection of civil society.”186 This resurrection will unfold in various stages, 
gradually transforming the polity into a liberalised citizenry to its ultimate goal of 
achieving socialization based on the citizenship principle of equal rights and obligations 
of a socialist democracy.187 
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This ‘resurrected’ civil society must not be an immediate threat to the transforming 
regime which firmly holds to its ‘arbitrary and capricious’ governmental power.188 
Gradually established, yet with strong transformative potential, the civil society (as 
organised groups of exemplary individuals) will be the “catalyst” force who will begin 
to test the boundaries of behaviour imposed by the incumbent regime.189 In stages of 
transformation, rebels (including artists and intellectuals) will begin to “poke holes” in 
the regime’s supreme governance authority, followed by semi-public forums and the 
privileged bourgeois, and finally joined by human rights organisations who will take 
“personal risks”190 and emerge with “enormous moral authority.”191 Private and public 
international support will prove to be of great help to these actors as they will not feel 
isolated in their transformative actions against the repressive regime.192 O’Donnell and 
Schmitter further argue that subsequent to such development, a working class of low-
ranking and unionised employees will emerge against the authoritarian regimes, and 
“as soon as it becomes possible to do so” there will be an explosion of worker demands 
joined by grass-roots movements.193 This ‘popular upsurge’ of civil society is 
eventually short-lived. As the incumbent regime continues to negotiate contingent 
pacts, the upsurge in the civil society will become disillusioned and dissolve.194  
 
As I understand, in conceptualising the civil society, O’Donnell and Schmitter suggest 
an opposite route to democracy from the one suggested by the classical democratic 
theory and the theory of liberal democracy. Instead of grass-roots movements 
instigating the challenge against the repressive regime, in transition theory such 
movements emerge much later, as the resurrected civil society finds its feet gradually 
without openly threatening the governing elite. The civil society – with private and 
public international support – stays out of the elite ‘pact making’, and therefore does 
not become part of the “democratic bargain”195 or political compromises. In other 
words, the sphere of civil society stays within the ‘middle ground’ between the political 
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elite of the state and the family, as a positive force with an ‘activist’ zeal and 
commitment. 
 
With insights from empirical research in this study, I contest this idea of ‘resurrected’ 
civil society. I argue that however valid this conceptualisation might be in the cases of 
transitions in Latin America, for most other parts of the world and particularly in 
Pakistan, civil society produces its own elite to gradually become part of the democratic 
bargain. NGOs, with private and public international support in Pakistan, are emerging 
as NGelites and taking the position of influence to discreetly join the political elite and 
push the transition in democratic directions to establish a minimalist procedural 
democracy. In this manner, similar to the political elite in O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 
theorisation, NGOs are pressing for democracy by (possibly) utilising undemocratic 
means, for instance, NGOs’ lack of representation and reach to grass-root civil society 
groups. We may critique their agency as apolitical, elite, urban and so on, but they serve 
a purpose of advancing democratisation, much like the political elite and their 
contingent pacts with other elites in the society. In this sense, NGelites contribute to the 
‘pacted democratisation from above’. They are neither good nor bad. Rather, NGelites 
are constituted by their context, i.e. political history and culture. In turn, they also 
constitute the context by developing reflective responses to it.  
 
To reiterate, my insights about NGOs as the emerging elite actors of the wider civil 
society are informed by the empirical research, conducted for this thesis. As I briefly 
alluded in the Introduction chapter, I am guided by hermeneutic phenomenology as the 
philosophy and methodology which emphasises on narrating and theorising on the basis 
of the ‘conceptual structures’ that inform and underpin participants’ actions – i.e. to see 
the phenomenon from ‘their point of view’.196 The conception of ‘NGelites’, in this 
sense, illuminates research participants’ conceptual structures and my interpretation of 
these.  
 
To further develop NGelites as a conceptual category, I now turn to a succinct 
discussion on elite theories in sociology.  
 
                                                 
196 See Chapter III on Researching Democratisation on methodology for this thesis. 
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In writing about Pakistan’s highest tier of commercial, political and military elite, 
Armytage’s ethnographic research explores the role of ‘instrumental friendships’ – the 
specific patterns of elite socialising – as a strategy for perpetuating elite power in 
politically and economically unstable environments.197 The Pakistani elite, Armytage 
notes, is comprised of disparate groups – “the uppermost tier of politics, business, the 
bureaucracy and the military.”198 Over the past seventy years, these groups have 
retained their cohesiveness, privilege, wealth, political and military influence and hold 
over powerful institutions “in pursuit of their broader shared interests in maintaining 
structural inequalities from which they benefit….”199 These elite (mostly men) foster 
peer-to-peer relationships through pleasurable social activities including dinner parties, 
informal private gatherings and marriages between families. They make use of these 
‘spaces’ to tackle challenges to their business and political success. Furthermore, the 
Pakistani elite is comfortably familiar with the ‘political life of the nation’ or the 
national politics. They either personally serve in a political capacity, or are related to 
the elected political leaders, army generals and top-tier bureaucrats. Armytage argues 
that this “intimacy with politics … is one of the primary ingredients of ‘being elite’ in 
Pakistan.”200     
 
Armytage’s ethnographic exploration is illuminating. The reality of Pakistan’s political 
elite and its ‘intimacy with politics’ is known to most Pakistanis, including myself. 
However, the vivid account offered by Armytage on how the elite socialises, brings to 
the academic discussion a much needed sociological perspective to studying the 
complexity of democratisation in Pakistan. 
 
By the same token, I argue that much like the long existing political, military and 
bureaucratic elite in Pakistan, I see the emergence of a new sub-group of elites in the 
form of internationally funded NGOs in democratisation, whose ‘intimacy with 
politics’ is also an established practice. Lucratively funded, well positioned in the urban 
political scene and focused on strengthening procedural democracy, this NGO-elite 
operate as organisations. These organisations – whom I call the NGelites – are staffed 
                                                 
197 Armytage, R., (2015) The social lives of the elite: friendship and power in Pakistan. The Asia Pacific 
Journal of Anthropology, 16(5), pp.448-463. 
198 Ibid. p451. 
199 Ibid. p452. 
200 Ibid. p455. 
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with individuals who either belong to the existing social elite or the class of aspiring 
elite-entrepreneurs educated in top class educational institutions in Pakistan, the United 
Kingdom (UK) or the US. NGelites, like the other elite, also employ ‘instrumental 
friendships’ of elite socialising, as a strategy to establishing their power and influence 
in the existing elite circles. In the following brief discussion, I explore the ‘elite-ness’ 
of NGelites with reference to their autonomy, structure, values, social circulation and 
transformation. I will mainly (and broadly) draw upon the elite theories of Pareto and 
Mosca,201 Michels202, Mills203 and Bourdieu.204 
 
Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and Gaentano Mosca (1856-1941) are considered as the 
classical elite theorists. Portraying elite formations in modern societies as inescapable, 
Pareto and Mosca, both maintained that democratic systems based on free and open 
political participation for all are impossible because of the self-interested elites who 
would rule the demos as the governing elites.205 In Laswell’s words, “[t]he influential 
are those who get the most of what there is to get…. Those who get the most are elite; 
the rest are mass.”206 In this sense, elites can be identified in terms of their hold over 
the most formal political positions in a society, influence on other elite and capacity to 
make key political decisions. Pareto emphasised the psychological and intellectual 
supremacy of elites who possess the capacity to reach the highest positions, whereas 
Mosca believed that the elites are the organised ruling class in minority, having 
intellectual, moral and material superiority over the majority class that is ruled.207 
Michels (1876 – 1936) held that the majority is ruled because it lacks the ‘technical’ 
capacity to govern; a dominant class having such capacity is therefore, inevitable.208 
This technical governing leadership remains concerned with holding on to, and 
strengthening their power and control in social organisations – a technocratic and 
bureaucratic power structure for any organisation is the key to governing. 
                                                 
201 Meisel, J.H. ed., (1965) Pareto & Mosca. Prentice-Hall. 
202 Linz, J. J. (2017). Robert Michels, political sociology, and the future of democracy. Transaction 
Publishers. 
203 Mills, C.W., (1956) The power elite. Oxford University Press. 
204 Bourdieu, P., (1996) The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power.  Translated by Claugh, 
L.C. Stanford University Press. 
205 Meisel (n 201). 
206 Laswell, (1936) quoted in Dankwart, R., (July 1966) The study of elites: Who’s who, when and how. 
World Politics, 18 (3), pp690-717. p690.  
207 Meisel (n 201). 
208 Linz (n 202). 
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C. Write Mills (1916 – 1962) in his book ‘The Power Elite’ argues that in the US, the 
political power rests on the group of elites composed of three institutional hierarchies 
– political, military, and economic elites. According to Mills, the American elite is ‘not 
bound by one community’ and possesses control over the means of information and of 
power, both of which are centralised and ruled by it.209 Mills asserts “Whether or not 
they profess their power, their technical and political experience of it far transcends that 
of the underlying population.”210 This class of hierarchical and connected elite rules 
over ordinary men and women, because “they are in positions to make decisions having 
major consequences” which makes them some-what corrupt.211 The ordinary men and 
women feel that “they live in a time of big decisions; they know that they are not making 
any. Accordingly, as they consider the present as history, they infer that at its centre, 
making decisions or failing to make them, there must be an elite of power”.212  Politics, 
thus is reduced to an arena where power rests with very few and outside the reach of 
elected representatives.  
 
Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) refers to a social order in which elites are able to 
reproduce themselves, passing privileges to their children and families, for example in 
education.213 In such a social order, the dominant class or the social elite attends the 
best educational institutions known in the society and gains access to best social 
positions. Their ‘natural’ talent and intellect is highlighted by the elite-structured social 
order as it conceals the inherent social inequality of opportunity in the wider society.  
 
The above conceptions cohere the qualities of elite, as a relatively small dominant group 
of people who occupy a position of influence and privilege in a society; possess 
technical supremacy and political experience; have the power to make decisions; 
educated in superior educational institutions; and who pass these privileges to their 
children and families to reproduce themselves. They ‘circulate’ amongst each other as 
the reproduction of elite is not always hereditary – the elite allows entrance to the new 
elite and replaces the old to enable a certain social equilibrium and to keep in check any 
                                                 
209 Mills (n 203) pp3-4. 
210 Ibid. p3. 
211 Ibid. p4. 
212 Ibid. p5. 
213 Bourdieu (n 204). 
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possible rebellions to their power positions. In other words, the elite possess the 
capacity to co-opt the possible deviant sectors to secure itself. 
 
The internationally funded NGOs in democratisation (and their personnel as NGOs) in 
Pakistan, possess many characteristics of elites highlighted by these prominent 
theories.214 They have technical and bureaucratic power structures, political experience, 
material and psychological superiority over other NGOs and the wider civil society, 
and the ability to circulate amongst other elites. As NGelites, these organisations are 
more than often staffed by individuals who are educated in elite educational institutions 
in Pakistan or abroad. Though they claim to be (and perceived by other actors) as 
apolitical, it mainly refers to their impartiality in relation to specific ideological political 
position. Yet NGelites are ‘inherently political’ as they work towards procedural goals 
to establish democracy which benefits their vested interests in the historical, social and 
political context of Pakistan. Thus, the elite-ness of NGelites – though argued 




This chapter set out to explore the academic debates on NGOs in democratisation. By 
way of understanding theoretical and empirical debates on ‘defining’ and 
‘understanding’ the conceptions of democracy, constitutionalism, civil society and 
NGOs, I settled for the procedural and minimalist conceptions of democracy, 
constitutionalism and democratisation as advanced by O’Donnell and Schmitter within 
the transition theory paradigm.  
 
Acknowledging the diversity and conflicting conceptions of defining NGOs as part of 
the wider conception of civil society, I have argued that firstly, in understanding the 
nature (or agency) of civil society, one should domesticate it in its context – such a 
context is shaped by internal and external influences including the constraints of 
structures of power inherent in the practice of international aid and associated 
conditionalities. Secondly, I outlined the reasons for narrowing the focus on studying 
                                                 
214 Chapters V and VI of this thesis offer a detailed empirical study of NGOs in democratisation in 
Pakistan as elite actors. 
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NGOs as part of the civil society. In this sense, NGOs as organisations aim to promote 
democracy by shaping government policy and legislation; are recognised for advancing 
public interest and related causes including human rights, minorities and women’s 
issues; and are engaged in election monitoring; legislative strengthening and 
accountability support; anti-corruption research; citizenship education, and other “good 
things” that contribute to promoting democracy. NGOs are officially established; 
registered within the state law; run by employed staff (urban professionals or 
expatriates); well-supported either by domestic or international funding; and are often 
relatively large and well-resourced as compare to other civil society groups. 
 
After clarifying the definitional and conceptual boundaries, I undertook a review of 
critical literature on the nature and roles of NGOs in democratisation in the global 
South. I argued that most critiques evaluate NGOs against the liberal benchmark of a 
‘good’ civil society. Such ‘normative framing’ of NGOs does not help with examining 
the ways NGOs do things and what that teach us about them. In this sense, the nature 
of internationally funded democratisation and the roles of NGOs in distinct spheres 
remain hidden. I contend further that in order to understand what NGOs in 
democratisation actually do, a contextual and methodological focus must leave aside 
normative framing of either appreciation or critical evaluation of NGOs. Instead, 
studying NGOs in democratisation should reveal empirical realities of the specifics of 
political context in a given democratising country. Thus, revealing empirical contextual 
reality of NGOs in democratisation forms the rationale for my research.  
 
Lastly, I articulated the theoretical contribution of this thesis. Informed by the lived 
experiences of NGOs in democratisation in the context of Pakistan, I have highlighted 
gaps in the existing democratic transition literature and its emphasis on the ‘resurrected’ 
civil society. With a particular reference to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transition theory 
I argue that contrary to how the roles of NGOs are conceptualised as generating norms 
for liberalisation; condemning and exposing regime’s corruption; and creating a general 
climate of rejecting the authoritarian regime, NGOs with international financial and 
ideological support in democratic transitions may in fact emerge as the elite of civil 
society. Yet similar to the ways in which bourgeoisie political and economic elite act 
in democratic transitions, NGOs may also – for vested interests – support the political 
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elite and push the processes of transition by advocating for a less radical and more 
procedural transition. I call them NGelites.  
 
To close this chapter, I bring insights from elite theories in sociology to begin to 
comprehend the nature of NGOs as elite actors. I show that the internationally funded 
NGOs in democratisation in Pakistan, possess many characteristics of elites highlighted 
by the prominent elite theories offered by Mosca, Michels, Mills and Bourdieu. 
 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the research methodology for this thesis. I will 
establish the usefulness of an interpretive and contextual approach to studying 
democratisation which enabled me to see and acknowledge the phenomenon of 
democratisation as it revealed itself in the lived experiences of NGOs and other 




Chapter III: Researching Democratisation  
In which hermeneutic phenomenology reveals itself as the research methodology. 
 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time.1 
 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, I have stated the reasons that underpin my 
motivation to explore and write about the roles of internationally funded NGOs in 
democratisation in Pakistan. I have stated that my motivation was essentially personal. 
I wished to arrive at crucial insights into the nature of democratisation in Pakistan and 
the roles of internationally funded NGOs in it. Since my motivation arose from my 
lived experience of working with NGOs in democratisation, I was naturally inclined to 
learn through the experiences of the research participants. I wanted to see their ways of 
seeing, engaging, assigning meanings to, and understanding of democratisation. This 
inclination of learning through the lived experiences, embedded my research firmly in 
the qualitative research domain.2 The dual questions that I asked myself then were: how 
do I seek a way to understand what the research participants do and how, what the 
research participants feel and why? And how could this lead me to understand the 
nature and meanings of democratisation?  
 
In learning through the lived experiences of the research participants, as well as through 
my own reflections, an epistemological stance was already taken. I needed to reflect, 
recognise and own it. I recognised that my research approach was going to be 
interpretive.3 Meanwhile, reviewing the existing academic literature on democratisation 
and the roles of NGOs in it, I was developing a critical sense of how the practice of 
                                                 
1 Eliot, T.S. (1943) Four Quartets. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1st edn. p59. 
2 See Silverman, D. (2000) Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, London: Sage. See also 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. (1990) Basics of Qualitative Research, Newbury Park: Sage. 
3 On interpretive qualitative research, see Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. (eds.) (1994) Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks:Sage; Denzin, N. K. (1989) Interpretive Interactionism (Applied 
Social Research Methods Series, Vol (16), Newbury Park, CA: Sage; Mason, J. (1996) Qualitative 
Researching, London: Sage. 
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democratisation is constructed in different contexts. Accordingly, the reality or 
ontology, of democratisation through NGOs was produced by the NGOs themselves 
and by other concerned actors. I learnt that I was going to deal with multiple realities, 
meanings and understandings of democratisation and that there was unlikely to be 
single explanation of my inquiry.4 What remained unexplored, however, was the 
methodology which coheres my inclinations and lays down a research path.  
 
To begin with, I chose the critical participatory action research (PAR). PAR aims at 
learning through conversations and communications of participants about the 
difficulties confronted by their social systems.5 Influenced by personal experience of 
working with NGOs, I idealised this approach for its ‘transformative’ potential.6 In 
other words, through this research, I wished to contribute to ‘de-imperialise 
democratisation’.7 However, once I immersed myself in the field, I had to rethink and 
eventually discard PAR. I had then little to no idea of another suitable methodology. 
This, for sure, presented a challenge (I will explain the reasons for discarding PAR 
shortly). What, in turn I learnt, was that undertaking research is a journey: I might have 
some idea to my destination, but the paths to destination are many. The path I take 
depends upon who I am, as a researcher but also as a person. In other words, my 
research has been a journey of self-exploration through gradual reflection; revealing at 
every step of the way, a new insight not only about my research but also about myself.  
 
Before I set out in detail the research methodology which I gradually came to choose – 
or rather it chose me – let me explain why I discarded PAR. I discarded PAR for 
methodological difficulties and a shift in my epistemological stance. Methodologically, 
though NGOs as research participants were willing to share their experiences, their busy 
work cultures had little space for any transformative intervention which required 
                                                 
4 For a comprehensive discussion, see Vasilachis de Gialdino, I. (2009) Ontological and Epistemological 
Foundations of Qualitative Research, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 10(2), Art. 30. 
5 Kemmis, S. (2008) Critical Theory and Participatory Action Research, in Reason, P. and Bradbury 
(2008) (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice, 2nd edn, 
London: Sage Publications Ltd, pp: 121-138. 
6 Sarantakos, S. (1998) Social Research, 2nd edn, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
7Tully, J. (2008) The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy in Loughlin, M. and Walker, N. 
(eds.) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp: 315-358.I wanted to not only find meanings but also to build solidarity in resolving 
problems associated with the problems of demcocratisation. See Bohman, J. (2005) Critical Theory in 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (First published Tue Mar 8, 2005), Available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/critical-theory/ (Accessed: 17 Jan 2014). 
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involving all the staff and board members over a considerable period. Logistically, this 
was difficult to achieve given the duration of the fieldwork (eight months) and the level 
of participation required. Moreover, the sensitive political nature of the research, 
involving questions regarding perceptions and meanings of democracy in Pakistan and 
the influence of international funding for democratisation, meant that the NGOs’ 
personnel were apprehensive to share their thoughts amongst the staff and other actors.8 
My epistemological stance was also shifting; whilst I firmly stayed within learning 
through lived experiences, I was keener to understand deeper meanings than to bring 
about transformation.9 PAR was restricting my pursuit. 
 
It gradually became clear to me that I was seeking to understand the nature and 
meanings of democratisation, through the lived experiences of NGOs involved in 
promoting democracy. The phenomenon in question, was revealing itself in my 
interactions with the research participants through conversations. It is in this way, I 
believe, that phenomenology chose me; I was already guided by it even though I was 
not academically aware of it. Whilst in the field, I kept working with this approach 
applying research methods including undertaking semi-structured interviews, 
observations and writing memos. Upon returning to the University, at a discussion with 
my supervisors about the challenges I had faced, Professor Saward suggested a book 
entitled ‘At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails’ authored 
by Sarah Bakewell.10 Reading it, I felt that I was situated within that approach – I was 
also in that ‘Café’. Further explorations led me to read about Heidegger11, Sartre12, 
                                                 
8 During the initial phase of research with a few NGOs, I noticed that they were reluctant to involve their 
board members or share their programme contracts with funding agencies to inform the research. 
9 I felt that for any transformation in social systems, one must first know these and the associated 
problems as closely as possible. 
10 Bakewell, S., (2016) At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails with Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Edmund Husserl, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Others. New York: Other Press.  
11 Heidegger, M. (1988) The basic problems of phenomenology; Edited by Hofstadter, A. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press; Heidegger, M. (1962) Being and time; Translated by Macquarrie, J. and 
Robinson. E. Cornwall: Blackwell Publisher; Heidegger, M. (1971) Poetry, language, thought; 
Translated by Hofstadter, A. New York: HarperCollins. 
12 Sartre, J.P (1965) Nausea; Translated by R. Baldick.  Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
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Merleau-Ponty13, Gadamer14 and van Manen.15 Phenomenology, as a philosophy and 
methodology, frames this research. In the rest of this chapter, I discuss it in detail. 
 
The chapter has three sections and it unfolds in the following fashion. Following this 
introduction, section one provides an overview of phenomenology with reference to 
hermeneutic phenomenology. I briefly discuss its origin and characteristics and 
examine the epistemological, ontological and axiological orientations. The purpose of 
this section is to draw philosophical insights for conceptualising a framework for the 
research. Section two discusses the style of writing in phenomenology and its adoption 
for writing in this thesis. I discuss reasons for constructing the narrative in an evocative, 
reflexive and personalised manner. I also elaborate research methods with an emphasis 
on bracketing common sense; conducting interviews; producing thick descriptions and 
illuminating the essences through themes and interpretation. In section three, I develop 
an autobiographical tale about how and why I became interested in this research. The 
aim is to outline reasons for my pursuit and expose my assumptions. In the same 
section, I also discuss the research participants. I conclude by highlighting the 
suitability of hermeneutic phenomenology for this research.  
 
Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Phenomenology 
Origin and characteristics  
Phenomenology encompasses both a philosophical movement and a range of research 
approaches.16 It was developed before and during the First World War (1914-1918) 
when Europe ‘was shaken to its roots’ and the ideologies of capitalism and 
enlightenment were in deep turmoil for not explaining the causes or solutions to the 
                                                 
13 Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962) Phenomenology of perception. London:Routledge.  
14 Gadamer, H.G. (2008) Philosophical hermeneutics. Transladed and Edited by D.E. Linge,Berkely: 
University of California Press;  Gadamer, H.G. (2004) Truth and method, 2nd revised edn. Translation 
revised by J. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marsh, London: Continuum.  
15 van Manen, M., (2016) Researching lived experience: Human science for an action sensitive 
pedagogy. Routledge; Manen, M., (2007) Phenomenology of practice. Phenomenology & Practice, 1(1); 
van Manen, M. ed., (2003) Writing in the dark: Phenomenological studies in interpretive inquiry. Left 
Coast Press; van Manen, M., (1997) From meaning to method. Qualitative health research, 7(3), pp.345-
369; van Manen, M., (1984) “Doing” Phenomenological Research and Writing: An Introduction, 
Monograph No.7, Curriculum Praxis, University of Alberta. 
16 Kafle, N.P., (2013) Hermeneutic phenomenological research method simplified. Bodhi: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal, 5(1), pp.181-200. 
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wreckage of war.17 Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938), the German philosopher, developed 
phenomenology as a philosophical approach to offer ‘absolute certainty’ to the 
decaying European society.18 To be sure, though Husserl is commonly known to have 
initiated phenomenology as a philosophical movement,  the term phenomenology can 
be referred back to Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) with his ‘distinction between the 
phenomenon or appearance of reality in consciousness, and the noumenon or being of 
reality in itself’.19 According to Kant, we only know about a phenomenon through the 
means of our consciousness of it. Noumenon remains to be ‘not known’.20 In this sense, 
reality is never fully known.  
 
Husserl was opposed to Kant’s dualism in the understanding of reality. He called for a 
return of attention to the ‘things themselves’; to set aside abstract notions of reality 
outside human experience and study a phenomenon ‘as it presents itself to my 
experience’.21 In this sense, phenomenology frees us to talk about our experiences, as 
they are lived, without having to look for abstract theoretical explanations. Husserl’s 
response to Kant’s dualism asserted that the lived experience presents itself as the only 
reality.22 By digging deep and getting to the heart of that lived experience – through our 
consciousness of it – the phenomenon appears as we find reality. The method to do this 
is to set aside our presumptions and abstract thoughts and to be free from their influence 
on our interpretation of the experience.23 Moreover, Husserl viewed consciousness as 
an “intentional and co-constituted dialogue between a person and the world”.24  
 
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) agreed to Husserl’s ‘reality as the lived experience’ to 
a degree. He conceded that human life is a practical affair in which reality reveals itself 
but contended the idea of setting aside presumptions to be free from their influences.25 
Heidegger maintained that this ‘setting aside’ was a fatal mistake: “Husserl had 
                                                 
17 Groenewald, T., (2004) A phenomenological research design illustrated. International journal of 
qualitative methods, 3(1), pp.42-55; Laverty, S.M., 2003. Hermeneutic phenomenology and 
phenomenology: A comparison of historical and methodological considerations. International journal of 
qualitative methods, 2(3), pp.21-35.  
18 Bakewell (n 10); Lester, S., (1999) An introduction to phenomenological research. 
19 Lauer, Q., (1958) Phenomenology: its genesis and prospect. Harper, Fordham University Press, New 
York. p1-2 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Lester (n 18); Groenewald (n 17). 
24 Laverty (n 17). 
25 Kafle (n 16). 
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bracketed out the wrong thing. He bracketed out Being, the one thing which is 
indispensable”.26 For Heidegger it is this everydayness of our lives, constrained by our 
presumptions and abstract thoughts, with all the influences of lifeworld27 that presents 
itself in the reality of our experience. We cannot rise above these influences because 
we are thrown in the world which is already full of them. In this sense, our lifeworld is 
the starting point to the study of reality as we experience it.28 
 
Gunter Figal notes that in phenomenology, “there is a tendency, perhaps even a 
necessity to be hermeneutical.”29 Hermeneutic phenomenology is also concerned with 
the lifeworld or human experience as it is lived.30 But it is Heidegger’s emphasis on 
consciousness, inseparable from the lifeworld, which gives hermeneutic 
phenomenology a distinct edge from that of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology. 
For Heidegger, our consciousness of reality is formed through our historically lived 
experience. In Being and Time, Heidegger develops a concept of phenomenon as an 
‘event’ that ‘shows itself’.31 A self-disclosure of the ‘historicity’ and ‘situatedness’ or 
one’s background, helps with the intentional co-constitution of a dialogue with one’s 
self to get to the essence of the phenomena.32 It is the ‘indissoluble unity’ between a 
person and the world.33  
 
It is here that hermeneutic phenomenology takes a shape as a method of research. Its 
application requires the observer or researcher to be aware of her own background or 
historicity in addition to the awareness of the fore-structures or situatedness of the 
observed event. In other words, researcher’s background is bound to influence her 
                                                 
26 Bakewell (n 10) p65. 
27 By the term ‘lifeworld’ I understand a world, which we as human beings are conscious of, as existing 
precisely through our 'living together’. A world that is given to us all, is dynamic and constantly 
functioning, and which we all shape. The concept of lifeworld was introduced by Edmund Husserl in 
early 1930s, and was further developed by Martin Heidegger and Alfred Schutz. The lifeworld coheres 
our experiences, in the sense that it is that background on which all things appear as themselves and 
meaningful. It is a dynamic background in which we live, and which lives with us in the sense that 
nothing can appear in our lifeworld except as lived. See Heidegger, 1988 (n 11).  
28 Heidegger, 1962 (n 11)  
29 Figal, G. Hermeneutical Phenomenology., in Zahavi, D. ed., (2012) The Oxford handbook of 
contemporary phenomenology. Oxford Handbook on Phenomenology. Published online in 2013 
available at 
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/978019959490
0.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199594900-e-26, accessed on 24 September 2016 
30 Ibid., Laverty (n 17). 
31 Heidegger, 1962 (note 11).  
32 Kafle (n 16) p187. 
33 Koch.,1995 quoted in Laverty (n 17).  
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interpretation of the lived experience which she is observing.34  Interpretation thus 
becomes the essential task for hermeneutic phenomenological research. Heidegger 
extends it by arguing that the language, with which one engages with the everyday 
experience of lifeworld, is another inseparable aspect of interpretation to arrive at an 
understanding of a phenomenon.35  
 
The element of language and its necessity in interpretation within hermeneutic 
phenomenology is then advanced by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). For Gadamer, 
hermeneutics was more than merely developing a procedure of understanding; rather it 
starts from the premise that the observer who is seeking to understand a phenomenon, 
has an existing bond with the subject matter; a bond that comes into language through 
the text and description of the observed phenomenon. For Gadamer, “language becomes 
the medium in which understanding occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting”36 
and so it is language which reveals being.37 He further asserts that “[n]ot just 
occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author”.38 In this sense, 
interpretation of a phenomenon is an ever evolving process; it is unlikely to acquire a 
definitive interpretation or an absolute understanding of it.39 For Gadamer, ‘prejudice’40 
of presumptions and historicity as well as the bonds of language that exist between the 
observer and the observed text, are the necessary conditions of knowing a phenomenon.  
 
Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) stitched an existentialist turn to hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Living through the social, cultural and political disorder during and 
after Second World War, Sartre felt responsible for not just describing and interpreting 
the lived experience, but also ensuring that it is conducted with an attached, interested, 
engaged and evocative standpoint.41 It was believed that certain phenomena only show 
                                                 
34 Laverty (n 17) p9. 
35 Heidegger, 1971 (n 11). 
36 Gadamer, 2004 (n 14) p384. 
37 Ibid. Also see Sloan, A. and Bowe, B. (2014) Phenomenology and Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The 
Philosophy, The Methodologies and Using Hermeneutic Phenomenology to Investigate Lecturers’ 
Experience of Curriculum Design, Quality and Quantity, 48(3), pp: 1291-1303. 
38 Gadamer, 2004 (n 14) p296. 
39 Ibid.  
40 Ibid. 
41 For Sartre, writing was a form of ‘acting in the world’ as it produces effects for which the author must 
assume responsibility. Rejecting “art for art's sake,” Sartre insisted on the social responsibility of the 
artist and the intellectual in general. See Flynn, T. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/sartre/>. 
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themselves to the one who is engaged with the world ‘in a right kind of way’.42 In this 
sense, being human is not just something that ‘I am’ automatically but something that 
‘I seek to be’ and at liberty to be.43 With regards to the method of writing, the 
existentialist turn gave phenomenological movement a literary and artistic rigour. In 
this sense, writing ‘artistically’ carried a special power of communicating without 
alienating the reader. 44 Such writing has a gift-appeal in which the writer invites the 
reader to engage and realises the possibilities that the text offers.45 In other words, the 
reader responds to the text by an act of re-creation as a mutual relationship develops 
between the reader and the text.  
 
Kafle argues that the primacy of being has also been discussed historically in the 
literatures of eastern origin.46 However, it is inadequately explored in research 
discourse. The idea, central to phenomenology is that truth has multiple existences, and 
therefore multiple interpretations. Similar understanding is held in the eastern traditions 
including Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism. These debates are mostly theological with a 
focus on the ‘divine’ nature of truth (the ‘being’ of higher god) and existence of cosmos. 
This divine truth exists independent of the individual or practiced truths of the world, 
which are valid and multiple but possess a secondary value as compare to the divine 
truth.  
 
More recently, Max van Manen (1942-) has been developing the hermeneutic 
phenomenological research approach with a focus on language and art of writing.47 He 
summarises it with following characteristics: it is a study of lived experience, of a 
lifeworld as we immediately experience it; it asks for the very nature of the 
phenomenon, for that which makes a “thing” what it is. In this sense, it is the study of 
essences; it is a project of thoughtfulness – a mindful wondering about what it means 
to live a life; sociocultural and historical traditions give meanings to the lifeworld, 
therefore hermeneutic phenomenology searches for what it means to be human; and 
finally, for van Manen, interpreting and writing phenomenological research is a 
                                                 
42 Warthal, 2006 quoted by Kafle (n 16) p188.  
43 Bakewell (n 10).  
44 Flynn (n 41). 
45  Denzin, Norman. K. (1989) ‘Interpretive Interactionism: Applied Social Research Methods Series 
Vol 16’. Sage. 
46  Kafle (n 16) pp184-185. 
47 van Manen, 1984 (n 15).  
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poetising activity which is ever-evolving with no definitive conclusions. Sartre’s notion 
of artistic writing as an act of re-creation between the reader and the text is relevant 
here.   
 
To summarise the above discussion, I refer to Finlay who states that hermeneutic 
phenomenological research is the study of the nature and meanings of a phenomenon 
in which a researcher aims at providing rich description of a lived experience, 
accentuated by her interpretation to illuminate its essence that makes what it is.48  
  
Ontological, epistemological and axiological orientation  
Hermeneutic phenomenological research is structured within the constructivist 
interpretive paradigm which aims to understand the complex world of lived experience 
from the view of those who lived it.49  Ontologically, therefore, reality is perceived as 
constructed: just as the lived experience is dependent on multiple situations and 
influences, hermeneutic phenomenology rests on the belief that reality is not ‘out there’ 
but an intangible construction and context dependent.50 
 
With regards to the question of ‘how do we know this reality?’ hermeneutic 
phenomenology understands reality through human experience and perception whereas 
knowledge is created through interaction between and among the researcher and 
respondents.51 Thus, epistemologically it is inter-subjective and interpretive. And 
finally, an axiological orientation of the researcher in hermeneutic phenomenological 
investigations is driven by her values and attachment to the subject.52  
 
Researching and Writing hermeneutic phenomenology  
In researching and writing in the frame of hermeneutic phenomenology, I am guided 
by Max van Manen 53 and Norman K.Denzin.54 Langdridge asserts that van Manen’s 
                                                 
48 Finlay, L., 2009. Debating phenomenological research methods. Phenomenology & Practice, 3 (1), 6-
25.  
49 Racher, F.E. and Robinson, S., (2003) Are phenomenology and postpositivism strange bedfellows?. 
Western Journal of Nursing Research, 25(5), pp.464-481. 
50 Ibid. Also see Denzin and Lincoln (n 3). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Kafle (n 16). 
53 van Manen  (n 15). 
54 Denzin (n 45).  
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approach follows Gadamer’s with a focus on how language reveals being or phenomena 
within some historical and cultural contexts.55 In this sense, the following discussion 
on phenomenological research and writing has an implicit acceptance of 
phenomenology as hermeneutical. Denzin’s ‘Interpretive Interactionism’ on the other 
hand, offers a mode of qualitative research to “make the world of lived experience 
directly accessible to the reader.”56 In other words, lived experience is brought to life 
in writing with rich descriptive detail including thoughts and feelings of the persons, 
act or phenomenon involved. In so doing, the author “brings the reader into the 
situation.”57 
 
van Manen provides a path to phenomenological research, which is a dynamic 
interplay of the following procedural activities:  
a) turning to a phenomenon which seriously interests us and 
commits us to the world; 
b) investigating experience as it is lived rather than as we 
conceptualise it;  
c) reflecting on the essential themes which characterise the 
phenomenon; and 
d) describing the phenomenon through the art of writing and 
rewriting.58 
With an emphasis on lived experience, let me first sketch my understanding of it.  
 
Understanding ‘lived experience’ 
The term ‘lived experience’ may at first seem superfluous; after all, “What an 
experience might be if it were not lived.”59 Burch reminds us, however, that the term 
‘lived experience’ must be understood in its German etymological roots to appreciate 
how it is discussed in phenomenology. Derived from the German word, Er-lebnis, lived 
                                                 
55 Langdridge, D., (2007) Phenomenological psychology: Theory, research and method. Pearson 
Education. 
56 Denzin (n 45) p10. 
57 Denzin (n 45) p13. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Burch, R., (1990) ‘Phenomenology, lived experience: taking a measure of the topic’. Phenomenology 
+ Pedagogy, 8, 130–60. Available at 
https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/pandp/index.php/pandp/article/view/15137/11958 accessed 3 June 
2017. 
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experience is that which “unfolds and endures from life by virtue of life itself”.60 Lived 
experience does not only consist in what is felt and lived by the observed beings in a 
specified time, but also what is meaningfully understood, singled out and preserved by 
it.61 This means that an understanding of lived experience is retrospective and reflexive; 
it refers to the “process of turning back on oneself and looking at what has been going 
on.”62  
 
Alfred Schutz introduced the notion of reflexivity in phenomenology.63 Schutz argues 
that we gain knowledge of the everyday world through our empirical sensory 
perceptions and employ socially constructed concepts to organise and interpret them, 
resulting in our lived experience.64 This suggests that in attaching meanings to actions, 
the already lived experiences are meaningful.65 Furthermore, reflexivity for lived 
experience is not merely a process of attaching meaning to our own actions. It also 
involves interpreting the actions of others.66  However, the genuine understanding of 
other self may require us to begin with reflecting on our own lived experience.67 
Conceding to this assertion, later in this chapter, I present an autobiographical tale of 
my experience of working with an NGO, which was focused on promoting democracy 
in Pakistan. It serves as my entry-point for this research and helps me to reflect on the 
lived experiences of the research participants. 
 
I now turn to van Manen’s four procedural activities and their dynamic interplay that 
guided my research. Firstly, I outline how I became interested in the phenomena of 
democratisation and the roles of NGOs in it. I then discuss methods of investigating 
lived experience employed in this research. These include conducting interviews, 
making observations, bracketing assumptions and producing thick descriptions. Next, 
I discuss adopting a thematic structure and interpretation process. And lastly, I discuss 
writing artistically for this thesis. 
                                                 
60 Ibid. p133. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., (2017) Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis: Elements of 
the sociology of corporate life. Routledge. p244. 
63 Alfred Schutz (1967) quoted in Calhoun, C., Gerteis, J. Moody, J. Pfaff, S. and Virk, Indermohan. eds. 
(2002) Contemporary Social Theory. ‘Introduction to Part V – The Sociological Theory of Anthony 







When the phenomenon calls  
I can recall my interest in the phenomena of democratisation and the role of civil society 
in it from a very early age.68 However, I started to reflect on it seriously when I began 
working with Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency 
(PILDAT) in Pakistan during 2004-2005. It still took me another eight years to 
articulate questions for the academic pursuit.69 Initially, I wanted to explore the role(s) 
of NGOs in democratisation and constitutionalism in Pakistan. Subsequently, I began 
to question more in-depth about the nature and meanings of democratisation (foremost) 
and of constitutionalism and civil society (as related concerns). Phenomenological 
inquiry requires a commitment to an abiding concern. In my case, democratisation 
became such a concern. This in turn requires deep questioning, a kind of 
‘thoughtfulness’ that Heidegger refers to as a “single thought till it stands like a star in 
the world’s sky.”70  
 
For such a pursuit, gathering deep information becomes crucial. It is also crucial to 
establish a good level of rapport and empathy to gain such information.71 This proved 
not so difficult – ever since I left Pakistan in 2005, I had maintained links with PILDAT. 
Through friends in Pakistan, I also knew other actors in NGOs, academics, politicians 
and journalists that were engaged in promoting and/or writing about democracy and 
NGOs in Pakistan. They offered to help in selecting research participants.72 Whilst still 
in the UK, on recommendations, I began to contact the prospective research 
participants. However, my emails did not yield any response. I shared my concerns with 
a friend in an NGO, who reminded me, that in Pakistan it is really the ‘presence’ of the 
person which counts. I needed to be there to be able to engage and involve people.  
 
I began my fieldwork in January 2015 which lasted until July 2015. I paid a follow-up 
visit during July-August 2016. I conducted 36 interviews in total. To observe the daily 
                                                 
68 See biographical tale in Section 3. 
69 Meanwhile, I continued to work with the civil society both in Pakistan and in the UK. 
70 Heidegger, 1971 (n 11) p4. 
71 Groenewald (n 17). 
72 In this sense, the selection of participants was based on the theoretical sampling model developed by 
Glaser and Strauss. Representatives in the research are identified based on prior or emerging knowledge 
about the phenomena under study. See Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) cited by Flick, U., 
2014. An introduction to qualitative research. Sage. 
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workings of NGOs, I requested PILDAT who generously agreed and provided me the 
space at their office for nearly two months during April-June 2015. I conducted two 
focus group discussions with two NGOs’ staff members. In total, I spoke with 45 people 
including 27 NGO personnel; four politicians; six academics; three journalists; and five 
international donor and intermediary fund management organisations’ 
representatives.73  
 
I interviewed people in three cities including Lahore, Islamabad and Karachi.74 It was 
not always straightforward to arrange meetings. By nature of their work, meetings with 
politicians and donor agencies proved to be the hardest to organise.75 I kept an excel 
worksheet to record appointments and meetings.76 It often happened that scheduled 
meetings in Islamabad were cancelled at the last minute when I had already travelled 
there from Lahore where I was based. Such cancellations were unavoidable and were 
only to be endured.77  
 
Building trust through interaction: the interviews  
To make sense of others’ lived experience, one-to-one interaction is essential as it helps 
with the social situatedness of the researcher in the culture of the observed.78 In this 
sense, semi-structured or open-ended interviewing is a collaborative effort between the 
interviewer and interviewee: framing of questions and responses to the questions 
generate a reciprocal ‘give-and-take’ understanding as meanings emerge during the 
course of the interview.79 The inter-subjectivity came at play in our conversations 
through the use of probes and follow-up questions.  
 
                                                 
73 I provide the details about participants in Section 3. 
74 See Chapter I. The focus of my research is on internationally funded NGOs that are mostly based in 
cities. Some of them have regional and local sub-offices. 
75 In some instances, I had to chase their personal assistants for weeks before they finally offered an 
appointment, some of which were then cancelled and rescheduled. 
76 The worksheet listed the number of people I have contacted; the number of positive and negative 
responses; meetings agreed, cancelled and rescheduled; places where meetings were to be held; 
participants’ contact details and the number of time I called them. 
77 This proved difficult since it is a long journey on road, especially when my six-year old daughter was 
accompanying me every time I had interviews in Islamabad. I am very grateful to my friends in 
Islamabad for their hospitality and support, especially in taking care of my daughter when I was busy 
interviewing.   




With the impossibility to offer ready-made questions, van Manen suggests letting the 
interviewee think of a specific instance, situation, person or event to then probe with 
the ‘how’ and ‘who’ questions.80 The probing should encourage interviewees to 
describe the ‘feel’ of the event or situation.81 I would begin by asking concrete question 
e.g. ‘What does your NGO do in promoting democracy? Research participants would 
usually describe their activities – projects and programmes with the details of what, 
who, where, how and to certain extent why.82 These responses would stay basic at first 
but the purpose of this specificity was to open-up the space for conversation. Once the 
conversations were established, I would bring in the questions of how do they ‘feel’ 
about NGOs’ ‘democratisation activities’ in the context of Pakistan? Or how, in their 
opinion, NGOs have contributed (or not contributed) to democratisation in Pakistan? 
The salience of historicity would naturally come to play as the participants attempted 
at understanding their own place in the history of democratisation in Pakistan. Most 
interviews followed a pattern in which the participants would begin with straight 
forward responses. However, once the trust would be established between us, they 
would open-up and conversations would take shape. The main goal of 
phenomenological research, as distinct from other qualitative research, “remains 
oriented to asking of what is the nature of this phenomenon (‘democratisation’ in this 
thesis) as an essentially human experience.”83 This, however, was the question that I 
directed at the text of the transcriptions more than to the participants at the time of 
interviews. However, for some key participants, I phrased the question of ‘nature of the 
phenomenon’ during my follow-up visit.  
 
Whilst facilitating the interviews, I stayed patient and silent to create an atmosphere of 
listening.84 Occasionally, however, to establish a reciprocal conversation, I shared 
insights from my own experience which helped developing the dynamics of trust 
between the participant and myself, as well as filled the odd occurrences of silence.85 
With participants’ permissions, I tape-recorded all interviews and focus group 
                                                 
80 van Manen, 1984 (n 15). 
81 As I stated previously, I was not guided by the techniques of interviews in phenomenology per se, but 
the qualitative research method’s training in the first year of PhD guided me in conducting interviews. 
In engaging with the research participants, I would broadly introduce the topic of research. 
82  I found that generally it comes easy to most people to list activities. 
83 van Manen, 1984 (n 15) p18. 
84 Gubrium (n 78). 
85 Denzin (n 45) p43.  
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discussions. It was not always possible to transcribe the interviews soon after they were 
held, therefore, I wrote reflective memos on the experience of interviews including 
details about how I felt about the environment and participants’ responses to our 
meetings. I subsequently transcribed 28 interviews and two focus group discussions. 
For the rest, I took detailed notes. 
 
As a general principle, phenomenological research is guided by ‘minimum structure 
and maximum depth’.86  Merleau-Ponty calls it ‘the study of essences’.87 van Manen 
opines that a good description reveals the essence of a lived experience “in such fashion 
that we are now able to grasp the nature and significance of this experience in a hitherto 
unseen way.”88 He further guides that the essence is achieved when the researcher 
attempts to creatively capture the phenomenon “in a linguistic description that is both 
holistic and analytical, evocative and precise, unique and universal, powerful and 
eloquent.”89 The following assertion explains the dynamics between description and 
interpretation: 
 
[I]t is not enough to simply recall experiences others or I may have had with 
respect to particular phenomenon. Instead I must recall the experience in such a 
way that the essential aspects, the meaning structure of this experience as lived 
through, are brought back, as it were, and in such a way that we recognise this 
description as a possible human experience, which means as a possible 
interpretation of that experience. This then is the task of phenomenological 
research and writing: to construct a possible interpretation of the nature of a 
certain human experience.90 
 
Bracketing common sense 
Before I allude further on the nature of description and interpretation (with reference to 
my research), a significant task in hermeneutic phenomenology needs attention. It is 
the task of explication of assumptions and pre-understandings. Phenomenological 
inquiry demands that we approach the phenomenon of study in such manner that our 
                                                 
86 Lester (n 18). 
87 Merleau-Ponty (n 13). 
88 van Manen, 1984 (n 15). 
89 van Manen, 1984 (n 15) p6. 
90 van Manen , 1984 (n 15) p7. van Manen’s emphasis. 
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‘common sense’, presumptions, assumptions, existing body of knowledge including our 
everyday knowledge do not obscure our gaze into the essence of the phenomenon. It 
calls for the ‘suspension’ or ‘bracketing’ of existing beliefs and knowledge. Recalling 
the discussion earlier on the characteristics of hermeneutic phenomenology, and 
Heidegger’s insistence that being of a phenomenon resides in the everydayness of lived 
experience, I am guided by van Manen that the best way for explication is to ‘see’ and 
‘make explicit’ the existing beliefs and knowledge.91 The purpose of this action is to 
reveal the ‘shallowness’ with which we see the world and our phenomena.92  
 
In my experience, this explication of existing knowledge happened in two stages. 
Firstly, I reviewed the existing academic literature on democratisation and NGOs 
(within the wider debates on civil society). I noticed that the majority of books and 
articles were ‘framed’ within the liberal conceptions of constitutional democracy which 
take the roles of NGOs in democratisation as self-evidently positive. This lack of 
critical and a-contextual focus, was not helpful to reflect upon the ways NGOs do things 
and what that tells us about them. Thus, the nature of democratisation and the roles of 
NGOs remain hidden. On Pakistan, I found a few books and articles (specifically) on 
democratisation which advocate for and on behalf of NGOs (it seems) for their 
inevitability for democracy. The same was true for the literature (official documents 
and publications) produced by the NGOs in Pakistan.93 No matter how compelling those 
researches are, they did not help me get closer to understanding democratisation in the 
context of Pakistan. In questioning the inadequacies of literature, I recognised not only 
the limits of prevalent views, but also the manner in which I was personally inclined to 
question these.  I understood that for a contextual focus, one must leave aside normative 
framing of either appreciation or evaluation of NGOs against liberal benchmarks of 
democracy and civil society. In this sense, I contribute methodologically for studying 
democratisation by focusing on how it is experienced by its main actors.94 
 
                                                 
91 van Manen, 1984 (n 15) p9. 
92 Ibid. 
93 In their role to promote democracy, PILDAT, FAFEN and some other NGOs have published a good 
number of research reports and briefing papers on the problems of democratisation in Pakistan. These 
are available on their websites.  
94 Teorell, J., 2010. Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–
2006. Cambridge University Press.p156. 
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I took the challenge of explication once again when I set to transcribe and develop thick 
descriptions. Gadamer advises the researchers “to keep one’s gaze fixed on the thing 
throughout all the constant distractions that originate in the interpreter (researcher) 
himself.”95 I kept reminding myself that I, as a researcher, needed to ‘stay’ within the 
words spoken and read, whilst being sensitive to the historical situatedness of 
participants’ described lived experiences. Whilst writing, I made links between the 
thick descriptions based on transcriptions and existing literature but only to an extent 
that participants’ understanding of the phenomenon is highlighted.  
 
Illuminating the essence: conducting thematic analysis and interpretation  
Munch asserts that in order to understand the meaning of action we must “identify the 
sense of the action as intended by the actor and recognise the context in which the action 
belongs and makes sense.”96 In other words, the ‘intent of the actor’ and ‘the context in 
which the action belongs’, become the focus of exploration. van Manen advises that 
this exploration requires the researcher to “borrow” the lived experience(s) of the 
actor(s) in the research.97 The actors’ retrospective reflections on their experiences 
“illuminate deeper meanings or significance of an aspect of human experience, in the 
context of the whole of human experience.”98 So, in the phenomenological investigation 
of the experience of democratisation, I wish to understand what being an NGO 
personnel is like for individual participants, and therefore, by an extension, the 
possibilities for the wider civil society in democratising Pakistan.99 
 
To achieve this ‘parts-to-whole’ understanding, following conversations (interviews) 
and reflective memos, the next step was to produce thick descriptions. Going beyond 
facts and surface appearances, a thick description “presents detail, context, emotion, 
and the webs of social relationships that join persons to one another.”100  It should allow 
a ‘space’ where the voices of the participants can be heard, feelings can be felt, and 
through the reciprocal sharing of views between the interacting individuals, meanings 
                                                 
95 Gadamer, 2004 (n 14). 
96 Munch .P.A (1975) quoted in Ritzer, G. (1996). Sociological Theory, McGraw-Hill Book Co. 
Singapore. p116 
97 van Manen 1984 (n 15) p16. 
98 Ibid. 
99 In making this assertion, I am guided by van Manen’s discussion on parenting. Ibid. 
100 Denzin (n 45) p83. 
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emerge. It “re-creates a historical situation”101 based on the facts but offers more than 
mere facts – it offers the ‘feeling’ of that situation as lived by the research participants. 
 
I produced thick descriptions by first transcribing the recorded interviews. I re-listened 
to the recordings whilst also considering my reflective memos. In bringing these 
sources together, I began writing creatively putting in the elements of wonder, 
emotions, historical facts, the details of the place, time and feel of the setting in which 
the conversations were held. Laverty asserts that thick descriptions can include the 
researcher’s personal reflections as well as the depictions of the experience outside the 
research participants including the arts, such as poetry and painting related to but not 
limited to the context.102 In writing this thesis, I was inspired by the poetry of dissent 
in the context of Pakistan and have quoted some to contribute to the evocative style of 
writing. It was in the process of producing thick descriptions, ‘in interactional, 
relational, and biographical manner’103, that I began the task of interpretation.  
 
Interpretation is a process of giving meanings to the thickly described lived 
experience.104 It is important to note that interpretation of lived experience brings to 
surface multiple meanings of the experience, therefore no experience will have the same 
meaning for two individuals.105 It is in this sense, that hermeneutic phenomenology 
stays deeply inter-subjective; not only between the researcher/writer and the text that is 
being interpreted, but also between the reader and the final prose.  
 
In the process of developing thick descriptions, several revisions of the initial 
projections of meanings must be made.  Gadamer, in discussing hermeneutic circle 
refers to Heidegger’s proposed method of arriving at interpretations:  
The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the 
fore-projection (initial meanings as they emerge out of descriptions) 
is capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; 
rival projects can emerge side by side until it becomes clearer what 
the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions 
that are replaced by more suitable ones.106 
                                                 
101 Ibid. Denzin provides examples of thick description quoting the works of Geertz (1973) and Foucault 
(1979) among others. pp84-86.  
102 Polikinghorne 1989 quoted in Laverty (n 17) p18. 
103 Denzin (n 54) p101. 
104 Ibid  
105 Ibid. van Manen 1984 and 2016 (n 15). 
106 Gadamer, 2004 (n 14).  
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In such process of interpretation, the themes begin to emerge. Phenomenological 
themes, according to van Manen “are the structures of experience.”107 Through these 
themes, the ‘wholeness’ of meaning is illuminated. Themes allow the researcher to 
navigate through different understandings to arrive at the central idea and the meanings 
of the phenomenon. Hence, the process of hermeneutic circle is applied by the 
researcher through rigorous reading, reflective writing, and interpreting.108 
 
In responding to the primary and secondary research objectives of this thesis, I have 
given it a thematic structure. After listening to the recordings and reading the text 
several times, in producing thick descriptions, I asked myself “What statements or 
phrases seem particularly essential or revealing about the experience being 
described?”109 I highlighted these and noted their ‘commonality’ in various 
descriptions.110 I then lifted out phrases that captured the essential experiences and 
began to develop a thematic structure. 
 
The empirical part of this thesis is divided into two essential themes. In chapters 5 and 
6, I develop these themes as I interpret the nature of democratisation. I have written in-
parts creatively with the use of vignettes, biographical tales, and idiomatic phrases. The 
purpose of adopting the artistic expression is to grasp the essence of lived experience 
to not just ‘represent’ or ‘imitate’ the described experience, but to ‘transcend’ it in the 
act of reflection. An artistic text has a “reflective mood” which enriches the experiential 
lifeworld of human being; that is the goal of phenomenology.111  
 
Furthermore, interpretation must uncover theories that are often told in the form of 
stories.112 Theory in this sense, refers to the conceptual structures that inform 
participants’ actions, to see the phenomenon from ‘their point of view’.113 To illuminate 
such conceptual structures and cohere the two themes, in chapter VII, I present a 
                                                 
107 van Manen 1984 (n 15) p20. 
108 Laverty (n 17) p18. 
109 van Manen 1984 (n 15) p21. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. p23. 
112 Denzin (n 45) p110. 
113 Ibid. 
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vignette.114 Written as an autobiographical account of my meeting with an NGO 
personnel, this vignette is adapted from a number of interviews texts. As “symbolic 
expressions of lived experiences”,115 the vignette brings me, as a researcher, into the 
lived experience of democratisation. The main character is developed as a ‘composite 
character’ to combine the views expressed by a number of NGOs’ personnel. Thus, the 
character and setting of the vignette is fictionalised to imaginatively capture ‘thoughts’ 
and ‘feelings’ (theories) of the research participants. The vignette provides ‘a gaze’ into 
the nature of democratisation as it is lived by its actors. To develop vignettes and tales, 
I researched the sequence of events and places to develop their ‘setting’. I collected 
photos and journalistic information about the sites to re-create the detail as closely as 
possible. For example, for the vignette about a protest in Lahore, I collected photos, 
newspaper and magazine texts to narrate the event as it happened, whilst keeping the 
artistic expression and narrative style expected from a vignette.116  
 
The art of writing  
Writing in-part creatively brought to the fore challenges unknown to me. van Manen 
asserts that “to do the research, is to write”, to make contact with the things of our 
world.117 Our insights depend on the words we use, phrases, styles and traditions, 
metaphors and figures of speech. There is a bond that our written words create between 
us and the observed phenomenon. The words we use to communicate, develop yet 
another bond between the readers and the text of our research and writing. Writing 
creatively supports our endeavor to create this bond by reflecting deeply and 
communicating in a language which ‘makes sense’ to the readers in the context of 
research.  
 
Reading and experiencing phenomenological research and writing, I have come to 
believe that just as our research must be aware of the context and its ‘situated-ness’, our 
writing should also be sensitive, not only in terms of the context of the ‘lived event’ but 
also in how it is ‘spoken’ and ‘told’. I have tried to capture this in writing the thesis. I 
aimed at ‘seeing’ the phenomenon of democratisation, in ways with which it has not 
                                                 
114 Denzin notes that the ‘critical-biographical’ method formulated by C.M.Mills, Sartre, and Merleau-
Ponty, aims to build studies that make sense of the post-modern period of human experience. Ibid. p14. 
115 Ibid. p119. 
116 See Chapter 5 ‘From Resistance to Submission’. 
117 van Manen, 2003 (n 15) p237. 
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been seen before in academic literature. I also ‘integrate’ it into its semantic context (of 
Pakistan).118 With a use of vignettes and realistic biographical tales,119 I have written in 
an evocative manner for the textual representation of the lived experience of both the 
research participants and myself. My aim is to stimulate the readers’ imagination. The 
extent of my success in communicating the phenomenon of democratisation in 
Pakistan, depends on the readers and their interpretations of my writing.  
 
The quality and ethics of research 
 
This interpretive nature of phenomenological research brings me to the questions of its 
reliability, validity and rigour. In the absence of a universal criteria or agreed upon 
standards for assessing the quality of such research120, I follow van Manen who enlists 
orientation, strength, richness and depth as the quality concerns for conducting and 
writing phenomenological research.121 Accordingly: 
 
• My orientation (the abiding concern) to the phenomenon of democratisation is 
visible throughout my writing but specifically in the autobiographical tale 
presented in the next section. My interest in democratisation through NGOs 
reveals that it has been part of my being long before I became involved in its 
practice and research;  
 
• With the use of rich quotes, the essential themes give (hopefully) a convincing 
account of inherent meanings of the phenomenon as understood by the research 
participants;   
 
• the use of poetry, vignettes and biographical tales bring in the ‘reflective mood’ 
and enrich the narratives and perceptions of the research participants; and  
 
                                                 
118 Laverty (n 17). 
119 van Manen, 2003 (n 15). van Manen divides ethnographic writings that include the voice of research 
in three categories. In this thesis, I use one of these in constructing vignettes as realistic tales. Realistic 
tales follow a conventional style to represent lifelike representation of people, events, and the social and 
cultural world and adds the authoritative voice of the researcher in the text.  
120 Laverty (n 17); Kafle (n 16). 
121 van Manen, 2016 (n 15). 
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• the depth of the analysis attempts at expressing the intentions of the participants, 
as carefully and closely as possible. Additionally, the analytical rigour of the 
research has meant that all perspectives recorded are analysed and discussed in 
the research.122 
 
• To reiterate, the credibility of phenomenological research lies in its vivid and 
faithful description of the lived experience in a manner which ensures that the 
phenomenon is accurately identified and described.123 
 
With reference to the ethical concerns for conducting qualitative research, I have 
followed the standards proposed by Creswell124 and Sarantakos125 including clarifying 
the purpose and process of the research before interviews and where required sharing 
in writing what these involved; obtaining consent for tape-recordings, observations and 
examining of documents; and assigning assumed names or symbols to the participants 
to protect their privacy. 
 
The question of generalisability  
It is generally understood that phenomenological method makes no claims of 
generalisability.126 Denzin asserts that interpretive research approaches (that underpin 
phenomenological research) “…reject the impulse to abstract and generalise.”127 
However, van Manen offers a different understanding of the notion of generalisability. 
He posits that in phenomenological research, attention to the particular contributes to 
an understanding of the essences; whereas, “the essence of a phenomenon is a universal 
which can be described through a study of the structure that governs the instances or 
particular manifestations of the essence of a phenomenon.”128  
 
                                                 
122 Langdridge (n 55). 
123 Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G., (1985) Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75). Sage. 
124 Creswell, J.W., (2007) Five qualitative approaches to inquiry. Qualitative inquiry and research 
design: Choosing among five approaches, 2, pp.53-80. 
125 Sarantakos, S. (1998) Social Research. (2nd ed), Palgrave. 
126 Mottern, R. (2012) From Parzival to the Princess Bride: Generalizability in Phenomenological 
Research, Paper Presented at Tennessee Board of Regents: Qualitative Research Conference, Austin 
Peay State University, Clarkesville, October 15, Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/7587105/From_Parzival_to_the_Princess_Bride_Generalizability_in_Pheno
menological_Research (Accessed 2 July 2016).  
127 Denzin (n 45) p21. 
128 van Manen 2016 (n 15) p10. My emphasis. 
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In this sense, an adequate study of the structures – which underpin the formulation and 
articulation of the essence in its ‘lived quality and significance’ – could attain a 
“phenomenological nod” or an affirmation of its common understanding.129 It depends 
on the reader to validate whether the description rings true, and in so doing, the reader 
extends its generalisability.130 Furthermore, since the goal of phenomenology is to seek 
the essences or meanings of lived experience, the enquiry is not tied to an individual or 
group but is universal, and therefore generalisable.131  
 
Subsequent to philosophical and methodological discussions on hermeneutic 
phenomenology, in line with this research tradition, I now narrate an autobiographical 
tale to authenticate my voice in the research and to claim democratisation as my abiding 
concern. 
 
 ‘Personal is Political’: seeking the phenomenon within 
(An autobiographical tale of my pursuit of understanding democratisation and the 
roles of NGOs in it) 
 
Remember that your essence is experienced by you as a feeling 
The trap is this: wanting to know who you are which means you want 
to be able to say some words, think a thought, cling to a description.  
The question comes: how can I find out what my essence is? 
There is nothing to find out. 
Remember it. Experience it. Feel the feeling of it.132 
 
It was a cold but sunny morning of February in 2004. I entered the grand hall of a five-
star hotel in Islamabad to attend an inaugural event of the Strengthening National and 
Provincial Legislative Governance (SNPLG) Project. The event was organised by an 
NGO - the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT). 
Just recently, I was offered a job at PILDAT as a projects manager. Attending the 
inaugural event was part of my orientation at PILDAT. In entering that five-star hotel, 
                                                 
129 Ibid.  
130 Thomas and Pollio 2002:42 quoted in Mottern (n 126).  
131 Heidegger, 1962 (n 11). 
132 Paul Williams (1999) ‘Remember Your Essence’, p10 
http://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1412926.Remember_Your_Essence Published July 1st 1999 by 
Entwhistle Books (first published 1987) 
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I also ‘entered’ into the phenomenon of my inquiry: the nature of democratisation in 
Pakistan and the role of internationally funded NGOs in it.  
 
The SNPLG – the project of PILDAT – inaugural event was my doorway to the new 
post-9/11 wave of democratisation programmes in Pakistan. These programmes, 
focusing on strengthening democracy and good governance, were mainly supported by 
international funding agencies including USAID and DFID, CIDA, AUSAID and 
others. The SNPLG was funded by USAID.133  
 
The event had approximately 50 parliamentarians as confirmed participants from the 
Senate (the Upper House of the Parliament), the National Assembly and provincial 
assemblies. Nancy Powell, the then Ambassador of the US to Pakistan and Siguard 
Hanson, Country Director of World Vision were also expected to attend. The speakers 
ranged from members of the National Assembly to senior members of the judiciary and 
academics.134  
 
I had arrived earlier than the scheduled start time to acquaint myself with the 
arrangements. At first, I felt a little unsettled and out of place. Having previously 
worked with a women’s rights organisation, I understood that NGOs were 
fundamentally pressure groups, working with limited resources and often depended on 
donations from concerned parties and volunteers to do the job. This meant that they 
were ‘out of cash’ most of the time. But this inaugural event was different. The grand 
hall ambiance was posh with tall windows covered in silk drapes. It was set up in a 
horse-shoe seating style with a head-table for the speakers. There were microphones 
attached to the tables, one each for every participant. At one corner of the hall was a 
small table with two computers set for the note-takers to record the proceedings. Behind 
the head-table, stood an impressively large banner, printed in modern digital design 
with event details and official logos of PILDAT and USAID. The table and chair décor 
was formal. The air of the hall was serious and comfortably warm for a cold day outside. 
In the soft rattling of cutlery, waiters in crisp white uniforms with black waistcoats, 
were ready to serve coffee and tea to the guests.  
                                                 
133 See Chapter IV. 
134 PILDAT News,  June 2004, Vol: 2, Issue 1. 
http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/AnnualReportAndNewsletter/PILDATNewsLetterVol2
Issue1June2004.pdf accessed 23 July, 2016. 
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As part of my orientation, I was asked to help my colleagues handling the event 
registration and information desk. Various publications by PILDAT were on display. I 
had already seen some of these publications including briefing and background papers 
on the issues of parliamentary governance.135 There was also promotional literature 
from USAID and World Vision and a glossy brochure on PILDAT’s mission indicating 
its current and future programmes. PILDAT aimed at “strengthening democracy and 
democratic institutions in Pakistan by building the capability of and instituting non-
partisan monitoring framework for the elected representatives and legislatures while 
facilitating greater participation of all segments of the society in the democratic process 
and development of new political leadership.”136  
 
Soon my unsettled feelings lessened, giving way to new feelings of pride and 
importance (reflecting much later, I figured those feelings were bordering arrogance!). 
I felt that, I, working at PILDAT, training and educating parliamentarians in grand 
hotels, would be at the top-game of influencing politics and policy for the development 
and sustenance of democracy in a country like Pakistan, where the idea as well as the 
practice of democracy had been a puzzle and a struggle for decades. And, most 
importantly, we would achieve all this in the midst of President Musharraf’s 
dictatorship which began in October 1999.  
 
It was then that a quick glimpse of memory took me to my younger self. I had seen my 
father and his friends meeting in our modest home; debating, arguing, planning and 
agreeing activities on various political issues. It was the 1980s. Pakistan was ruled by 
the most forbidding dictator, Zia-ul-Haq. I learnt later that civil liberties were curtailed; 
political parties were banned and freedom of speech was severely restricted. Our home 
was a hub where meetings of likeminded liberals, democrats, and literary 
revolutionaries were held. I also remembered my mother’s mutterings on how useless 
those meetings were – a waste of time! The dictator and his fellow-men were far 
stronger and out of reach for people like my father and his friends and their insignificant 
get-togethers. Yet, these committed people, after finishing their daily jobs, tirelessly 
                                                 
135 See PILDAT Publications available at http://www.pildat.org/publications.asp  
136 PILDAT Mission Statement, Annual Report July 1, 2003- June 30, 2004. Mission Statement can also 
be found at http://www.pildat.org/about_mission.asp. 
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gathered in the evenings. There was nothing posh or expensive. But it was their space 
to breathe their values of freedom, democracy and dissent. I listened to them, sitting in 
the corner of the room. I understood little but enough to know that they planned street 
protests and poetic gatherings at the city’s press-club and Arts Centre, channeling the 
poetry of dissent. At the end of these meetings, they recited poetry on freedom, love, 
longing, dissent, hope and revolution. I sensed they had a mission against the 
dictatorship and for the return of democracy. 
 
Now, in 2004, I could see a chain, connecting the experience of my younger self at 
home with PILDAT’s programme for promoting democracy in Pakistan. (Or perhaps, 
I imagined the chain and connection out of my desire to do so?). I wanted to feel that I 
had taken the similar path as my father’s. Little did I know that there was hardly any 
similarity in these paths; the mission of a modest home and the event at the grand hotel, 
were poles apart.  
 
As I continued at PILDAT, I was initially made responsible for two projects. The first 
one involved conceptualising and organising four provincial briefing events for 
parliamentarians in each of the four provincial assemblies in Sindh, Punjab, 
Balochistan, and the Northwest Frontier Province (now renamed as Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KP Province). Focusing on the Effective Committee System, the 
briefing events were part of a wider programme of the Pakistan Legislative 
Strengthening Consortium (PLSC) supported by the USAID. The aim of the event was 
to invite and educate the parliamentarians about the importance of the oversight role of 
the parliamentary committees as an integral part of a democratic system. As per 
PILDAT’s practice, background and briefing papers on Effective Committee System in 
Pakistan were to be produced. The events required intense event management including 
inviting a large number of provincial legislators to arranging project staff and senior 
staff travels to the cities in each province. Background and briefing papers were 
commissioned externally to academics and subject experts. Speakers were identified, 
invited, chased and confirmed. Their travels were arranged. To boost efficiency, the 
project staff and senior staff were to arrive a day before the event for an overnight stay 
at local four or five-star hotels. The four events were held within a short period of a 
month and therefore required an extensive paraphernalia of both human and material 
resources of PILDAT.  
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Besides organising briefing events, my other task was to produce a Directory of the 
Members of the Senate. Previously a similar Directory of the Members of the 12th 
National Assembly of Pakistan had already been produced. These Directories were part 
of PILDAT’s “efforts to bring parliament and its members closer to people and the civil 
society and promote a closer and more frequent inter-action between the people and 
their representatives.”137 The Directories provided a list of important information about 
all parliamentarians including their photographs, constituency (for the members 
National Assembly), party and contact details. The project was funded by DFID. 
 
Other than these projects, a lot more was going on at PILDAT. There were similar 
briefing events; study tours for selected parliamentarians to foreign countries; 
roundtable discussions; exchange visits of parliamentary delegations from Western 
democracies; parliamentary internship programme; dialogue on free, fair and credible 
elections and civil-military relations and preparation of parliamentary orientation 
curriculum for member and staff of parliament. Financial support during 2004-2005 
mostly came from USAID and DFID. PILDAT produced over 30 publications during 
January 2004 - January 2005 including briefing and background papers in both English 
and Urdu; state of democracy reports and democracy updates and parliament 
programme reports; event proceedings; handbook and booklets; directories; case 
studies; and reports of the Senate Committees.138  
 
All activities had a common aim of strengthening democratic governance in Pakistan; 
more specifically through legislative capacity-building, political leadership 
development, performance monitoring of democratic actors and institutions and 
education in democracy and political management. Since 2001, PILDAT has been a 
prominent NGO in these areas of work and has grown stronger every passing year to 
this day. 
 
My experience at PILDAT introduced me to the everyday workings of democracy in 
Pakistan through knowing the representatives and staff at the parliament and concerned 
                                                 
137 See Directories of the Members of the Senate and of the 12th National Assembly of Pakistan published 
on December 2004 and January 2004 respectively. Available at Pildat’s website 
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Publications.asp  
138 PILDAT (n 136). 
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outsiders. I was engaging with existing and former parliamentarians; parliamentary 
staff and other bureaucrats; and members of academia and media. There was a small 
group of ten to fifteen parliamentarians who were sensitive to PILDAT’s mission, may 
be more so because PILDAT’s President had developed good professional rapport with 
them. Then there was another bigger group who would turn up at the briefing events 
and were polite to PILDAT’s invitations. Majority of the parliamentarians, in both the 
National Assembly and the Senate, never attended any event. Besides, the parliament 
itself was pretty much a rubber parliament elected under the controversial presidency 
of General Pervez Musharraf in October 2001 and governed by the army backed PML-
Q (the President’s political party).  
 
I also observed and gradually began reflecting on our own role at PILDAT. We were a 
team of approximately 15 programme staff at PILDAT. Almost all projects officers and 
senior managers were locals with British degrees in development, politics and media 
studies. PILDAT offices was based in Gulberg, Lahore; in a high-class locality. The 
office culture was formal and functional with a good number of support staff. I headed 
a team of three people. There were three more teams. Each team worked on specified 
projects. Each project manager had a direct access to the President of PILDAT but I do 
not recall attending any programme staff meetings or collective deliberations on 
organisational strategy or foresight. This was strictly limited to the President PILDAT 
and Deputy Director. Working on only my projects, without having information on the 
overall strategy and direction of the organisation felt strange, and at times, isolating. 
The resources available to us were in abundance and there was absolutely no 
compromise on efficiency and quality of work. Expectations were high and given the 
quantity of work being produced, there were regular late evenings for most of us. We 
were paid reasonably well by Pakistani standards. Overall, it was a fast paced, 
performance oriented, formal and a rather top-down organisational culture. 
 
Who were PILDAT’s beneficiaries? Who were the agents of democratisation? What 
was the role of the international funding agencies and what difference did it make if 
projects and programmes were lucratively funded? Who were we? What were we doing 
precisely to promote democracy? What was the point in educating and training 
parliamentarians who were scarcely interested in learning and their way of ‘doing’ 
politics, in their context, had little to compare with democracies elsewhere. What was 
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that context? Since its inception, PILDAT has organised hundreds of briefing events, 
dialogues, foreign study tours, consultative roundtables, etc. and produced thousands 
of publications most of which were produced for the parliamentarians. In a parliament 
where majority of the members were barely educated, could we claim that a good 
number of them have read, understood and applied their acquired knowledge into 
everyday politics? I doubted it then and I doubt it now. 
 
So, I have no reservations in stating that my understanding of democratisation in 
Pakistan and NGOs role in it, is mixed, to say the least. This autobiographical tale not 
only affirms my orientation to this research, it also invites a deeper and contextual 
understanding of the phenomenon in question. NGOs intrigue me as possible agents of 
change whose agency must be critically examined to reveal the contextual facets of 
democratisation, not only in Pakistan, but also elsewhere in the global South.  
 
Illuminating research participants: seeking the phenomenon therein  
In this section, I introduce the research participants including NGOs’ personnel, 
politicians, academics, funding agencies, and journalists.  
  
NGOs and research participants   
Perhaps an account of a research participant’s experience can serve to illustrate 
the “expression of the whole”139  with regards to how participants reflected on 
their roles in democratisation:  
When we refer to NGOs aiding to democratise Pakistan……….. we 
(like to) say many groups are being formed, a silent revolution is 
creeping and people will soon occupy the state. That is essentially not 
happening…………. These groups do not challenge the patronage 
system of our state…………..they become part of it and bring benefit 
from….. There is no aggregation of demands from the lower levels. 
People are talking about lack of water, poor health facilities, right to 
health and right to education and these demands are not even heard 
let alone act upon. ……We (working in NGOs) take salaries and 
provide professional services. I am not a social activist. I am being 
hired by an association or a board of trust to deliver certain technical 
services and I am being paid for it. So I should not create the imagery 
that I am some big social activist. I am an employee. We need to get 
out of this contradiction………. What kind of activists are we? How 
can we be connected (with public)? The biggest disconnect is this.140 
                                                 
139 van Manen, 2016 (n 15). 
140 Interview 7, 10 April 2015. 
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Who are the NGOs in democratisation? The statement highlights the tensions that are 
felt by most research participants, albeit articulated differently. They reflected on the 
sort of lacunae that exists in defining who they are (as NGOs) and what they do 
(democratisation)? In so doing they pondered whether as leaders in their NGOs, they 
are activists, advocates, revolutionaries, professionals, the social or political elite, or 
just employees drawing salaries in exchange for their services. In their reflections, I 
look for my phenomenon: the essence of democratisation and what it means to be an 
NGO in democratisation.  
 
Table 1 below lists the number of the research participants from NGOs. They are 
grouped according to their missions and functions. All NGOs aim at promoting 
democracy in Pakistan, however the ways in which they do so are varied. Some 
endeavor to build the capacity of parliamentarians and political parties by familiarising 
them with democratic parliamentary procedures. Others are purely focused on electoral 
processes and aim to ensure that free and fair elections take place. They monitor 
elections and work to inform and influence the Election Commission of Pakistan. There 
are also rights based NGOs who work to promote and protect human rights and seek to 
influence government policies and constitutional provisions through research, 
advocacy and lobbying.  
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Table 1: Number and profile of research participants from NGOs 
No of 
Participants   

















Promotion NGOs  
2 Human rights 
NGOs 
1 Think Tank/ 
Research NGO 
1 Media and 
Human Rights 
NGO 
6 based in 
Lahore 
3 based in 
Islamabad with 




2 based in 
Karachi 
 
2 NGOs 70-100 
staff  
3 NGOs 20-35 
staff  
5 NGOs 10-20 
staff 
1 NGO 5-10 staff 









1 based in 
Islamabad 
 







3 based in 
Islamabad 
2 based in 
Lahore 
2 NGOs 70-100 
staff 
1 NGO 20-35 
staff 
 










1 NGO 70-100 
staff 
1 NGO 20-35 
staff 
Total number of participants from NGOs = 27  
 
*Mission statements of all NGOs refer to their roles in democracy promotion. However, where 
this is specified as central role, those NGOs are categorized as Democracy Promotion NGOs. 
NGOs with missions to advance and promote human rights for democracy are categorised as 
Human Rights NGOs; media for democracy as Media NGOs and so on.  
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In terms of the positions of people interviewed, I selected those who have been engaged 
in democratisation for a prolonged period to explore historical development of the 
phenomenon of democratisation. Not surprisingly, these participants were on leading 
positions in their organisations, from Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and directors to 
heads and managers of programmes.  
 
All NGOs have a nation-wide scope. However, their projects may have only local or 
regional reach due to the nature of projects or resource limitations. They are, or have 
been, internationally funded for democratisation projects. Funding agencies include 
USAID, DFID, EU, UNDP, Denmark’s development cooperation (Danida) and others.  
Their head-offices are based in cities with only a few having regional and local offices 
or partnerships with local and community based organisations. In terms of their size, 
they range from large NGOs with up to 100 staff to small organisations with 5-10 staff 
members. Size depends on the nature of their mission and available resources. Chart A 
also lists the geographical spread. 
 
Finally, and most importantly, my choice of these personnel and NGOs is deliberate.141 
I focus on these NGOs because they have been leading the democratisation agenda in 
Pakistan with extensive resources, scope, reach and length of experience. It is because 
of the leadership, long-term experience, commitment, and their vision that 
democratisation programmes have been negotiated, developed and implemented with 
international funding. On average, each research participant brings over twenty years 
of experience of involvement with NGOs for human rights, social and political 
advocacy and research, lobbying and campaigning for law reforms, and capacity 
building for parliamentarians and political parties.  
 
The concerned others 
In understanding democratisation and the roles of NGOs in Pakistan, it is crucial to 
involve people from other sectors who may have a direct interest and stake in the 
phenomenon. Politicians and funding agencies belong to this category. Politicians are 
                                                 
141 As ‘phenomenology is the philosophy of the personal, the individual’ all twenty research participants 
are worthy of my gratitude to agree to share with me their personal views and reflections as agents of 
democratisation in both their personal and organisational capacities. Not a single research participant 
held back or appeared reluctant to discuss critically what they do and do not do.  
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the recipients of support provided by NGOs and therefore have a view on the nature of 
the support and on NGOs as its providers. Funding agencies are guided by their 
development assistance and foreign policy goals towards supporting and sustaining 
democracy in Pakistan. They fund large programmes for promoting democracy in 
Pakistan. A significant proportion of their financial assistance is channeled through 
NGOs. They are, therefore, directly concerned to the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
The wider civil society, in which NGOs in democratisation are situated, is also relevant 
to this research. However, given the nature of my enquiry into the internationally 
funded NGOs only, it is mostly media and academics who have views on related issues. 
Thus, in addition to NGOs’ personnel, the research participants include politicians, 
journalists, academics and representatives of funding agencies. Grass-roots, 
development oriented, welfare and charitable civil society groups are not included in 
this research. This is because the scope of research is limited to internationally funded 
democracy promotion NGOs.142 Although there are NGOs with large international 
funding profiles, such as National Rural Support Programme (NRSP), Pakistan Poverty 
Alleviation Fund (PPAF), etcetera, they target the economic and infrastructural 
development of local communities and do not directly claim to promote democracy and 
democratic institutions in Pakistan. By the same token, small grass-roots groups and 
organisations that do focus on democracy promotion with human rights and social 
mobilisation perspective, but who do not wish to or do not hold international funding, 
are not included in the research.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have reflected on my experience to frame this research within the 
hermeneutic phenomenological approach. I have outlined the origins and characteristics 
of this research approach (including philosophy and method) and established that it is 
the study of the nature and meanings of a phenomenon in which a researcher aims at 
providing rich description of a lived experience, accentuated by her interpretation to 
illuminate its essence that makes what it is. 
 
                                                 
142 See the Introduction Chapter and Chapter II for the scope of this research limited to the internationally 
funded NGOs for democracy promotion programmes in Pakistan. 
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In the process of identifying a theoretical and methodological framework, I have learnt 
that undertaking qualitative research is a journey of self-exploration with many paths 
to the destination i.e. understanding of a phenomenon. To understand the nature and 
meanings of democratisation and the roles of internationally funded NGOs in it, I have 
outlined the application of qualitative research methods for data-collection including 
semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, observations and reflective 
memos. I have also provided a chart on the numbers and nature of participants in the 
research.  
 
In conducting analysis, I have followed van Manen’s and Denzin’s guidelines on 
interpretive and phenomenological research. I have stated that my orientation to the 
phenomenon was guided by personal motivation informed by my lived experience of 
working with NGOs in democratisation. I have discussed the interpretive technique of 
explicating data; producing rich descriptions; interpreting and lifting out essential 
themes which characterise democratisation; and writing creatively. I have also briefly 
discussed the issues of validity, ethics and generalisability of this research approach.  
 
Referring to Eliot’s Little Gidding, I feel that arriving at an understanding is indeed just 
a start for yet another journey of exploration. As Gadamer asserts that “… the meaning 
of a text goes beyond its author.” It transcends the author and traverse into the domain 
of the reader who finds new meanings. In this sense, this research offers new 
interpretations while inviting the reader to arrive at theirs. 
 
Thus, in this chapter, I have established that hermeneutic phenomenological research is 
the suitable approach for the purpose of my research which seeks to understand the 
nature and meanings of democratisation (as a phenomenon) through the lived 
experiences of internationally funded NGOs. 
 
In the next chapter, I will discuss the socio-political context of Pakistan. Thus, the 
second part of this thesis will unfold consisting of chapters IV, V and VI. 
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Chapter IV: Carry on companions-Democratic waves in Pakistan 
In which ‘democratic deficit’ and the roles of NGOs in democratisation are 
historically shaped. 
 
Introduction    
nahin nigh mein manzil to justuju hi sahi 
 nahin visal mayassar to arzu hi sahi 
   
na tan mein khuun faraham na ashk ankhon mein 
 namaz-e-shauq to vajib hai, be-vazu hi sahi 
   
kisi tarah to jame bazm mai-kade vaalo 
 nahin jo bada-o-saghar to hav-hu hi sahi 
   
gar intezar kathin hai to jab tallak ai dil 
kisi ke vada-e-farda ki guftugu hi sahi    
[Faiz Ahmad Faiz]1 
        
No matter if the destination is not in sight, keep the desire burning, 
No matter if there is no embrace, keep the longing alive. 
 
No matter if blood in the veins and tears in the eyes have withered,  
Say your prayers of yearning, impure as they may be. 
 
Carry on companions, the tavern must rejoice, however possible, 
No matter if your goblets are empty, keep making your raucous 
sounds.  
 
If painful is the wait, till then Oh Love! 
Let’s recall the promises made to us, [keep the wait].2  
                                                 
1 Available at https://rekhta.org/ghazals/nahiin-nigaah-men-manzil-to-justujuu-hii-sahii-faiz-ahmad-
faiz-ghazals. Faiz Ahmad Faiz, was a Pakistani intellectual, revolutionary poet, and one of the most 
celebrated writers of the Urdu language, having been nominated four times for the Nobel Prize for 
literature. A notable member of the Progressive Writers’ Movement (PWM), Faiz was an avowed 
Marxist, and he received the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962. He wrote many revolutionary poems during the 
time of Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship that stirred resistance in the public to protest against the dictatorship. 
He was exiled repeatedly and had written about his experience of exile, craving for returning to Pakistan 
and for the return of democracy.   
2 My Translation.  
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Faiz wrote this poem while in exile, yearning to return to his homeland and longing for 
the return of democracy in Pakistan. He and many other poets, intellectuals, singers, 
artists, labour leaders, human rights activists and journalists took great risks upon 
themselves and their families to resist the formidable dictatorships of General Ayub 
Khan (1960s) and of General Zia-ul-Haq (1980s). They were jailed, tortured and exiled. 
Women rights movements led by women’s NGOs received global recognition and 
support in their demands for reforming the discriminatory family and criminal laws. 
Civil society’s struggles in democratisation have profound roots in Pakistan’s politics. 
However, there is also an emerging skepticism about their potential for support of 
democratic culture and institutions. I will illuminate the nuances of these conflicting 
views in this chapter which sets the historical and political context for the empirical 
section. 
 
Debates on democratisation in Pakistan fundamentally deal with one question: since 
India and Pakistan share the same colonial roots of a constitutional political order, why 
is it that they followed divergent trajectories to democratisation after independence in 
1947? Democracy in India took root within two years of its independence, while on the 
other hand, Pakistan struggled to establish democracy and eventually failed as it 
witnessed the first martial law in 1958. In India, democracy grew deeper with elected 
parliaments governing the country. In contrast, Pakistan entrenched a political system 
of a ‘perpetual oscillation’ between the civil and military led governments.3 Even 
during the civilian rules, governments have consistently failed to deliver on the 
principles of democracy. Consequently, in Pakistan, democracy has substantially and 
systematically failed in relation to ‘international standards of good practice’ thereby 
creating deep-rooted democratic deficit.4 
 
My review of the academic literature on democratic deficit in Pakistan suggests that 
while democracy has not taken root in Pakistan, the struggle for democracy has 
continued. Equally important, therefore, is the question concerning the resilience of 
                                                 
3 Kurzman Charles, (1998) The term ‘perpetual oscillation’ is used by Kurzman, C. March, (1998) 
Waves of Democratisation., Studies in Comparative International Development, 33 (1) pp42-64.   
4 The term ‘Democratic Deficit’ is used here as defined by David Beetham. See Beetham, D. (2012) 
Defining and Identifying a Democratic Deficit in Lenard, P.T. and Simeon, R. (eds.) Imperfect 
Democracies: The Democratic Deficit in Canada and the United States, UBC Press. pp 76-90. 
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democracy. In making this argument, I reflect on the nature and role of civil society in 
Pakistan’s democratisation. I show that the existing limited research offers conflicting 
stand-points. On the one hand, civil society and NGOs are seen axiomatically as 
necessarily good for democratisation. Conversely, they are critically appraised and 
considered elitist, unaccountable and eager to serve military governments. I suggest 
that these contrasting stand-points can be read in a different way: by situating civil 
society and NGOs in Pakistan’s historical context, it is useful to see them as ‘historical 
product’, embedded in the edifice of Pakistan’s politics and its democratic deficit.  
 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section one sets out the context of democratic 
deficit and resilience. In section two, I analyse the practices of democratisation in 
Pakistan in four distinct ‘waves’.5 Categorised as periods of time with a focus on the 
key political events and actors, these waves capture the history of Pakistan’s struggle 
in establishing democracy over seventy years. The first three waves were followed by 
the reverse waves to authoritarian rules. The fourth wave of democratisation is ongoing. 
Section six reflects upon the premises of democratic resilience and the development of 
the civil society and NGOs in Pakistan’s democratisation. Finally, the conclusion 
summarises the chapter’s key arguments. 
 
Sustaining democracy in Pakistan 
The problem of sustaining democracy in Pakistan is explained in many ways. It has 
been argued that the ‘democratic deficit’ in Pakistan is the inevitable consequence of 
the politics of the Independence Movement.6 The legacy of British Raj has left Pakistan 
captivated by the minority elite-led politics; weak and personality driven political 
parties; centralised governance; linguistic and ethnic divisions; and the innate 
incompatibility of Islamic doctrines with more liberal conceptions of democracy.7 
                                                 
5 Borrowing the term and conception of ‘waves of democratisation’ from Samul Huntington. Huntington 
suggests that a wave of democratisation is a transition from nondemocratic to democratic regime that 
occurs within a specified period of time. A reverse wave is when transition to democracy reverts to 
nondemocratic rule. See Huntington, S.P., (1991) Democracy's third wave. Journal of democracy, 2(2), 
pp.12-34.  
6 The term ‘democratic deficit’ is used by Jaffrelot. C. (2015). The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and 
Resilience, Translated by C. Schoch, Hurst & Company: London and Talbot. I. (2015) Pakistan: A New 
History, Hurst & Company: London. 
7 Alavi, H. and Harris, J. (1989) Sociology of “Developing Societies” South Asia Macmillan Education 
Ltd : London; Talbot (n 6); Tudor, M. (2014a) The Promise of Power: The origins of Democracy in India 
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Recurrence of armed conflicts with neighbouring India and the civil war of 1971 – 
which divided Pakistan into two countries – has resulted in Pakistan army’s continuous 
involvement in directing national foreign policy.8 Pakistan’s involvement in the Cold 
War as a proxy state to the United State (US) in Afghanistan further entrenched army’s 
role in politics.9 Since the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, an alliance 
with US and other western countries in the ‘War on Terror’ has boosted the role of 
Pakistan army as an inevitable political force in global strategic affairs.10 Internally, 
there has been an alarming rise of militancy and insurgencies resulting in religious and 
political intolerance and violent conflicts amongst sections of the populace. Corruption 
and poor governance on part of the ruling elite, guided by self-interest and short-term 
planning, has worsened the governing apparatus both at national and provincial levels; 
citizens suffer with a general lack of availability of common goods and services in basic 
education, health-care and personal safety.11 Constitutional architecture of governance 
and the guarantee of fundamental rights to citizens remain uncertain as the successive 
constitutions repeatedly altered by changing governments to suit their vested needs.12 
Moreover, there have been multiple legal systems operating in parallel, and at times in 
conflict, to each other adding ambiguity in the recourse to justice for the citizens.13 
Unsurprisingly, most analysts regard Pakistan as a ‘failing state’, a ‘troubled state’, a 
‘fragile state’ and a ‘garrison state’.  
 
Nevertheless, the struggle for democracy in Pakistan continues. Equally important, 
therefore, is the question concerning the resilience of Pakistan’s democracy, and the 
resilience of Pakistan itself as a functioning state. At the time of its creation, British 
officials and the Indian Congress alike were doubtful about the survival of Pakistan.14 
                                                 
and Autocracy in Pakistan, Cambridge University Press: New Delhi; Weinbaum, M. G. (1996) Civic 
Culture and Democracy in Pakistan, Asian Survey, 36(7), pp: 639-654. 
8 Jalal, A. (2014) The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics. Harvard 
University Press: London.  
9 Cohen, S.P. (2004) The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, (2013) State of Human Rights in 2012. HRCP, Lahore. 
Pakistan. Pp4-9. 
12 Maluka, Z.K. (1995). The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan. Oxford University Press: Karachi. 
Waseem, M. (2006) Constitutionalism in Pakistan: The Changing Patterns of Dyarchy, Diogenes, 53(4), 
pp:102-115. 
13 Siddique, O. (2013) Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice, Cambridge University 
Press: New Delhi.  
14 Talbot (n 6); It is true that Pakistan struggled to survive in its original formation; it lost its Eastern 
wing which became an independent state of Bangladesh in 1971. There were four wars between Pakistan 
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Yet, seventy years on, we have witnessed an unprecedented change in Pakistan’s 
politics. The last civilian democratic government for 2008-2013 was the first ever to 
complete its full parliamentary term of five years, followed by reasonably fair and free 
general elections. Subsequently, governing authority was transferred to another civilian 
government.15 Currently, Pakistan is being governed by a civilian Prime Minister and 
a representative parliament. The next general elections are due in 2018. Recent polls 
show a positive trend in citizen’s perceptions of democracy in Pakistan.16 New political 
parties are being formed and the established ones are being publicly challenged for 
corruption and governing malpractices. Political analysts argue that the recent 
expansion of the middle class, a stronger civil society, new media, and increasingly 
independent judiciary have been crucial to the continuation of democratic governance 
in Pakistan.17 With these recent developments, problems facing Pakistan are being 
considered ‘surmountable’, although they will require a gradual but far-reaching 
process of reform, involving governance, education, the country’s economy and 
restructuring of the civil-military relations.18 
 
Another dimension to the importance of Pakistan’s democratic viability relates to its 
geo-strategic position in the world. For the US, Pakistan has a status of ‘pivotal state’ 
whose failure could risk regional as well as global stability.19 India, Iran, Afghanistan 
and China have borders with Pakistan. Except for Afghanistan, other states possess 
nuclear weapons. There are civil insurgencies in all states and inter-state relations in 
the region have been mostly tense. Afghanistan continues to have North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) residual troops (mainly from US) to fight Taliban and to 
maintain peace. Pakistan’s North-West region, which borders with Afghanistan, 
remains insecure from the Afghan Taliban’s influence; it has been the breeding ground 
for the Pakistani Taliban which is a separate militant group operating in Pakistan and 
is responsible for the several recent terrorist attacks aimed at civilians and foreign 
                                                 
and India and intense diplomatic relationships with the neigbouring Afghanistan since the Cold War. 
The country endured three decade-long dictatorships.     
15 General elections were held in Pakistan on 11 May 2013 to elect the members of the 14th National 
Assembly and to the four provincial assemblies of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. 
16 PILDAT ‘Assessment of the quality of democracy in Pakistan’ (2015). Available at  
http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/AssessmentoftheQualityofDemocr
acyinPakistan_2015.pdf. 
17 Lodhi, M. (2011) ed. Pakistan: Beyond 'The Crisis State', C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd: London.  
Weinbaum (n 7). This point will be analysed in detail later in this chapter. 
18 Lodhi (n 17). 
19 Talbot (n 6); Cohen (n 9).  
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diplomats.20 Pakistan has been regarded an 'essential ally' to the US in its ‘War on 
Terror’.21 Since 2001, both military and non-military aid has been committed and 
granted to Pakistan in return for its support to curb and capture Al-Qaida and Taliban 
insurgents. It has, thus, been argued that Pakistan is ‘too important to let fail.’22 
 
The international security and development experts have continued to produce 
numerous policy analyses emphasising the importance of democracy in Pakistan. 
Democracy, they believe, could save Pakistan from falling prey to religious extremism 
and becoming a ‘rouge state’.23 The Bellagio Papers on Pakistan’s Future observe that 
“Pakistan needs to experiment with democracy; it cannot be run as an autocracy, 
whether by the military or a civilian leadership, no matter how charismatic he (or she) 
might be.”24 Bellagio Papers further emphasise the importance of the ‘human capital’ 
in Pakistan; its ‘tiny elite’ and the middle class that are competent and have a direct 
stake to transform Pakistan.25 Similarly, Sir Hilary Synnott, the former British High 
Commissioner in Pakistan also observed that Pakistan requires a prolonged and well-
directed effort to assist it with resolving its chronic domestic problems.26 Key policies 
have been adopted in the US and the UK, among other western states, to enhance 
strategic partnerships with Pakistan aiming at preventing religious terrorism.27  
  
                                                 
20 Masood, W. 2014. Taliban ya jamhooriat: Pakistan dorahey pe. Sanjh Publications, Lahore; For a 
broader discussion on the problem of terrorism and Pakistan’s relations with the US, see Haqqani, H. 
2013. Magnificent delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an epic history of misunderstanding. 
Public Affairs.  
21 Zaidi, S. A. (2011) Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan? Available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_aid2011.pdf (Accessed 5 March 2016). Epstein, S.B and 
Kronstadt A. K. (2013) 'Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance', Congressional Research Service. Available 
at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf (Accessed 15 Oct 2016).  
22 Cohen (n 9). 
23 Epstein and Karonstadt (n 21).  
24 Cohen (n 9).  
25 Ibid. p58. 
26 Synnott quoted in Talbot (n 6) p3. 
27 An important policy on Pakistan was agreed by the US Congressional Act, namely the 'Enhanced 
Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009’. It is famously called ‘The Kerry-Lugar Act’. The Act committed 
the US for five years to provide substantial financial assistance to “consolidate democracy” and “re-
establish an independent and transparent judicial system to extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan.” 
The financial assistance also aimed at promoting “sustainable development and infrastructure projects, 
including healthcare, education, water management, and energy programs.” Crucially, the Act 
committed US to work with the Government of Pakistan “to strengthen Pakistan’s counterinsurgency 
and counterterrorism strategy” and “to strengthen Pakistan's efforts to develop strong and effective law 
enforcement and national defence forces under civilian leadership.” Available at 
https://www.congress.gov/111/plaws/publ73/PLAW-111publ73.pdf. 
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Strengthening and empowering civil society – including NGOs – to consolidate 
democracy has been one of the foremost foreign and security policy imperatives for US 
and other Western states. In the case of Pakistan, civil society is considered as a 
‘potential force’ against anarchy and authoritarian rule.28 It could mobilise societal 
demands for institutional reforms, ensure rule of law and accountability, and educate 
citizens to help them understand and defend their rights.29 The ‘lawyers’ movement’ in 
2007 epitomised the roles of civil society and new media for making the army dictator 
accountable for expelling the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.30 Ever since 
then, civil society in Pakistan has found a new prominence and continues to dominate 
political debates.31 In such an approach, civil society, particularly NGOs, are perceived 
as a constructive and axiomatic institution which develops as a defensive response to 
the state’s power and growth.32 In the case of Pakistan, the ‘activist’ role of NGOs 
against dictatorships, for promoting democracy, for protecting and advancing women’s 
and human rights, has been praised.33 However, Pakistani NGOs have not always been 
the promoters of democracy. In 2007, Pakistani NGOs were ‘disproportionately’ the 
most vocal supporters of General Parvez Musharraf who overthrew the democratic 
government of an elected prime minister in 1999 and took charge as a dictator.34 Zaidi 
observes that “far from challenging the state, a number of Pakistani NGOs have become 
the state’s partners, to the mutual benefit of both.”35 
   
In response to the question of divergent trajectories of democracy in India and Pakistan, 
compelling comparative explanations are produced by Ayesha Jalal,36 Christophe 
                                                 
28 Weinbaum (n 7); Diamond, L.J. (2000) Is Pakistan the (reverse) wave of the future?, Journal of 
Democracy, 11(3), pp: 91-106. 
29 Diamond, (n 28).    
30 Lau, M. (2007) Pakistan Country Survey, in Cotran, E, and Lau, M. (ed.), Yearbook of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Law, Volume 12 (2005-2006), Brill: Leiden, pp 443-472. 
31 Zaidi,S. A. (2008) Pakistan After Musharraf: An Emerging Civil Society, Journal of Democracy, 
19(4), pp: 38-40.  
32 Whaites, A. (1995) The state and civil society in Pakistan, Contemporary South Asia, 4(3), pp: 229-
254. 
33 Jaffrelot, C. eds. (2004) A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, Translated by G. Beaumont, Anthem 
Press: London; Malik, I.H. (1997) State and civil society in Pakistan: Politics of authority, ideology and 
ethnicity. Macmillan Press Ltd.  
34 Zaidi (n 31). 
35 Ibid., p39.   
36 Jalal (n 8). Jalal, A. (1999a) The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for 
Pakistan. Sang-E-Meel Publications: Lahore.; Jalal, A. (1999b) Identity Crisis: Rethinking the Politics 
of Community and Region in South Asia, Harvard International Review, 21(3), pp: 82-85; and Jalal, A. 
(1991) The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan’s political economy of defence. Vanguard 
Books Pvt. Ltd: Lahore.  
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Jaffrelot,37 Ian Talbot,38 Sumit Ganguly,39 Maya Tudor,40 Ted Sevenson,41 and 
Katharine Adeney42 among others. Since a comparative political analysis is not the 
focus of this thesis, only the analyses on Pakistan’s challenges for democratisation are 
considered. Historical insights on the crisis of identity and early state formation in 
Pakistan offered by Hamza Alavi,43 Eqbal Ahmad,44 Sibt-e-Hassan,45 Akbar S. 
Ahmad,46 Khalid bin Sayeed,47 and Mubarak Ali48 have informed my research. On 
civil-military relationship, Pakistan’s foreign policy towards US and other western 
countries, on military insurgencies and terrorism, and military-democracy dichotomy 
in Pakistan, I have reviewed a rich body of research notably by Hussain Haqqani,49 Aqil 
Shah,50 C. Christine Fair,51 Hassan Askari Rizvi,52 Yunas Samad,53 Michael Hoffman,54 
                                                 
37 Jeffrelot (n 6); Jaffrelot, (n 33); Jaffrelot, C. (2002) eds. Pakistan: nationalism without a nation?, 
Palgrave Macmillan: Plymouth.  
38 Talbot (n 6).  
39 Ganguly, S. (2016) A Tale of Two Trajectories: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan and India, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 39(1), pp: 142-157; Ganguly, S. and Fair, C. (2013) The structural origins of 
authoritarianism in Pakistan, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 51(1), pp: 122-142; Ganguly, 
S. (2008) The Burden of History, Journal of Democracy, 19(4), pp: 26-31.  
40 Tudor, M. (n 7); Tudor, M. (2014b) Renewed Hope in Pakistan?, Journal of Democracy, 25(2), pp: 
105-118.  
41 Svensson, T. (2013) Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition, Routledge: 
Oxon. 
42 Adeney. K. (2015) How to understand Pakistan’s hybrid regime: the importance of a multidimensional 
continuum, Democratization, 24(1), pp: 119-137; Adeney, K. & Wyatt, A.K.J. (2004) Democracy in 
South Asia: Getting Beyond the Structure-Agency Dichotomy, Political Studies, 52 (1), pp:1-18; 
Adeney, K. & Wyatt, A.K.J. (2001) Explaining South Asia’s Uneven Democratic Career in J Haynes 
(eds.) Towards Sustainable Democracy in the Third World. Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, pp:113-
140. 
43 Alavi (n 7). 
44 Ahmad, E. (2000) Confronting Empire Interviews with David Barsamian, South End Press: 
Cambridge.  
45 Sibt-e-Hassan. (2002) Pakistan me tehzib ka irtiqa. 11th edition. Maktab-e-Daniyal. Karachi; Sibt-e-
Hassan. (2002) Pakistan ke tehzibee-o-siyasi masail. Maktab-e-Daniyal. Karachi. 
46 Akbar, S. A. (1997) Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic identity: The Search for Saladin, Routledge: London. 
Reprinted Oxford University Press: Karachi, 2009; Akbar. S. A. (1997) The Quaid: Jinnah and the Story 
of Pakistan (the Graphic Novel), Oxford University Press, Karachi. 
47 Saeed, K.B. (1968) Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857-1958, Oxford Unity Press: Oxford.  
48 Ali, M. (2011) Pakistan in Search of Identity, Aakar: New Delhi.  
49 Haqqani, H. (n 20); Haqqani, H. (2013) Islamists and democracy: Cautions from Pakistan. Journal of 
Democracy, 24(2), pp: 5-14. 
50 Shah, A. (2014a) The army and democracy: military politics in Pakistan, Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge; Shah, A. (2014b) Constraining consolidation: military politics and democracy in Pakistan 
(2007-2013)., Democratization, 21(6), pp: 1007-1033.  
51 Fair, C.C. (2011) Why the Pakistani army is here to stay: prospects for civilian governance, 
International Affairs, 87(3), pp:571-588.   
52 Rizvi, H-A. (1988) The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86, Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd: New 
Delhi.  
53 Samad, Y. (1994) The Military and Democracy in Pakistan, contemporary South Asia 3, pp.189-203. 
54 Hoffman, M. (2011) Military extrication and temporary democracy: the case of Pakistan, 
Democratization, 18(1), pp:75-99.  
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Steven. L. Wilkison,55 and Ayesha Siddiqa.56 For understanding the judiciary’s role in 
Pakistan’s democratisation, constitutionalism and Islamisation of laws, I have reviewed 
the scholarly works of Mohammad Waseem,57 Martin Lau,58 Paula Newberg,59 Zulfiqar 
Khalid Maluka,60 Shaheen Sardar Ali,61 and Osama Siddique.62  
 
Contrary to the rich academic debates on Pakistan’s challenges to democratisation, 
there is limited literature on the role of civil society and NGOs in democratisation. I 
examined Iftikhar H. Malik’s work entitled ‘State and Civil Society in Pakistan’ which 
provides a comprehensive analysis on the problems of an unequal relationship between 
the ‘elitist’ state structure and weak civic institutions.63 The second, more recent 
academic research has been undertaken by Masooda Bano on the influence of 
development aid on cooperation in NGOs and other voluntary organisations in 
Pakistan.64 Weiss and Gilani’s edited volume ‘Power and Civil Society in Pakistan’ 
offers varied analyses on the complexities of Pakistan’s political sociology.65 On 
women’s movements, Mumtaz and Shaheed’s research on blurry boundaries between 
the social, political and cultural aspects of women’s lives, law and politics, has been 
useful.66 Shaheen Sardar Ali has provided a detailed examination of women’s 
movement and its response to the state’s Islamisation of laws.67 Hassan and Sabir 
                                                 
55 Wilkinson, S.I. (2000) Democratic consolidation and failure: lessons from Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
Democratization, 7(3), pp: 203-226.  
56 Siddiqa, A. (2007) Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London, Anne Arbor: Pluto 
Press. 
57 Waseem, M. (2012) Judging democracy in Pakistan: Conflict between the executive and judiciary, 
Contemporary South Asia, 20(1), pp:19-31; Waseem (n 12). 
58 Lau, M. (2006) The role of Islam in the legal system of Pakistan. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Lieden; 
Lau, M. (2007) 'Pakistan Country Survey'. In: Cotran, E, and Lau, M. (ed.), Yearbook of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Law, Volume 12 (2005-2006), Brill: Leiden, pp 443-472. 
59 Newberg, P. (1995) Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge.   
60 Maluka (n 12).  
61 Ali, S.S. (2016) Modern challenges to Islamic law. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge; Ali, S.S. 
(2000) Law, Islam and the Women’s Movement in Pakistan, in S.M.Rai (ed.) Gender and 
Democratisation: International Perspectives. London: Routledge. 
62 Siddique, O. (n 13).  
63 Malik (n 33). 
64 Bano, M., 2012. Breakdown in Pakistan: How aid is eroding institutions for collective action. Stanford 
University Press. 
65 Weiss, A.M. and Gilani, S.Z. eds., (2001) Power and civil society in Pakistan (No. 101). Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
66 Mumtaz, K. and Shaheed, F., (1987) Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward. One Step Back, London; 
and Shaheed, F., 2010. Contested Identities: gendered politics, gendered religion in Pakistan. Third 
World Quarterly, 31(6), pp.851-867. 
67 Ali. (n 61) 2000. On civil society and NGOs also see Mehboob A.B. 2010. Civil society engagement 
in democratic transition in Pakistan in Cheema, G.S. and Popovski, V. (eds.) Engaging civil society: 
Emerging trends in democratic governance. United Nations University Press: Tokyo, pp:193-213.  
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offered an historical account of how civil society and NGOs in Pakistan have faced stiff 
resistance from the ruling clique.68 And finally, a more journalistic description on the 
history of people’s movements in Pakistan is offered by Aslam Khawaja.69 
 
Additionally, key constitutional rulings by higher courts, NGOs’ reports, and 
newspaper articles published in The Dawn, Daily Jung, have provided insights into the 
populist narratives on democratisation in Pakistan. Reports by international 
development agencies offered useful information and policy analyses on democratic 
trends in Pakistan and their significance for global politics. 
 
Having set the context with these preliminary observations, I will now trace the 
problems of democratisation in Pakistan and the roles of civil society and NGOs in it. 
As alluded previously, the following discussion is divided into four distinct ‘waves’ of 
democratisation over seventy years. I have categorised these waves in specified periods 
of time as ‘testing democracy’ (1947-1958), ‘idealising democracy’ (1972-1977), 
‘personalising democracy’ (1989-1998) and ‘re-constitutionalising democracy’ (2008- 
). The first three waves were followed by the reverse waves to authoritarian rules. The 
fourth and final wave is ongoing and refers to the present democratic governance in 
Pakistan.  
 
Testing democracy: the first wave of democratisation (1947-1958)  
The founding father of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned Pakistan as a 
sovereign nation state whose government was “…… in the hands of its people.”70 
Pakistan was to be governed by “… its provisional constitution based on the 
fundamental principles of democracy not bureaucracy or autocracy or dictatorship…”71 
This adherence to the fundamental principles of democracy was proved a rhetoric by 
Jinnah himself. Jinnah appointed himself as the first governor-general of Pakistan as 
                                                 
68 Hassan, T., and Sabir, M., 2011. Civil Society-Democracy Nexus in Pakistan. South Asian Studies, 
26(2), p.325. 
69 Khawaja, A., 2016. People’s Movements in Pakistan. Kitab Publishers Karachi. 
70 Jinnah quoted in Jalal (n 8) p48. Writing about Jinnah’s leadership, Dr. Mubashir Hassan asserts that 
by 23 March 1940, Jinnah had discovered the spark in the hearts of his followers. Muslims were 
historically ruled by the Muslim emperors – they secretly desired to be ruled by a Muslim state. That 
desire was the key which Jinnah identified and understood, which made him Quaid-e-Azam (the Great 
Leader). See Hassan, M. 2014. Awami Leader. Authored, printed and published by Dr. Mubashir Hassan. 
Gulberg, Lahore. 
71 Jalal (n 8) p49. 
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well as the President of the Constituent Assembly; declared his preference for ‘an 
Islamic democracy’; instructed that a presidential form of government was more suited 
for Pakistan; and forcefully seeded the centralisation of the state, leaving little space for 
provincial autonomy.72 All this was justified in the name of building a nascent state.73 
Clearly, there was a conflict between Jinnah’s claim and his approach to democracy. It 
could be argued that this ‘conflict’ in Jinnah’s rhetoric and action critically moulded 
the politics of Pakistan in its early years.74 
 
Pakistan gained independence in 1947 through the partition of British India, and 
consisted of two major territories – East and West Pakistan. Separated by a thousand 
miles of Indian land, the geographical divide between the two territories was further 
complicated by a much deeper divide of separate ethnicities – language, history, and 
culture. East Pakistan consisted the eastern territory of Bengal, with a distinct Bengali 
culture, history and language. It was also a numerically larger wing with more people 
residing in the region than in West Pakistan. West Pakistan consisted four geographical 
divisions as provinces: Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab, and North-West Frontier (NWFP). 
In addition, there were thirteen princely states. Contrary to East Pakistan, West Pakistan 
was culturally heterogeneous with diverse ethnic groups with their distinct cultures, 
languages and histories.  
 
Notwithstanding the ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity, Jinnah sought unity by 
religion.75 At the All India Muslim League (AIML) Lahore Resolution in March 1940, 
Jinnah asserted that Muslims were a separate nation; they were unlike Hindus and a 
significantly large minority in British India.76 However, it was not the majority Muslim 
territories of the British India that demanded the creation of Pakistan. AIML, as the 
leading political party for Indian Muslims, was rooted in the United Provinces (UP) of 
the North India where Muslims were in minority. AIML was the brainchild of the 
                                                 
72 Jaffrelot, (n 33) p62. Soon after independence, Jinnah had dismissed the provincial governments of 
NWFP and Sindh invoking the Article 51(5) of the Government of India Act (1935) which governed the 
new state of Pakistan until its own constitution was drafted. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Aqil Shah argues that Jinnah had been committed to the creation of a democratic polity. However, 
certain choices that he made in the early days of the state had profound, long term consequences for the 
structure of civil-military relations in Pakistan. See Shah, 2014b (n 50). 
75One nation, one culture, one language was Jinnah’s aspiration as well as justification for Pakistan. 
Jaffrelot, (n 37) 2002. 
76 Jalal, 1999a, (n 36). 
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established and educated minority Muslim elite of UP.77 Fearing marginalisation in case 
of a united India, this minority Muslim elite demanded a separate state to govern on 
behalf of majority of Muslims in other parts of India. In articulating the demand for 
Pakistan, the notion of democracy had to be disregarded. Jalal writes: 
What was unacceptable (to AIML) was a spurious notion of 
democracy that allowed the Indian National Congress to use the brute 
majority of the Hindu community to impose its will on the Muslims.78 
   
The imagined ‘unification’ of Muslims was subsequently considered as a defining 
factor for the national identity of Pakistan. ‘Urdu’ was made another defining factor. 
For the minority, Muslim elite leading AIML, Urdu was a mark of sophistication and 
refinement.79 AIML, which was called Muslim League (ML) after the Independence, 
was governing Pakistan. It ignored the fact that Urdu was mainly spoken by the 
migrants from India; the settled majority of Pakistanis were predominantly non-Urdu 
speaking. The centralisation of power around Urdu as Pakistan’s official language 
sparked resistance from other regions, especially Sindh and East Pakistan.80 This 
linguistic tension was manifested in the first draft of the Constitution known as the 
‘Interim Report’ drafted by the Constituent Assembly in September 1950.81 The Interim 
Report not only officially elevated Urdu to the rank of national language, it also 
proposed an equal representation of the East and West Pakistan in the Upper Chamber 
of the Parliament. This proposal disregarded the fact that Bengalis were a majority in 
the united Pakistan. Bengalis fiercely opposed the Interim Report which was 
subsequently withdrawn within two months of its presentation.82 The minority ethnic 
ruling elite, evidently, seeded the suppression of the majority from the very outset of 
national governance.  
   
Interim Report marked the beginning of what became an unending constitutional crisis. 
It also exposed the institutional demise of ML. Previously in 1948, after Jinnah’s death, 
Liaquat Ali Khan took charge as the first Prime Minister of Pakistan and appointed a 
new governor general. Soon after assuming office in January 1949, Khan had dismissed 
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the Punjab government on the charges of mismanagement, although it had a solid 
majority in the provincial assembly.83 In their arrogance as the sole political party for 
the Pakistan independence movement, ML executives refused to recognise emerging 
political parties in the provinces.84 With no national mandate to begin with, ML 
factionalised soon after the Independence and failed to establish either a political base 
or mobilise support at the grass-roots level.85 While the demise of ML has been 
considered critically damaging for the new governing apparatus of Pakistan,86 I argue 
that the emergence of other provincial political parties as a consequence of ML’s 
demise, could be regarded as a positive development for democracy in that period. 
However, it is to be noted that the trigger for the emerging political parties was a 
separatist resistance in the provinces. This separatist dimension would soon fuel a 
constitutional crisis resulting in the first reverse wave of democracy as Pakistan’s first 
dictatorship in 1958. 
 
The drafting of the first constitution on democratic principles was painfully slow given 
the power struggles between East and West Pakistan involving the questions of national 
language and parity.87 These power struggles caused an enduring distrust amongst 
Bengalis for the Punjabis of West Pakistan who were increasingly taking control of the 
national governance.88 Another fundamental setback to the drafting of the constitution 
was Khan’s conflicting approach to religion. Prior to the Interim Report, the Objectives 
Resolution of March 7, 1949 ruled out the notion of an Islamic state yet assured the 
Muslim citizens a right to live their individual and collective lives in accordance to the 
teachings of Islam.89 This ‘official’ assurance was far less promising for religious 
minorities.90 But it was surely “sufficient to embolden the religious lobby to 
periodically hold the state accountable to its professed commitment to ushering in an 
Islamic social order.”91 
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Jalal, however, argues that it was not the question of religion which disturbed the early 
development of a steady political order in Pakistan.92 It was the problem of ‘the 
privilege of ownership’ of the rich and powerful elite of Pakistan whose materialistic 
aim for accumulating wealth and power in ‘their’ new state was forever unsatisfied.93 
Hamza Alavi coined the term ‘salariat’ to describe the emerging urban class consisting 
of professionals, salaried civil bureaucrats and politicians who spearheaded the 
Pakistan Movement.94Their primary interest was to create a state apparatus that would 
allow them more power and influence.  
 
By 1952, five years into independence, ethnic tension between East and West Pakistan 
and within West Pakistan mounted rapidly. Eqbal Ahmad put it eloquently 
‘[n]ationalism was trying to create new realities, and it had not succeeded very well.95 
The continuing political uncertainty took its first casualty with the assassination of 
Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. Ghulam Muhammad, the former Indian civil 
servant, was then appointed as the governor general of Pakistan. Muhammad distrusted 
the politicians and the parliamentary system.96 This ‘new state’ of the executive and the 
bureaucracy assumed most of the legislative activity and a recourse to mass mandate 
was considered dysfunctional to govern the state.97 In November 1952, Muhammad 
rejected the proposed new report to the Constituent Assembly by the then Prime 
Minister Nazimuddin.98 The report suggested representation by majority in the Lower 
Chamber. Muhammad also disliked the proposed reduction in military expenditure in 
the report. The report was withdrawn but Muhammad’s distrust for democratic 
institutions led him to dismiss Nazimuddin’s government in April 1953, followed by 
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in September 1954.99 
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With the backing of the army, Muhammad entrenched the politics of patronage by 
including two prominent Bengali political leaders in his new government.100 This saved 
him from a possible public uproar against the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. 
However, the President of the Constituent Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin, (a Bengali) 
challenged the Governor General’s actions and filed a petition in the Sindh High Court 
alleging that these actions were in contravention of the sovereign right of the 
Assembly.101 The Sindh High Court ruled unanimously in his favour and considered 
the Constituent Assembly to be a sovereign body.102 Muhammad’s government 
appealed against the ruling before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The subsequent 
ruling entitled ‘Federation of Pakistan and others v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan’ is 
considered a landmark judgement in Pakistan’s political and constitutional trajectory as 
it would set course for the future politics.103 It accepted the Governor General’s actions 
as valid and ruled out the sovereign right of the Assembly to formulate valid laws unless 
they had been granted an assent by the office of the Governor General.104 The infamous 
judgment also justified the imposed state of emergency on the basis of a new doctrine 
the ‘civil law of necessity’.105 The judgement instigated the problematic nexus between 
the higher judiciary and the executive.106 
  
Since the beginning, Pakistan’s political economy revolved around security 
considerations to deter India.107 Jalal asserts that “(a)n acute sense of threat from India 
moulded critical policy decisions, including on Kashmir, and saw the army becoming 
a key player in shaping the destiny of the country.”108 During the Cold War, American 
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support came in exchange for Pakistan’s willingness to serve as a buffer zone against 
Soviet Union’s interventions in Afghanistan. This financial support strengthened the 
army which consequently amplified its stakes in the foreign affairs of the state. Alavi 
argues that the principle reason behind the weakness of democratic practice in Pakistan 
was the emergence of an early and an unfortunate nexus between bureaucracy and 
military.109 Ganguly blames ML which was unable to articulate a clear vision for the 
nascent state.110 He argues that the failure to provide effective governance paved the 
way for an elitist civil service and military to make an ‘alliance of convenience’ to 
suppress any openings for democracy.111 This nexus became the foundation of 
‘conservativism’ and came to be known as the ‘establishment’.112 
  
A second Constituent Assembly was elected in 1955 which produced Pakistan’s first 
Constitution in 1956.113 The Constitution finally ended Pakistan’s dominion status, and 
instituted the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as a federation. Based on a parliamentary 
system, the Constitution provided for a unicameral legislature with the Prime Minister 
as the head of the government, abolished the office of the Governor General, and 
established the post for a President. The Constitution combined parliamentary and 
presidential principles and empowered the President to dismiss the central as well as 
the provincial governments.114 The Objectives Resolution of 1949 was incorporated as 
its Preamble and provisions were made to ensure that the laws are not repugnant to 
Islamic injunctions. Muhammad resigned and Iskander Mirza, another bureaucrat, 
became Pakistan’s first President.115 
  
The Constitution was now in place but the politics of factions and patronage had already 
taken root. As a “failed compromise” on the Two-Unit scheme, it was too late for the 
constitutional order to unite the leadership of the two wings of Pakistan.116 Meanwhile, 
the gradual demise of ML continued. Its members were breaking up and forming new 
political groupings. Consequently, regional political parties emerged and gained 
strength in West Pakistan. United Front and Awami League were firmly in control in 
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East Pakistan. To control and govern, Mirza dissolved three federal governments in less 
than two years, a move which amplified political opportunism and administrative 
chaos.117 In October 1958, Mirza declared the first martial law in Pakistan. 
 
To conclude so far, at the time of its creation, Pakistan was imagined to be a 
constitutional democracy. However, the democratic practice was yet to be tested. 
Charting the trajectory of the decade, it could be observed that although Pakistan 
displayed aspects of ‘procedural’ democracy as evident by the provincial elections and 
promulgating the Constitution, it failed to acquire ‘social’ democracy based on the 
principles of wider political participation and the lowering of social inequalities.118 I 
would argue that despite this failure, the ten-year ‘testing’ of democracy itself was 
crucial in establishing a polity in which democratic principles were debated, fought for, 
repeatedly ignored, altered and negotiated. Had Pakistan begun with autocracy, there 
would have been no such avenues. A beginning with democracy, however notional, 
might account for the subsequent ‘spaces’ for the resilience of democratic practice in 
Pakistan against the odds of authoritarianism. 
 
Idealising democracy: the second wave of democratisation (1972-1977) 
The Martial Law of 1958 marked the first ‘reverse wave’ of democratisation which 
lasted until 1971. Mirza dissolved the Assembly and abrogated the Constitution. He 
appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator. Ayub had long 
been preparing to “take control should Civil Government break down” and was 
convinced that Pakistan’s survival was dependent on army taking hold of politics.119 
Military delved into politics for the first time. The judiciary validated the coup under 
the ‘Dosso Case’120 arguing that since the military coup had effectively changed the 
basic norm of laws implemented in the country, this act could only be ‘extra-
constitutional’ and therefore the courts were left with no authority but to work within 
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the confines of this new law.121 By Dosso Case, courts found the ‘legal’ ways to resolve 
constitutional crisis whenever the elected assemblies were dissolved.122 
  
Ayub introduced radical changes to restructure Pakistan’s economy focusing on both 
agrarian reforms and industrial development. However only a minority gained from this 
prosperity. Jalal states: 
These industrial families, together with an estimated 15,000 senior 
civil servants belonging to approximately 10,000 families, and about 
500 generals and senior military officials, formed the core of the 
regime’s bases of support in the urban areas.123  
 
 
With his ‘Basic Democracies Order’ Ayub set a precedent for dictators in Pakistan to 
propagate their own ‘system of democracy’ in the years to come.124 In the absence of 
political parties which were outlawed, and civil rights which were suspended, 80,000 
‘Basic Democrats’ were chosen as the electoral college for the presidential election.125 
Subsequently, Ayub was elected as the President. A new Constitution was promulgated 
on 8 June 1962 which gave absolute power of veto to the President against the 
Parliament.126 Parliament too was elected through the ‘Basic Democrats’ “whose votes 
he (Ayub) could readily buy or force.”127   
 
Ayub’s political ideal was reminiscent of the British era in which elite civil servants led 
the administration with their preferences and disregarded popular participation.128 The 
brightest bureaucrats, legal minds of the Judiciary, and ambitious politicians joined 
Ayub’s usurpation as ‘junior partners’.129 With political parties initially banned, 
political organisation at the grassroots was stifled. After the Constitution of 1962 was 
put in place, the political parties of East and West Pakistan jointly revolted against the 
ban on political parties, which apparently compelled Ayub to legalise political 
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parties.130 However, a great number of heavy-weight political leaders were still 
disqualified to join the parliament.131 Confident to win, Ayub announced presidential 
elections to be held in January 1965 and formed his own political party, the Muslim 
Convention League in 1963.132 Meanwhile, the restrictions on the freedom of 
expression meant that the press activities were also heavily constrained. This not only 
undermined the politics of the opposition but also “hampered the long-term 
development of civil society” in Pakistan.133 Notwithstanding restrictions, a coalition 
of political parties (both with left and right-wing groups) sprang under the leadership 
of Fatima Jinnah. It was named as the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) with a 
slogan ‘Democracy against Dictatorship’.134 This was the first political coalition for the 
restoration of democracy and was unique as even the Islamist political party, Jamat-e-
Islami which was against Ayub’s modernisation policies, joined in to oust the dictator. 
 
Despite mass political mobilisation and support for Fatima Jinnah, Ayub won the 
presidential elections of January 1965 because of the indirect votes of the ‘Basic 
Democrats’ as the electoral college.135 But the collective confrontation had left him 
weakened, particularly in the largest cities of Karachi and Dhaka.136 Ayub’s political 
volatility had a decisive blow in September 1965 with the military defeat of Pakistan 
by India in the first war between the two countries since Partition.137 In West Pakistan, 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto mobilised students against the humiliation of the defeat and the 
working class against economic inequalities.138 Bhutto, who until recently was a ‘key 
defender’ of Ayub’s political regime as the former foreign minister, ascended to 
become a popular political leader with his political party, the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP).139Several street parades, led by masses against Ayub’s rule were organised in 
key urban centres on 17 March 1969 and culminated in him stepping down from 
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office.140 General Muhammad Yahya Khan took over by imposing another Martial 
Law. 
  
The 1969 Martial Law was “harsher than the one imposed in 1958.”141 Political 
activities were banned, civil servants were dismissed and civilian courts were forbidden 
from scrutinising martial law. Yahya abrogated the Constitution and promulgated the 
Legal Framework Order (LFO) proposing new scheme for elections based on 
proportional representation.142 The LFO proposed a federal structure and provincial 
autonomy.143 It also proposed for East Pakistan’s majority in the national assembly.144 
On the issue of centralisation of power, LFO retained the authority of the President at 
the expense of legislative authority.145 The President was given sole authority to 
dissolve the National Assembly (yet to be elected) and to interpret the future 
Constitution; his interpretations were not to be challenged in the courts.146 However, 
the LFO did not guarantee ‘provincial autonomy’ which was the principal demand of 
Awami League leaving the issue to be resolved by the drafting of the constitution post 
general elections.147 
 
In December 1970, after 23 years of political chaos, the first ever general elections were 
held in Pakistan. Largely considered to be fair, the elections resulted in PPP winning a 
majority seats in West Pakistan under Bhutto’s leadership.148 Awami League under 
Mujibur Rehman, gained both a majority in East Pakistan as well as an overall majority 
in the National Assembly.149 But the Punjabi-Muhajir ML elite, including Yahya and 
his army were unwilling to be governed by East Pakistanis.150 Bhutto, a Sindhi wadera 
(feudal), was not keen on the Bengali-led parliament either.151 He demanded that PPP 
would share power with Awami League.152 The political turmoil became messier with 
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Yahya’s military ‘Operation Searchlight’ in Dhaka where hundreds of university 
students were killed.153 Mujibur Rehman was arrested but some of his aides escaped to 
India and set up a government-in-exile in April 1971.154 Awami League declared 
Independence from Pakistan and the civil war began.155 Between April and November 
1971, the Muslim army of West Pakistan ferociously killed the Muslims of East 
Pakistan. In December 1971, India launched a decisive attack on West Pakistani forces 
who surrendered within two weeks and suffered substantive losses of their ground and 
air forces.156 More than two decades later, Pakistan was partitioned once again. 
However, the tragic irony of this partition was that it was the majority, and not the 
minority group, that seceded from the state.157 
  
By 1971, the politics of factions, co-optation and self-interest had ingrained in all 
political spheres, from army quarters to civilian political groups. Jalal argues that in its 
first 25 years, Pakistan developed an elaborate ‘hydra-like’ structure of the state mainly 
to “parry external and internal threats to its survival”158 She asserts further: 
Steeped in the classical tradition of colonial bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, the state sought to penetrate society, extract 
resources from the economy and manipulate the polity rather than 
devolve responsibility or serve as a two-way channel of 
communication between the rulers and the ruled.159 
  
On 20 December 1971, Bhutto assumed power as the President and the martial law 
administrator.160 Bhutto’s ‘idealised’ approach to democratisation meant curbing the 
power of the army so much so that it stays out of politics as a rule.161 Besides, the 
defeated and disgraced army also required time and resources to recover its 
stronghold.162 Bhutto fired a number of senior army officials including the chief of army 
staff (COAS) within four months of his rule.163 With his own appointed men in the 
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senior ranks of the army, Bhutto moved on to restructure the civil service.164 However, 
his ‘socialist’ measures, including big-scale nationalisation of private industry and 
agrarian reforms, forced him to rely increasingly on state bureaucrats to implement 
policies. The secession of East Pakistan and the fear of insecurity led Bhutto to embark 
upon a rapid nuclear weapons programme165 which ironically strengthened the position 
of the army for many years to come.  
 
Bhutto ended the Martial Law in April 1972 by promulgating a temporary constitution. 
Thus, a second wave of democratisation began. An incumbent government produced 
the new Constitution which was declared on 14 August 1973 with a unanimous support 
by different parties within the Assembly.166 The 1973 Constitution manifested Bhutto’s 
ideal: it introduced a constitutional democracy with a representative parliamentary 
system of government. It guaranteed fundamental rights to the citizens including the 
right of religion, freedom of speech, movement and the like. It established the national 
assembly and the senate as the main representative governing bodies and strengthened 
the powers of the Prime Minister elected by the Assembly. President’s powers were 
significantly curtailed making him a figurative head of the state.167 To please the 
religious lobby who supported Bhutto against dictatorship, the Constitution reaffirmed 
the Islamic character of the state with both the President and Prime Minister required 
to be Muslims.168 The Preamble declared the ‘sovereignty of God’ and Islam as the 
‘State Religion’ of the country.169  
 
With the Constitution in place, Bhutto became the Prime Minister. “Islam is our faith, 
democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy, all power to the people” was 
Bhutto’s ideal in which he evoked the will of the awam (people) as the moving force in 
Pakistan.170 Bhutto’s appeal to populism and his political charisma led urban, educated, 
middle class professionals who were socialist by inclination to join Bhutto’s mission to 
empower the people of Pakistan.171 However, Bhutto’s populist appeal was short lived 
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as he failed to work through participatory institutions and led with a strong personalised 
rule.172 His land reforms fell short of redressing the structural rural inequalities.173 The 
nationalisation of private industries including financial companies did restore workers’ 
rights and freedom of organised trade unions, but it backfired when small entrepreneurs 
and merchants felt alienated as their profits fell.174 To please them, the government 
placed a crackdown on labour leaders with the help of the army.175 
  
Bhutto’s haste in restructuring the governance meant that he had little time and attention 
for the development of PPP as a democratic political party.176 PPP had not mobilised 
the public at grassroots level. As the elections of 1977 approached, Bhutto had no 
choice but to gain support from land owners for supporting PPP; he nominated a 
number of them to lead PPP with him.177 This move estranged his middle-class 
educated supporters.178 Bhutto’s Islamisation policies also failed as the mainstream 
religious political parties vehemently opposed what they perceived were western, 
secular or socialist inclinations in Bhutto’s governance.179 Once again, to appease the 
religious lobby, Bhutto compromised democratic principles of the rights of minorities; 
Ahmadis (who believe that they are followers of Islam), a minority in Pakistan, were 
declared officially as non-Muslims in 1974.180 
 
To summarise, the second wave of democratisation was a lost opportunity to establish 
representative democracy in a broken Pakistan of 1971. Though initially Bhutto 
fostered the popular support, idealised parliamentary representative democracy with an 
ideological preference for socialist democracy, in the end he failed to deliver a liberal 
state with his intolerance for a legitimate political opposition. Like his predecessors, 
Bhutto chose politics of co-optation, personalised authority and control as opposed to 
strengthening democratic institutions. Wider participation and grass-roots political 
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mobilisation was restrained. On the problem of regional autonomy, though the 
Constitution was apparently sensitive to the smaller provinces and concessions were 
given to federalism, “the authority of the central government was left essentially 
unchanged.”181 In his zeal to centralise authority within the lower-house of the 
Parliament and to denigrate the army and bureaucracy, Bhutto paradoxically 
established more centres of authority and became increasingly dependent on the 
bureaucracy, police and the intelligence agencies.182  
 
In the end, Bhutto became the victim of his own doings. In 1976, the mainstream 
religious parties with other political groupings formed a political alliance known as the 
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) against Bhutto’s drastic nationalisation of agro-
industries.183 PNA simply wanted to break the PPP which proved not so difficult given 
that the PPP itself never managed to rise as a truly democratic party with public support. 
In these circumstances, PPP’s landslide victory in 1977 elections was challenged as 
fraudulent by the PNA and other opposition parties.184 Street-demonstrations were held 
all around the country calling for Bhutto’s resignation.185 To their side, the PNA’s 
religious leaders had the new COAS, General Zia-ul-Haq. The night Bhutto told the 
press that he would agree to all the demands put forward by the PNA including holding 
of the fresh elections in both the centre and the provinces, and would sign the 
agreement, the very next morning, on July 5, 1977, Zia ordered for the military coup 
and seized power.186 
 
Personalising democracy: the third wave of democratisation (1989 - 1998) 
With General Zia-ul-Haq in power, 1977 set into motion a second reverse wave of 
democratisation in Pakistan which lasted until 1988. Zia belonged to a middle-class 
family of East Punjab who migrated to Pakistan in 1947.187 He believed that Islam was 
the reason behind the idea of Pakistan and was keen to construct a stronger, religiously 
driven authoritarian regime, which naturally attracted support from the religious groups 
                                                 
181 Jalal (n 8) p193. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Weinbaum (n 7). 
185 Jaffrelot (n 33); Jalal (n 8). 
186 Jalal (n 8). Khawaja (n 69). 
187 Jaffrelot (n 33). 
 121 
who led the campaign against Bhutto.188 Like Ayub, Zia too blamed politicians for their 
failure to compromise and forcing the country near anarchy.189 Unlike Ayub, Zia 
remained as COAS as well the Martial Law Administrator.190 He promised free and fair 
elections within ninety days, dissolved the Parliament and placed the Constitution of 
1973 in abeyance.191 With the Constitution not abrogated but ‘merely’ placed in 
abeyance, the President elected under the 1973 Constitution continued to be the 
President indicating a continuity of the constitutive order.192 Once again, Zia’s coup 
was validated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan with a ruling entitled ‘Begum Nusrat 
Bhutto V. The Chief of the Army Staff and Another’ on the grounds of ‘necessity’ in 
the interest of the state and public welfare.193 This validity ensured a “durable basis for 
the garrison state.”194 The ruling also empowered Zia to amend the Constitution “at 
will.”195  
 
The politics of patronage soon became evident. With political parties banned, Zia 
appointed his Council of Advisors in 1978, which was a combination of civil 
bureaucrats and the army officers.196 Furthermore, retired army officers were appointed 
as provincial governors and ambassadors.197 Politicians were co-opted to join as 
ministers.198 Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq was appointed by Zia who subsequently 
validated the coup and sentenced Bhutto to be hanged.199 
 
Unlike Ayub and Yahya who followed a ‘moderate’ style governance, Zia’s martial 
rule was focused on ‘a state sponsored Islamic ideology’.200 Given the power to amend 
laws, Zia passed a series of presidential orders in 1979, including the order to establish 
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the Federal Shariat Court and the Acceleration of Islamisation Committee as 
constitutional bodies to ensure that the legal and political frameworks conform to 
Islamic principles.201 Other steps taken to implement Zia’s Islamisation include the 
zakat and ushr (agriculture tax) laws, hudood ordinances (laws of Islamic punishment), 
interest free banking, and qanoon-e-shahadat (law of evidence).202 Elected parliament 
was replaced by Majlis-e-Shura in 1981 consisting 350 members appointed by Zia as 
advisors on Islamic governance.203  
 
The global political context was favourable to Zia’s Islamisation. During 1980s, US 
supported Zia’s Islamisation as ideological resistance to counter Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.204 Zia was not criticised for delaying the elections and returning Pakistan 
to a democratic order. Instead, billions of dollars were given to Pakistan in aid to finance 
jihad (holy struggle of Muslims) against the ‘evil empire’.205 Ahmad asserts that the 
Afghan Jihad’s adverse impacts became a curse for generations of Pakistanis.206 There 
was an ‘extraordinary proliferation’ of drugs and guns which came from Afghanistan 
and Iran. Proliferations of weapons fuelled violence between diverse ethnic and 
religious communities.207 
  
The rampant civil unrest throughout the country may have shaken the foundations of 
Zia’s military coercion. Pakistanis started doubting Zia’s promise of general elections 
as the elections were never announced, despite his continuous promises.208 PPP had 
geared up gradually to launch and lead a multi-party Movement for the Restoration of 
Democracy (MRD) under the leadership of Nusrat Bhutto (late Bhutto’s wife).209 MRD 
consisted of former PNA parties including the Islamist Jamiat-Ulma-e-Islam (JUI) and 
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several smaller parties.210 Consequently, to legitimise his rule, in 1983 Zia held local 
elections which resulted in ‘a class’ of local politicians, including large landowners, 
who looked up to Zia for patronage.211 Later, in December 1984, a country-wide 
referendum was held to ask the public whether they approved Zia’s Islamisation 
policies; MRD and many other political parties boycotted the referendum.212 
Nevertheless, Zia secured a significant vote in his favour which was disbelieved by 
most observers and considered a massive fraud.213 Legislative elections were then 
announced on a non-party basis in 1985 and were once again boycotted by MRD, now 
led by Benazir Bhutto (Bhutto’s daughter).214 The opposition notwithstanding, Zia 
proceeded with the elections and ended up with an elected parliament of his choice. He 
then went on to establish a much larger political base for his rule in the form of a 
national political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), persuaded Muhammad 
Khan Junejo to lead PML and appointed him as the Prime Minister.215 This was the 
Parliament which passed the controversial Eighth Amendment to the Constitution 
giving Zia overarching powers over the prime minister and empowered provincial 
governors with similar authority to dismiss the provincial governments.216 Martial Law 
was finally lifted on December 31, 1985 and Zia became the President of Pakistan.  
 
However, public’s opposition to Zia’s rule did not disappear. Pakistanis from various 
walks of life started organising themselves to challenge the dictatorship, both within 
Pakistan and abroad.217 Political resistance to Zia’s regime inspired poets and 
intellectuals of Pakistan to denounce his ‘rule by whip’.218 Contribution of the civil 
society and NGOs in resistance to Zia’s dictatorial rule will be discussed below. Suffice 
to say that poets, intellectuals, lawyers and teachers were coming out in support of the 
leading political parties, calling for the return of democracy and the MRD. Benazir had 
emerged as a beacon for democracy and received a warm welcome as she returned from 
London in April 1986, where she lived in exile.219 PPP also gained the support from the 
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Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) – a rising political party in Karachi. MQM held 
demonstrations that disturbed the government in Sindh. To prove he was still in control, 
Zia dismissed Prime Minister Junejo in May 1988 and took Karachi under direct federal 
control.220 Until his mysterious death in a plane crash in August 1988, Zia retained his 
authority over the governing apparatus aided by the ‘ever-powerful military 
institutions’.221 His death left a ‘power vacuum’222  to be eventually filled by Pakistan’s 
third wave of democratisation. 
  
Talbot argues that the ‘longevity’ and ‘severity’ of Zia’s rule had ‘an especially 
pernicious impact’ on the prospects for democratisation in Pakistan.223 Most 
importantly, Zia’s demise did not mean the demise of the army-bureaucracy 
‘establishment’ which was by now firmly rooted in Pakistan’s politics. With army’s 
support, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, yet another bureaucrat of the colonial times and the 
Chairman Senate under Zia’s rule was elevated to the post of the President.224 The 
general elections were held at both national and provincial levels in November 1988, 
after eleven years of dictatorship. 
 
PPP seemed as the most deserving political party to lead democratisation. Over the 
years, it managed to revive Bhutto’s charisma and attracted the public appeal for its 
discord against Zia’s authority. Benazir was leading the party. Educated in England, 
she possessed a modern, westernised and young persona. Daughter of the martyred 
leader, Benazir had an appeal in public, urban and rural at large, for her family’s 
sacrifices for Pakistan.225 On the other hand, PML had now broken into two distinct 
political parties: PML-N was led by Nawaz Sharif, while Junejo had formed a separate 
party after his dismissal known as PML-Junejo. Politics of factions once again took 
root, furthered by those who had clear vested interests in this emerging political 
arrangement. The outgoing military elite, led by Mirza Aslam Beg, with the support of 
other military institutions, guided opposition parties to form an alliance to counter 
PPP.226 The alliance was known as Islami Jamhuri Ittihad – IJI (Islamic Democratic 
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Alliance). The elections resulted in PPP’s winning just over 25% of the votes; highest 
in proportion to other parties but short to achieve an overall majority.227 Most 
significantly, Punjab retained its historical support for the PML.228 Benazir forged an 
alliance with MQM with their stronghold in Karachi, but needed more weight to lead 
the government. Like her father, Benazir tried to attract large landlords and big 
businesses with winning constituencies, and opened doors even for those who had 
historically been in opposition of PPP.229 Most importantly, Benazir had to assure the 
army her allegiance for its policies on Afghanistan and India; not to reduce the military 
budget; and for proliferation of the nuclear programme.230 She also accepted to let Ishaq 
Khan serve a full term in office as President and to appoint retired army officers as her 
closest aides in government.231  
 
In December 1988, Benazir formed the government as democracy returned to Pakistan. 
This apparently popular civilian government was essentially a ‘compromised’ ruling 
coalition.232 Jaffrelot argues, that the 1988 Pakistan “re-established, under a new form, 
the old ‘colonial diarchy’” of the British times of 1919 Reforms whereas the governors 
had control over the ministers and the executive was answerable to both the government 
as well as the governors.233 With the Eighth Amendment still intact, though Benazir 
was responsible to the elected Assembly, she remained subservient to Ishaq Khan who 
owed his presidency to the military high command. To revert the Eighth Amendment, 
Benazir needed a two-thirds majority in the Parliament which she simply couldn’t 
muster.  
 
In addition to the weak parliament, Benazir’s government inherited a polity which was 
deeply divided on ethnic and sectarian lines; plagued by the culture of guns and drugs; 
and faced the Afghan refugee crisis post Zia’s policies on Afghanistan Jihad. 
Externally, Benazir’s friendly invitation to American diplomats, who were critical of 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions after the fall of Soviet Union in 1989, was the most 
alarming for Pakistani army. Subsequently, Benazir’s government collapsed.234 On 
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August 6, 1990, Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir and dissolved the National Assembly 
using powers vested in him under Article 58(2b) of the Constitution with the charges 
of ‘corruption’ and ‘maladministration’.235 Upon Benazir’s petition against her 
dismissal, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s decision. 
 
On 24th October 1990, Pakistanis went to the polls once again. PPP lost against IJI’s 
supported Sharif who became the Prime Minister in December 1990.236 A Punjabi 
businessman, Sharif was a minister under Zia. He immediately sought to preserve the 
interests of the business community which supported him. Nearly 89 public companies 
were privatised and exchange controls were relaxed.237 However, external political 
developments were going against Sharif’s economic liberalisation. US having lost 
interest in Pakistan, suspended substantive American aid to rescue Pakistan’s 
economy.238 Consequently, new taxes were imposed which infuriated the businesses 
and the urban middle-class – the foundation for PML-N support.239 Despite introducing 
social schemes for improving the economic conditions for the poor, PML-N’s 
government was caught up with corruption and embezzlement of government resources 
for personal gains.240 PML-N also tried to revert aspects of the Eighth Constitutional 
Amendment with a proposed Twelfth Amendment seeking authority for the Prime 
Minister to take over control of the provincial governments; an act which upset a career 
bureaucrat turned President, Ishaq Khan.241 The scrimmage for authority between the 
Prime Minister and President led to another dissolution of the Parliament on 18 April, 
1993. Once again, the charges included ‘maladministration, nepotism and 
corruption.’242 Nawaz petitioned against his dismissal in the Supreme Court. This time 
however, in an unprecedented U-Turn, the Supreme Court ruled in his favour and 
declared the dismissal non-constitutional.243 It is believed that the reason for higher 
court’s positive decision was encouraged by the new COAS’s neutrality towards the 
situation.244 In the next six months, Ishaq Khan and Sharif left no stone unturned to 
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defeat each other at the war of authority over provincial governments. In the end, army 
intervened for face-saving its aide Ishaq Khan and fashioned a compromise whereby 
both Ishaq Khan and Sharif resigned and the fresh elections were called.245 
 
Between 1993 and 1996, PPP returned to power with the help of a political alliance like 
1990s. Benazir’s planned a stronger return by appointing PPP’s senior member, Farooq 
Laghari as President. However, Benazir’s personalised authoritative rule with her 
husband Asif Ali Zardari’s infamous corruption and continuous political interference, 
significantly hindered any  transition to democracy.246 As war in Afghanistan broke out, 
civil unrest in NWFP heightened and Shi’a-Sunni sectarian violence became worst.247 
In the end, a dispute over Benazir’s appointment of Lahore High Court judges against 
the Constitution alarmed the higher courts who managed to oust Benazir’s government 
with President Laghari’s decision to dismiss the government.248  
 
Elections were held again in February 1997 and PML-N came to power with a 
significant majority. PPP was wiped out even in its stronghold in Sindh. Positioned 
comfortably in the Parliament, Sharif’s government set out to amend the Constitution. 
The Thirteenth Amendment annulled the Article 58(2) and Article 101 obliged the 
president henceforth to consult the prime minister for nominating provincial governors; 
similarly, governors were deprived of their powers to dismiss the provincial 
governments. The President also lost his powers to appoint military leaders. Now with 
absolute control, Sharif began to govern as Benazir did previously. He too sought to 
reign the higher judiciary and once again President Laghari objected. In December 
1997, army brokered yet another compromise by which both the President and Prime 
Minister resigned leaving a vacuum of authority. Sharif, however, was called back to 
continue to lead the government as he sought to establish an ‘elective dictatorship’ 
rather than to strengthen parliamentary democracy. His government proposed the 
Fifteenth Amendment Bill on 9 October 1998 and began intimidating the media for 
criticising the government. The proposed amendment was to empower him to 
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implement Sharia as the supreme law of the land. Passed through the National 
Assembly, the Amendment Bill was rejected by the Senate.249  
 
Jalal asserts that Sharif in late 90s had become “one of the most powerful prime 
ministers in Pakistan’s history.”250 So far, the army stayed out of directly interfering in 
politics but it was not ready to accept Sharif’s supremacy. Despite a grave financial 
crisis, military’s expenditure remained very high and it continued to influence 
Pakistan’s foreign policy. Besides, with the controversial Eighth Amendment removed, 
the option for a ‘constitutional coup’ was unavailable to the army.251 Tensions had 
grown between the army and Sharif’s government over the latter’s distaste for the 
Council of Defence and National Security (CDNS) – an advisory body on national 
security – through which army formally shared decision-making with politicians.252 
Finally, over the Kargil conflict with India, Sharif blamed the military and held it 
entirely responsible.253 Sharif also indicated that to improve Pakistan’s standing in the 
global community, he was likely to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. That may have 
nailed it; COAS Musharraf carried out a coup on 12 October 1999. The coup triggered 
a third reverse wave of democratisation in Pakistan. 
 
This eleven-year wave of democratisation was disorderly in the sense that despite the 
opportunity, major political parties failed to establish stronger democratic institutions 
and continued to undermine Pakistanis’ trust in democracy. Though crucial 
constitutional gains were made, they were mainly used to exercise ‘parliamentary 
dictatorship’. Both PPP and PML-N proved to be corrupt and internally undemocratic 
as they tried to establish their ‘personalised’ rule. Army retained its policy-making role 
with no compromises on military’s expenditure. 
 
Re-constitutionalising democracy: the fourth wave of democratisation (2008 -) 
General Parvez Musharraf began his coup with the arrest of Sharif and taking a full 
control of the national television network.254 As in the past, the army met with no 
resistance from the public or the political society. Hoffman argues that the failure of 
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democratic regimes following ‘major divisions’ within the political leadership, 
develops a sense of ‘authoritarian nostalgia’ in which public looks back to the ‘good 
times’ of past dictatorships.255 Musharraf and his aides in the army had a good sense of 
public’s mood. Though the army did not have the constitutional means to legitimise its 
coup, it knew that the disorderliness of the outgoing democratic rules had left the 
masses with a desire for stability. An examination of the earlier reverse waves to 
authoritarian regimes highlights that army has ‘always’ taken over with the assistance 
of bureaucracy, political parties in opposition, judiciary and the members of parliament 
itself.256 There was not a single demonstration anywhere in the country against the coup. 
Sharif was tried in the court and found guilty of tax evasion, corruption, hijacking of 
Musharraf’s plane and terrorism.257 He was exiled to Saudi Arabia after a political 
arrangement with Musharraf.258 
 
Musharraf’s approach to administrative rule was more or less the same as the dictators 
before him; government and parliament were dissolved and the Constitution was placed 
in abeyance; the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was proclaimed in 1999 which 
denied courts the authority to challenge any orders of the Proclamation of Emergency 
and PCO.259 A new government was then installed with the chosen few as the cabinet 
members whilst judiciary was forced to take new oath of office in 2000 under the 
authority of the PCO.260 The Supreme Court validated Musharraf’s coup and declared 
that coup d’etat and revolution are ‘interchangeable’ to achieve certain objectives.261 
As the Chief Executive of Pakistan, Musharraf formed a National Security Council 
(NSC) consisting six members from military higher command and competent advisors 
on civil matters.262 NSC supervised a council of ministers consisting of businessmen 
and professionals. Press was allowed ‘restricted’ freedom mostly to establish that the 
new regime followed a liberal agenda.263 Military budget continued to account for its 
biggest share in the GDP.264 Retired army officers were appointed to civilian posts and 
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millions of acres of land was allocated to the military men, making them feudals, both 
in terms of land holdings and mentality.265   
 
Musharraf’s political rhetoric was similar to Ayub’s as he proclaimed to build a ‘real’ 
democracy as opposed to what he termed the ‘sham democracy’ of civilian 
governments. Talbot writes: 
Although Musharraf was initially adept at speaking the language of 
an internationally acceptable ‘good-governance’ agenda, with its 
vocabulary of transparency, accountability and empowerment, the 
attempt to build a ‘real’ democracy boiled down to the tried and 
trusted approaches of the country’s previous military rulers: namely, 
a process of accountability to discipline political opponents, rather 
than root out across-the-board corruption; the curtailing of political 
activity; and the attempt to build direct links with the populace by 
means of local government reforms which bypassed the influence of 
the political opposition.266 
 
Local elections were held in 2001 on a non-party basis during which Musharraf obliged 
aspiring politicians to get organised for the general elections planned for 2002. Like 
Zia, Musharraf held a national referendum in April 2002, seeking legitimacy and 
extension of his rule as the president for the next five years.267 As per plan, the 
referendum’s fraudulent results brought victory for Musharraf. Under the ‘grip of a 
history’, Musharraf founded his own political party the PML(Q) – the ‘Q’ standing for 
Quaid-e-Azam.268 Patronage extended, the PML(Q) was soon filled with opportunist 
politicians. The October 2002 general elections brought a coalition government with 
PML(Q) and its allies, notably the Islamist parties, in power.269 Musharraf’s term as 
President was extended until 2007. Being firmly in post, Musharraf led the parliament 
to pass the Seventeenth Amendment Bill which reverted the Eighth Amendment.270 
  
Soon after Musharraf took power, Pakistan was asked to support the US and its allies 
in their ‘War on Terror’ against Al-Qaeda.271 The terrorist attacks in the US in 2001 
turned the initial international disdain for Musharraf’s coup in his favour. Pakistan 
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became an ‘essential ally’ to US and allowed the use of its air space and intelligence to 
capture Osama bin Laden. Musharraf told the nation that if Pakistan refused to 
cooperate with US, India would exploit the situation to convince the international 
community that Pakistan was a terrorist state.272 The historic ‘fear’ and ‘insecurity’ that 
India would undermine Pakistan’s image was once again employed for political gains. 
In return for its cooperation, Pakistan received massive military and economic aid and 
removal of US economic sanctions which benefited Pakistan’s economy.273   
 
Though Musharraf was initially successful in taming the religious based political 
parties and their alliance, they were not happy with Musharraf’s pro-US policies and 
military action to restraint Al-Qaeda and its supporters in Waziristan.274 Military 
insurgency was rising across Pakistan. At the same time, the international community 
was getting impatient with Pakistan’s ambiguous support as it has been unable to help 
with capturing Osama bin Laden or curb increasing religious violence. Pressure was 
built on Musharraf to return Pakistan to a democratic order.275  
 
A parallel domestic development was lawyers’ movement of a mass dissent against the 
dismissal of the Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry by Musharraf on 9 March 2007 over 
his determination to investigate the cases of missing political activists in Balochistan.276 
The dismissed Chief Justice had the support of prominent members of judiciary who 
were also political activists in their personal capacities.277 A protest movement turned 
into a political movement against Musharraf’s arbitrary rule. Subsequently, on 20 July 
2007 Supreme Court reinstated the Chief Justice but Chaudhry’s activism had 
threatened the military’s usual disregard for the rule of law and accountability.278 In the 
following months tensions between Musharraf and the Supreme Court heightened over 
the issue of his dual roles as both President and COAS. Meanwhile, Benazir had also 
returned to Pakistan in October 2007 as fresh elections were due in January 2008. Upon 
arrival, there was a bomb explosion at her public rally in Karachi which killed and 
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injured hundreds of civilians. Benazir was unharmed but she indicated that Musharraf, 
and his men in the army, might have been behind the assassination attack.279 
  
With both judiciary and political society revolting against him, Musharraf declared a 
state of emergency on 3 November 2007. 280 To denounce Musharraf, massive 
resistance was organised by lawyers who took to the streets.281 There was a media 
black-out and most political leaders were arrested. In the end, due to both foreign and 
domestic pressures, Musharraf gave up his post as COAS. Musharraf also had to allow 
Sharif to return to Pakistan ahead of the upcoming elections. At this point, it was risky 
even for the army to continue to support Musharraf’s personalised politics.282 On 27 
December 2007, during the election campaign, Benazir was assassinated. Musharraf 
lost further credibility and support amongst the international community which was 
historically sympathetic to Benazir as the first female leader of a Muslim country. The 
responsibility for her murder remained unresolved like many other political murder 
mysteries in Pakistan.283  Following her death, massive protests and civil unrest racked 
Pakistan. The divided people and political society were now united against Musharraf 
who resigned as president on 18 August, 2008, after PPP’s simple victory in general 
elections held on 18 February 2008.  
 
The current wave of democratisation thus began in 2008. Since no party had a simple 
majority, in an unprecedented move, PPP and PML-N agreed to form a government. 
They agreed to restore the judges dismissed in the previous year. PPP’s senior politician 
Yousuf Raza Gilani became the Prime Minister.284 PPP was now being led by Benazir’s 
husband Zardari as the interim leader.285 
  
The coalition civilian government faced immense challenges with regards to military 
operations against Islamist insurgents in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
and areas of NWFP. It had to knowingly take the blame for fighting America’s war 
against its own people; something that it was willing to do to keep the army away from 
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politics. Rifts between the coalition parties started to emerge, primarily on the problem 
of restoration of judges which led to PML-N leaving the coalition. PPP then rallied the 
support from other parties including MQM and ANP (Awami National Party) and 
remained in government. Zardari was sworn in as president in September 2008.   
 
Being the President, Zardari showed surprising skills in managing the new coalition 
government by navigating compromises. But insurgency in northern areas worsened. 
Pakistan has long been at war with itself. The public mood was increasingly aggressive 
towards US for its drone-strike and collateral damage of thousands of civilians’ killings 
in the troubled northern areas.286 Meanwhile, relations with India were also critical due 
to militants’ attack in Mumbai in 2008, in which Pakistan was allegedly implicated.287 
In these circumstances, against the mood of the public, Zardari let the military handle 
the foreign and defence policies. He strived to secure the required support in the 
national assembly to pass the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 2010.288 
This Amendment introduced a great number of reforms most significant of which relate 
to: the removal of the Presidential power to dissolve the elected assemblies and greater 
powers to the Prime Minister;289 re-naming of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province from the 
earlier NWFP conceding to the demand from people of the region;290 establishing a 
local government system in all provinces;291 repeal of LFO implemented by 
Musharraf;292 and an express linking of the abrogation or suspension of the Constitution 
to the High Crime of Treason.293 Now, at least constitutionally, the parliament, the 
prime minister, the judiciary, and the provincial governments had more autonomy than 
ever in an otherwise military-dominated state.294 
 
Political turmoil was rampant during the PPP led government as 2012 proved to be the 
judiciary’s year. The Supreme Court not only asked for the resignation of the sitting 
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prime minister on 19 June 2012, it also maintained pressure on the succeeding prime 
minister to not pursue the allegations of corruption and money laundering against 
Zardari.295 Zardari managed to mobilise the National Assembly to pass a ‘Contempt of 
Court Act’ against the judiciary which the Supreme Court declared illegal in August 
2012. Chief Justice Chaudhary also reopened old cases involving the former army 
officials and made the army’s fraudulent practices open to the public for the first time 
in Pakistan’s history.296 In his continuous assaults against the parliament, Chaudhary 
alarmed many of his former supporters from the lawyers’ movement. They believed 
that Chaudhary was moving with a ‘personalised power’ agenda against the politicians. 
After all, judges were not elected representatives of the people and were now 
‘arrogating’ power to themselves.297 
   
Earlier in May 2011, Osama bin Laden was found and killed by the US army operation 
in the garrison town of Abbottabad without Pakistan army’s knowledge. If the army 
had not collaborated with US, it must be incompetent not to be aware of the attack. 
Pakistani citizens were outraged against the army. One incident of mass-killing of 
civilians and security personals followed another. Meanwhile, US government kept 
praising Pakistan for being a good partner in the fight against terrorism while also 
acknowledging that the approach to fighting insurgency of the two countries was 
different.298 
  
With the higher judiciary, army and opposition political parties, all against the PPP led 
government, it is surprising that it lasted for its full term. Zardari’s ‘legendary 
corruption’ continued and dampened PPP’s credibility, but it was not enough to 
collapse the government, which persisted against all odds. The next general elections 
were scheduled for May 11, 2013. The PPP and its ruling alliance with ANP and MQM 
was blamed for every ill of the past years, both by the opposition political parties and 
by the media. This time the election campaign was manipulated by the militant 
organisations who managed to restrain PPP and its alliance from holding public rallies 
and gaining support for their agenda.299 The main opposition parties including PML-N, 
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Imran Khan’s ‘Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaaf’ (PTI) and religious political parties were 
‘permitted’ to campaign by the militant organisations. It is an ‘open secret’ that the 
army and the ISI were behind this intimidation.300 Nevertheless, it was a risky election 
campaign under fear of the Taliban, who openly opposed democracy and election as 
‘un-Islamic’. Despite threats, with security of the polling stations on high alert, there 
was a good voter turn-out.301 PML-N won the election and PTI emerged as a potential 
new political force, but mainly in the urban areas.  
 
The election of 2013 transformed the image of the main political parties. Talbot asserts 
that PML-N emerged as more balanced and mature with a clear political agenda, a full 
grip in Punjab and with supporters in both urban and rural communities.302 PTI 
appealed to the educated urban youth while PPP considerably lost its national appeal 
and came to be viewed as a ‘feudal’ party that was out of touch with its traditional rural 
base and urban workers. Religious parties retained their status as semi-popular and 
traditionally unable to win popular votes in big numbers. All parties remained 
‘dynastic’ and ‘undemocratic’ institutions, but appeared to somewhat defensive against 
their structural and institutional ambiguities and democratic weaknesses.  
 
The 2013 elections were soon accused of rigging and electoral malpractices. PTI most 
significantly accused the PML-N and the election commission for serious 
wrongdoings.303 Imran Khan led street protests, long marches and street sit-ins 
(famously called dharna) throughout 2014 calling for a judicial commission to 
investigate electoral rigging and for the resignation of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister. 
These protests, however, were to no avail. Judiciary remained active, but now with 
restraint as Chaudhry resigned in 2014.  
  
Despite the outcry against Zardari in almost all political circles, his departure as the 
President was awarded with official honour and succeeded by PML-N’s supported 
candidate, Mamnoon Hussain. General Raheel Sharif became the COAS in 2013 and 
retired after completing his full term of three years in November 2016. Throughout his 
tenure, General Raheel outshined politicians by keeping up with the crackdown of 
                                                 





Islamist militant groups. It seems that the army and the civilian governing elite worked 
together through a compromise whereby the army led foreign and defence policies 
while leaving domestic political working to the civilian government. Similar to 
previous years, army once again managed to win the support of the public. However, 
this time it remained officially behind barracks. Such a state may also be the result of 
Sharif’s mature politics which involved compromises with the army and other political 
allies and opposition leaders. Against PTI’s dharna politics, PPP supported PML-N’s 
response for it respected the parliament as an institution to resolve political disputes.  
 
At present, PML-N led government continues to be in power. The China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC) is under construction and is likely to add to the geopolitical 
significance of Pakistan in the region. The accountability of politicians’ financial 
doings by the Supreme Court has recently resulted in the ousting of Nawaz Sharif as 
the Prime Minister.304 The court cases on the Panama leaks controversy have brought 
all political parties to accuse each other for corruption and financial wrongdoings. 
Sharif had appointed a new COAS Qamar Javed Bajwa who was believed to be much 
more reserved and ‘apolitical’ than his predecessor General Raheel and was expected 
to support the civilian government’s authority. However, with Sharif’s removal, 
General Bajwa’s alleged partiality is in a limbo. Though Sharif was removed, the 
civilian government led by PML-N continued. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi of PML-N was 
sworn in as the interim Prime Minister in August 2017. It is widely speculated that he 
will remain as the Prime Minister until the next general elections to be held in 2018.  
 
It may be argued that the unprecedented continuity of democratic governance is moving 
towards sustenance or consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. However, democracy’s 
inexorability is still an open question. Pakistan has indeed witnessed promising 
developments since 2008. With the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
constitutional certainty for the continuation of parliamentary governance was secured 
and paths were outlined for the devolution of powers between the centre and the 
provinces. Yet, political parties’ failure to amend the Articles 62 and 63 through the 
Eighteenth Amendment made it possible for the Supreme Court to use these for 
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dismissing Sharif in 2017. In the previous years, despite PTI’s and other religious 
parties’ dharna politics, the army and judiciary had kept their distance from delving 
into the mainstream politics. This changed with the recent Panama leaks controversy. 
The regional tensions still abound as Balochistan continues to resist Federal 
government’s control over its internal affairs. Recurrent tensions with India and 
Afghanistan and the recent adversarial shift in the US’s support for Pakistan’s fight 
against terrorist networks is likely to result in the army keeping its grip on foreign policy 
and strategic affairs. Lastly, the mainstreaming of religious fundamentalist groups (of 
previously banned terrorist groups) is underway with many emerging as political parties 
under new names and openly touring major cities to gather support for the next general 
elections. These recent developments, given the historical trajectory of political 
organisation and democratisation discussed above, are perhaps not surprising. Yet they 
can be argued to be disappointing in the face of the optimism which, until recently, was 
associated with the continuation of civilian democratic governance and its promising 
future.  
 
Democratic deficit  
The four waves of democratisation in Pakistan unravel a discourse of ‘democratic 
deficit’ that is far more engrained in the Pakistani society than the simplified 
understanding of the causes and effects of political events. Yet, it is only by looking 
deeper into the events and actors’ behaviours that the premises of this discourse could 
be articulated. I acknowledge the arguments debated above that the political, social and 
economic deficits for democratising Pakistan have been burdened by its history. 
Pakistan’s beginnings with an elitist edifice of politics were inherited from the British 
colonial rule, in which the minority elite ruled at the expense of the participation by the 
majority. This left a cultural legacy where agreeing minority ‘elite pacts’ between 
political actors became the norm. Subsequently, the majority’s claim on the governing 
apparatus by East Pakistan was nipped very early on by the minority ruling elite and 
the emerging urban salariat including bureaucrats. In the late 1950s, as the army began 
to intervene in politics, the discourse of ‘national security’ was instigated. Thus, the 
bureaucracy-army ‘establishment’ took roots in the already elitist political edifice of 
Pakistan. Furthermore, in the fear of India’s regional hegemony, Islam was used as the 
unifying identity and as the justification for the otherwise unjustifiable military 
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resources. In establishing the legal architecture of a nascent state, Islam was 
‘appropriated’ by the judiciary to claim a contrary ideological and cultural stance 
against the secular colonial legal systems which continued to govern Pakistan. Such 
elitism and ideological contestations were manifested in the fractured 
constitutionalisation of Pakistan in its formative years. 
 
Yet, whilst the historical beginnings and structural factors of elitism, authoritarianism, 
the ‘infusing’ of Islam as the national identity and basis for the legal systems,305 and 
the discourse of national insecurity contributed significantly in creating the democratic 
deficit in Pakistan, these cannot be singularly attributed to the structural determinants 
inherited from the British rule. The choices that the political actors made in the last 
seventy years, and the effects of evolving external factors from the polarisation of the 
Cold War to the War on Terror, have considerably reconfigured the boundaries of 
political governance in Pakistan. In this sense, political actors are not only constituted 
by their environment, they also constitute it. Talbot and Adeney argue that in 
understanding the divergent trajectories of democratic governance in Pakistan and 
India, a structure-agency dichotomy will not be useful.306 In agreeing with this 
observation, I contend further that though such a dichotomy provides many structural 
factors as premises of democratic deficit, it does not explain the resilience of 
democracy. There is a need to shift our focus to a more dynamic and mutually 
constitutive relationship between politics and political actors.   
 
In this sense, a few observations can be made to understand the resilience of democracy 
in Pakistan. Firstly, despite the minority elite-led politics of ML that undermined the 
majority claims over governance, other political parties emerged in ML’s opposition 
and developed and sustained their political role. They generated mass support against 
the ruling elites and the subsequent dictatorships. Even before the secession of East 
Pakistan, there were recurrent joint resistance movements by the political parties. In 
1965, political parties formed the COP against Ayub Khan to demand the return of 
democracy. Similarly, in the 1980s, the MRD kept challenging the formidable 
dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq. Despite all encompassing co-optation of political 
and civil actors, General Musharraf’s dictatorship was brought down by the main 
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political parties with the support from the lawyers’ movement in 2007. Though the main 
political parties have been persistently led by the feudal and tribal chiefs and have 
stayed ‘elite’ with a disregard for democratic and representative internal structures and 
grass-roots mobilisation, nevertheless, their contribution to demanding a representative 
democratic governing system cannot be ignored. It is also interesting to note that in all 
such democratic alliances, the main Islamist political parties were also involved!  
 
Another significant factor in the resilience of democratisation in Pakistan is the 
rejection of the political actors against the tendency of personalised rule. Since the 
advent of the bureaucratic rule in 1947 to the present political architecture of Pakistan, 
the recurrent pattern of entrenched personalised rule is evident. Yet, it is also clear that 
whenever the ruling elite (military or civilian) concentrated the governing authority (at 
its extreme) in the hands of a single political leader or a small group, it faced the 
opposition of combined political actors. For instance, during the third wave of 
‘personalised’ democratisation, both Benazir and Sharif tried to personalise authority 
to which they faced opposition within their own political parties and amongst allies. 
Their governments were toppled because of their arrogance and restriction of the space 
for political participation. Similarly, the personalised politics of General Musharraf was 
eventually resisted by the army itself.  
 
NGOs and Democratic Resilience 
Finally, the role of civil society and NGOs in democratisation is another important 
factor for democracy’s resilience. However, there is also an emerging skepticism about 
their potential for the support of democratic culture and institutions. I will now briefly 
discuss the nuances of these conflicting views.307  
 
A notable contribution of civil society and NGOs in Pakistan has been in the sphere of 
women’s rights. Though the history of women’s movements can be traced to the pre-
independence period,308 soon after independence, in 1948, women’s groups came 
together to protest against the state. They were demanding the property rights for 
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women as recognised by the Islamic law, which were not part of the colonial inherited 
state law.309 Calling the legislature to adopt the West Punjab Shariat Application Act, 
these women had the ‘added advantage to invoke Islam’ in their favour.310 Ever since 
then, many Muslim women’s civil society groups were formed including the All 
Pakistan’s Women’s Association (APWA); the Democratic Women’s Association and 
the Business and Professional Women’s Association.311 In the making of 1956 
Constitution, women’s groups lobbied to “secure some economic rights, recognition of 
equality of status, reserved seats and the right to double vote, i.e. a right to vote for 
candidates to general seats as well as for women to reserved seats.”312 Earlier in 1955, 
as a result of APWA’s campaign, the Family Laws Commission was established. It 
discouraged polygamy in drafting the Family Laws Ordinance of 1961.313 Women’s 
movements for the equality of status made significant headways in the subsequent years 
and gradually became visibly politicised during 1970s. During Zia’s martial law, 
women’s groups forcefully resisted the Islamisation of laws and the arbitrary 
imposition of the Islamic moral code on the society overall but more specifically on 
women. Women activists became particularly concerned about the promulgation of the 
1979 Hudood Ordinances aimed at Islamising the state criminal law.314 In 1982, the 
government promulgated the Law of Evidence (Qanoon-e-Shahdat) stipulating that a 
woman’s evidence in the court of law amounts to ‘half’ the evidence of a man.315 This 
inequality of the legal status evoked a strong response from women’s groups and gave 
birth to the Women’s Action Forum (WAF). Led by WAF, nation-wide protests 
demanded the repeal of the law.316 Bano opines that it was during 1980s when the term 
“NGO came into vogue” in Pakistan.317  In early 1980s, the MRD led by PPP and joined 
by other political parties had begun. WAF, APWA, Punjab Women’s Lawyers 
Association and other women’s rights NGOs supported the MRD by launching 
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women’s protests in favour of democracy and political parties.318 After Zia, women’s 
NGOs – which were now firmly established with some supported by international 
funding agencies – continued to influence law reforms for the equal status of women.319 
 
Within the wider civil society, Pakistan’s press and related institutions also contributed 
to democratisation. Malik argues that the authoritarian politics in Pakistan has 
profoundly affected the progressive potential of the press which has played an 
important role in the political sensitisation of the society about their civil and political 
rights.320 Khawaja describes the resistance movements and strikes observed by the trade 
unions during 1960s which crucially led to the resistance against the Ayub’s 
dictatorship.321 Other civil society groups including the human rights NGOs, most 
prominently the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), not only supported 
women’s rights but also other minority rights. HRCP also led campaigns for the return 
of democracy and supported the resistance movements led by the political parties on 
various occasions.322 At present there are several NGOs aiming at promoting 
democracy in Pakistan. These include the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), 
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), 
Democratic Commission for Human Rights and Development (DCHD), Aurat 
Foundation, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Strengthening Participatory 
Organisations (SPO) and others.323 Almost all NGOs are funded by international 
development agencies or international NGOs. All have presence in Islamabad with 
many having regional and local outreach offices in the main urban localities.  
 
Most of the existing, albeit limited, literature on the role of civil society and NGOs in 
democratisation is critical about the historical role of the state in curbing the progressive 
potential of these organisations.324 This literature considers the role of civil society and 
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NGOs as necessarily axiomatic in support of liberal and democratic values and culture. 
However, there has also been a criticism of the nature of civil society and NGOs. For 
instance, writing about women’s movements and resistance against dictatorships, Jalal 
argues that the elitist class origins of women leading women’s rights movements in the 
early days of Pakistan was the decisive factor in their relative success in an otherwise 
patriarchal social and political context.325 Zaidi suggests that the socially and culturally 
westernised Pakistani elite – the ‘life-style liberals’ in form of NGOs came out 
disproportionally to support General Musharraf’s dictatorship in the 1990s.326 He 
further argues that members of the civil society in Pakistan are ‘eager’ to be co-opted 
and ‘serve’ military governments.327 More recently, Bano has followed a similar line of 
argument and contended that the international aid to NGOs has significantly 
contributed to the ‘breakdown of cooperation’ amongst groups for social developmental 
causes, which used to be functioning and voluntary.328 Bano’s empirical research on 
the public perception of NGOs shows that NGOs in Pakistan are “elitist, unaccountable, 
lacking public trust, and unworthy of public donations.”329 These contrasting stand-
points can be possibly interpreted in a different way - if we accept the historical account 
of democratic deficit in Pakistan, then it can be assumed that the civil society and NGOs 
are also shaped by it. Therefore, they should be examined as ‘historical product’, 
embedded in the edifice of Pakistan’s politics. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I set out to explore the context of this research. In reviewing the 
academic literature on the democratic deficit in Pakistan, I have argued that whilst it is 
evident that democracy has not taken root, nevertheless, the struggle for democracy in 
Pakistan has also continued. Therefore, it is important to consider the premises of the 
resilience of democracy. To explore this argument, I analysed the stages of 
democratisation in Pakistan in four distinct waves and reverse waves over the span of 
seventy years.  
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I noted the key factors behind the ‘democratic deficit’ in Pakistan including its historical 
beginnings with British bureaucratic and administrative state structure; elite-led edifice 
of Pakistani movements; identity crises of the nascent state on the basis of religion and 
language; negation of the Bengali majority in organising national governance and the 
centralisation of state at the expense of provincial authority; development of the 
‘establishment’ and its influence on politics; Islamisation of the state laws; and external 
influences from Cold War to the War on Terror. In explaining the key factors behind 
the resilience of democracy, I suggested that the development and survival of political 
parties and their resistance against the dictatorships as well as the repeated rejection of 
the personalised rule of the leaders at the expense of isolating other political actors have 
been the significant reasons. The third premise or reason behind resilience is the role of 
civil society and NGOs in democratisation. However, reflecting on the nature and role 
of civil society in Pakistan’s democratisation, I have suggested that the existing limited 
research offers conflicting stand-points. On the one hand, civil society and NGOs are 
seen axiomatically as necessarily good for democratisation. Conversely, they are 
critically appraised and considered elitist, unaccountable and eager to serve military 
governments. However, I have contended that these contrasting stand-points could be 
read in a different way: in situating civil society and NGOs in Pakistan’s historical 
context, it would be useful to see them as ‘historical products’, embedded in the edifice 
of Pakistan’s politics and its democratic deficit as well as a force of resilience. In this 
sense, the civil society and NGOs mirror Pakistan’s political developments in their 
making and functions.  
 
In examining democratisation in four waves, I have argued that (a) despite its failure, 
the first wave of ‘testing’ democracy itself was crucial in establishing a polity in which 
democratic principles were debated, fought for, repeatedly ignored, altered and 
negotiated as compromises. Had Pakistan begun with autocracy, there would have been 
no such avenues; (b) the second wave of ‘idealising’ democracy was a lost opportunity 
to establish representative democracy in a broken Pakistan of 1971. Though initially 
Bhutto fostered the popular support, idealised parliamentary representative democracy 
with an ideological preference for socialist democracy, in the end he failed to deliver a 
liberal state owing to his intolerance for a legitimate political opposition; (c) the third 
wave of democratisation was disorderly and ‘personalised’ in the sense that despite the 
opportunity for the civilian governments, the major political parties failed to establish 
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stronger democratic institutions and continued to undermine Pakistanis’ trust in 
democracy. Though crucial constitutional gains were made, they were mainly used to 
exercise ‘parliamentary dictatorship’; and finally given the recent political 
developments of ‘re-constitutionalising’ Pakistan, the future of the fourth (current) 
wave of democratisation is uncertain – democracy’s inexorability is still an open 
question. 
 
Given this detailed historical context of Pakistan, Chapters V and VI will present an 
empirical analysis of this research on the role of NGOs in democratisation. 
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Chapter V: From Resistance to Submission 
In which a shift in NGOs’ approach to democratisation in Pakistan is presented. 
 
 
Over the years, there has been a gradual shift in NGOs’ approach to democratisation in 
Pakistan. This shift is illustrative of a timespan, in which, NGOs moved away from pro-
actively advocating for a democratic political system against the odds of dictatorship in 
the 1980s, to implementing neatly designed and lucratively funded projects for 
instituting a democratic system from the late 1990s onwards. This chapter illuminates 
how this shift in NGOs’ approach has come about. It explores the meanings of the terms 
- fight, movement, distorted process, and projectised democratisation. My aim is to go 
beyond the literal meanings of these terms to understand what they signify to the 
research participants. The purpose is to ‘get closer’ to the phenomenon of 
democratisation through the lived experiences of the people in it, i.e. the research 
participants. In doing so, a narrative unfolds, beginning with a vignette which is 
followed by three sections.  
 
The vignette is titled, ‘the dissent’. It is creatively adapted from an actual event in 
Lahore in 1983. The purpose of narrating a vignette is to illuminate and introduce the 
focus of the theme. Following the vignette, I explore how democratisation has diverged 
from dissent and resistance to projects. Next, I describe the consequences of this 
divergence. With rich empirical insights, I analyse concerns of the widening gap and 
disconnect between NGOs and the civil society; NGOs and the political society; 
parliament and political parties; and parliament and the state. I then reflect on the 
nuances of political disconnect and discuss its consequences, in which, the dissent is 
now obsolete but the bounds of projectised democratisation are disputed. In conclusion, 
I discuss whether the projectised democratisation anticipates the consolidation of 
democracy in Pakistan - with regards to the role of NGOs in democratisation, should 







Ab dehr mein be-yaar o madadgar nahin hum,  
Pehley ki tarah be-kas o lachaar nahin hum,  
Aata hai hamain apne muqaddar ko banana,  
Taqdeer peh shakir pas-e-deewar nahin hum.1 
 
No longer are we helpless, no longer without friends, 
No longer weak and dependent on others, 
We can make our own destinies,  
No longer are we grateful for our pre-ordained fate, 
No longer are we, behind the walls.2    
 
Habib Jalib, the famous revolutionary poet in Pakistan, recited these verse at the 1983 
protest organised by Women’s Action Forum in Lahore.  
 
February 12, 1983, was a cold but sunlit morning in Lahore. A few hundred women 
were gathered at Lahore’s iconic Regal Chowk to stage a protest against General Zia’s 
Islamisation laws. At the heart of Lahore city, Regal Chowk links the Temple and 
Lawrence Road with The Mall. A site known for staging protests since the 
Independence Movement, Regal Chowk was surrounded by concrete commercial 
buildings, some really old trees, hundreds of shops and stalls of Lahore’s celebrated 
street food. Always busy with commuters and sellers, the Chowk was walking distance 
from the Lahore High Court and the Punjab Assembly.  
 
Some women protesters were sitting on the street, forming a circle between them. 
Others were standing around. They were all surrounded by policemen in khaki 
uniforms, who armed with batons, far outnumbered the protestors. This protest had been 
called by a network of women activists, the Women Action Forum (W.A.F). Women 
of varied ages, classes and ethnicities were there including prominent women activists, 
lawyers, writers and poets.  Soon, they would march to the Lahore High Court with a 
petition against the military government’s proposed Qanoon-e-Shahadat (The Law of 
Evidence). They were holding placards and banners which read; ‘kaley qanoon wapis 
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lo’ (withdraw dark and draconian laws); ‘naam nihad shariat bill na manzoor’ (No to 
the Shariat Bill); ‘aurat ki aadhi hasiyat na manzoor’ (half-recognition of a woman 
unacceptable); ‘Aaeen bahaal karo’ (reinstate the Constitution), ‘jamhooriat ke haq me 
awaz buland karo’ (raise your voice for democracy); ‘khawateen mahaz-e-amal’ 
(Women in Action); and ‘Islam hum sab ka mazhab hai’ (Islam is our religion too). A 
small group of protesters began to burn their dupattas (long scarves) chanting, ‘Mullah 
raj na manzoor’ (Mullah rule unacceptable).  
 
Disbelief, disdain, and ridicule was visible on the faces of the policemen. There were a 
handful of male supporters standing with the protesters. As Jalib arrived, women hailed 
to welcome him. Encircled by them, Jailb recited his poem ‘Ab dehr mein be-yaar o 
madadgar nahin hum’. The powerful verse may have heightened the passion of 
protesters as their slogans grew louder. All of a sudden, policemen began the baton 
charge. The protesters were shocked and chaos followed. They were hit, pushed and 
shoved to the ground, randomly and aggressively. Perhaps, as women, they had not 
anticipated such a reaction by the police forces. Some were frightened and ran to the 
sides of the road. Most were undaunted. They fought back with bare hands, shoes and 
batons wrested from the policemen during the scuffles. Struggling against the onslaught 
of police batons, they helped fellow protesters with water and wiped their blood. The 
police then sprayed tear-gas to disperse the protestors. In few moments, the peaceful 
but passionate protest had turned ugly. Many protesters were injured and taken to the 
nearby hospitals. Many others were arrested. Jalib too, was beaten and arrested. By 
early afternoon, Regal Chowk was left empty with burnt logs, dupattas, blood, batons 
and tattered shoes. The passionate chants with lively presence of the protesters could 
no more be heard. A silent roar of violence and fear filled the air. 
 
[In conversation with an NGO personnel on the role of NGOs in democratisation] 
If you look at women’s rights, Women Action Forum was a network 
not funded by foreign organisations, it was funded by women 
themselves. Not a rupee was taken from abroad by the forum. They 
played a small, momentary, but significant role for democracy at a 
very important time when the Mujahedeen Movement was on, 
Islamisation was being pushed……. and Pakistan was proxy-fighting 
the Cold War through the prism of Islam. The women in Pakistan 
…………. broke down the framework that they (the government) had 
created for women. I think that they played a very important role. 
Perhaps it has not been given as much credit as it should…. It jolted 
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people not just in Pakistan, but even the international community 
woke up to the fact that General Zia was not such a benign dictator 
as he was being painted out to be by the Western powers.3  
 
Awe and pride are shared sentiments amongst most research participants as they 
referred to the 1983 Regal Chowk women’s protest against the dictatorship. They 
considered the demonstration as what used to be the essence of democratisation in 
Pakistan. It was a fight against coercion and in support for the values of freedom, 
equality of rights and political participation. It was a movement for democracy as an 
ideology and as a practice. And, most importantly, it was a collective fight of both 
political society and civil society, together, against the dictatorship. As another NGO 
personnel observed: 
 
The women’s movement of the 1980s against General Zia-ul-Haq 
became the movement for democracy. When women stood up against 
the Law of Evidence in 1983, that to me, if you analyse it, was the 
time that women came forward and fought for their rights and for 
democracy. It started as a movement against the Law of Evidence, 
moved into opposing Zia’s laws, and it soon incorporated other 
political activists, who were demanding democracy, in it.4  
 
Since then, however, democratisation has not been a fight or a movement. Rather, it has 
become a ‘distorted’ process:  
 
In my opinion, civil society participation, grassroots mobilisation and 
activism existed prior to the introduction of donor funding. People 
used to work voluntarily with dedication. We have a long tradition of 
democratic resistance to all military rulers. The trade union 
movement, women’s activism, minorities’ struggle, struggle for 
economic and social rights was far more vibrant, widespread and 
organised at the grassroots level. With the introduction of donor 
money, the whole process got distorted. It has been projectised by 
NGOs. It is no longer a movement. It does not even have the potential 
to be a movement.5  
 
Participants’ reflections indicate a shift in NGOs’ approaches to democratisation. 
Various terms are used to express and explain this shift. In the following sub-sections, 
I explore the meanings of these terms including fight, movement, distorted process, and 
                                                 
3 Interview 8, 15 April 2015. 
4 Interview 4, 21 March 2015. 
5 Interview 17, 4 May 2015. 
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‘projectised’ democratisation. My aim is to go beyond the literal meanings of these 
terms to understand what they signify to research participants. Before I do so, let me 
discuss how democratisation has diverged from dissent to projects.  
 
The divergence 
In my discussions with the research participants on democracy and the role of NGOs in 
democratisation in Pakistan, a sense of divergence in democratisation – from fight and 
resistance to funded projects – emerged as the most explicit aspect.  
 
If we look at Pakistan’s history, the biggest challenge to Zia-ul-Haq’s 
dictatorship was from the civil society. W.A.F and other women from 
NGOs were on the street. (At that time) workers of political parties 
were under arrest. If we trace back, that is where civil society’s 
contribution to democracy began. Since the corporate model has been 
introduced to NGOs, the zeal, commitment, issue of social 
transformation, feeling of gratification has all been converted from 
project to project.6  
 
There was resistance in the early 80s………..street level 
demonstrations……the dynamics of that were very different. 
Genuine people came out against that dictatorship. It was not salaried 
people like us. We take salaries and provide professional services. I 
am not a social activist… I am being hired by an association or a 
board of trust to deliver certain technical services…to do evidence 
based advocacy, collect research data, publish reports, etc. 
……………Now the international business model (of NGOs) has 
completely transformed that resistance.7  
 
It appears that the 80s movements for democracy by NGOs, diverged into projectised 
democratisation with the introduction of international funding, specifically for 
democratisation programmes in early 2000s. It is difficult to state the exact time-period 
when the divergence was initiated as none of the research participants specified it. 
However, they did refer to some key aspects of the diverged purpose and nature from 
the fight and movement to the projects and programmes. Whereas during 80s, people 
demanding democracy “were on the streets” and possessed “the zeal, commitment, 
issue of social transformation, (and) feeling of gratification”, the projectised 
democratisation is seen as “the corporate model”. Instead of “social activists” and 
                                                 
6 Interview 1, 3 March 2015. 
7 Interview 7, 10 April 2015. 
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“genuine people” in the fight for democracy, the projectised democracy has “salaried 
people” and “technocrats”. Activism gets transformed into professionalism:   
Activism is now a professional category. It is a job sector……….We 
(internationally funded NGO) talk about fixing paths, fixing 
ideologies, understanding differences, other people’s ideologies, etc. 
[But] fixing norms is not easy. You can’t create them. They cannot 
be fixed and may never be fixed. The rot is too large.8  
 
Voluntary work with commitment became a story of the past. People 
started running after so-called projects fulfilling the project 
requirements, meeting the criteria. From social and political activists 
they became technocrats who could handle this NGO business. The 
competition was about who was more competent in framing 
this……….what you call them…… logical framework matrix and 
playing around with outputs and outcomes, capacity building for 
model organisations with a lot of spending on the personnel or 
employee side.9  
 
Likewise, persistence, commitment, eagerness to work with others and even to 
negotiate with adversaries, volunteerism and above all being local and knowing 
domestic realities that allowed prolonged follow-ups and persuasion are referred to in 
democratisation as a fight. A parliamentarian observed:  
I think their (women’s rights NGOs) basic resource has been 
persistence, having done their homework and the willingness to sit 
down and negotiate…..You would wish them away but they wouldn’t 
go away. They knew what they wanted. …………… They wouldn’t 
come to me and say Mr. Senator, there should be a law against acid 
throwing and it should be this. They would come to me and say, Mr. 
Senator, this is the law on acid throwing. Kindly go through it and if 
you have any issues, tell us and we will sit down with you and 
discuss……….They would even go and talk to the Mualanas 
(religious scholars). They would go to the right wing religious parties 
in parliament….. It is not that they always reached an agreement, but 
they tried to open a dialogue. It has to be the people of Pakistan to be 
able to stand up and protect their rights which flow from the 
Constitution. It cannot be the experts coming in from XYZ university 
or organisation in the US or UK through the doors of the so-called 
national NGOs. They come here for 3-4 days, they carry out the 
workshops and then they leave. That is of no use to me.10  
 
                                                 
8 Interview 10, 20 April 2015. 
9 Interview 13, 28 April 2015. (My emphasis) 
10 Interview 27, 5 July 2015. 
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The extent to which the research participants doubt NGOs’ intentions for bringing about 
social change, based on their perceptions of NGOs being professional instead of social 
activists, is open to interpretation. They do, however, seem to suggest that the corporate 
models of project planning, counting outputs and measuring outcomes compel them 
and their NGOs to recruit professionals on high salaries. Professional requirements 
notwithstanding, high salaries and fancy offices for the people in internationally funded 
NGOs and funding agencies appear to be a substantial matter of concern for the research 
participants. This suggests another aspect of projectised democratisation diverged from 
volunteerism in the past: 
 
There should be an element of volunteerism in the work of every civil 
society organisation, including NGOs that has disappeared with 
international funding. Yes, you need money to survive, but the kind 
of money that USAID, DFID, and local NGOs funded by them offer 
falls under corruption in my opinion.11  
 
They [international donors] have damaged the parameters of the 
development dynamics which used to stand on principles and 
volunteerism. Their people [working in internationally funded NGOs 
or in International agencies] have lavish lifestyles. [Other] people see 
them. They create a brain drain… as the brightest of people in the 
NGO sector get employed by them and other International NGOs and 
UN agencies. Only those which are far fewer in number, who have 
long term commitment to local NGOs, stay to work for their 
organisations. I have begged women to stay in our NGO. I have told 
them that money is not everything. I said to them ‘you owe something 
to this movement [women’s rights].’ I may have been able to stop a 
few. Most people break. Their [funded NGOs and agencies] 
administrative costs are unnatural. Our ratio is low. Theirs’ is almost 
50-50. They have many cars and stuff. They get criticised for it and 
should be. They have high management fee. We don’t have them. 
There is a big tussle between these funded projects and programmes 
and the local NGOs working with limited funds. You may call it a 
hegemonic tussle.12  
 
A significant aspect to democratisation as a fight is concerned with owning a political 
standpoint or following a political ideology. Freedom, equality, and human rights 
against dictatorship were the values and ideals endorsed by democratisation as a fight. 
                                                 
11 Interview 2, 4 March 2015. 
12 Interview 11, 21 April 2015. 
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Referring to the Regal Chowk demonstration, an NGO representative observed: “There 
has to be some ideological commitment to what we (NGOs) do.”13  
 
On the contrary, the projectised democratisation appears to be depoliticised. An 
international NGO professional asserted: 
I am working for ---[naming their INGO for democracy]. I am 
supposed to be non-partisan. I cannot even like something on 
Facebook. I am tired of this. I used to be openly political. Worked for 
an NGO for women’s rights. They [naming that NGO] too are no 
longer at the street level; they have been drowned by USAID funding. 
When I was in Peshawar, their Director used to call some people and 
within an hour we had about 70-100 people in front of the press club 
or governor’s house demonstrating against this or that. We believed 
in women’s rights. But when they got so much money from USAID 
they went into nice offices and posh locations. Now they are trapped 
in fund management. There is no one there to lead the movement. 
What they used to do and we used to work with them on, I want to 
do that. Now they have big cars, big rooms, big salaries, etc. This is 
now the face of NGOs in Pakistan.14  
 
Here, the lack of ideological commitment gets equated with ‘nice offices in posh 
locations’, ‘fund management’ and USAID funding. There is anger in the above 
assertion as the respondent feels constrained for not being able to express their political 
views openly. There is also a feeling of nostalgia for the past leadership which was 
openly political and led ‘the movement’ for democracy. To another research participant, 
there is a deeper meaning which underpins and explains the depoliticised nature of 
NGOs at present: 
 
In terms of voice, they [NGOs] are much disengaged from the street. 
They are a voice only through media and social media. I will add here 
something that is very important. After all, the sponsor has an agenda. 
We have to understand the external input into Pakistani NGOs and 
civil society. You cannot understand it without seeing where the 
money is coming from. Colonial rulers have packed up and gone but 
imperialism has not gone. They rule us through other means – 
economic, financial. But there are various ways of doing it. How do 
you regulate states? The new way is through its civil society. Reach 
and create civil society. Islamabad is full of donor agencies and their 
funded local NGOs. What is going on?15  
 
                                                 
13 Interview 8, 15 April 2015. 
14 Interview 12, 22 April 2015. 
15 Interview 25, 2 July 2015. 
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NGOs are depoliticised because they “do projects for the masses but they are not the 
masses”.16 Whilst their work on raising awareness of the vote and functional input in 
electoral processes cannot be ignored, it must be understood that it is limited: 
 
I would not dismiss it because it is definitely important to teach the 
voter. But again it is limited. Then they [NGOs] have been doing 
something with the legislatures. They made a library for the National 
Assembly. These are the sort of stiches they are putting in democracy. 
They have their election studies and training sessions for the 
parliamentarians. But after all this, there is this thing that democracy 
is a political thing.17  
 
The depoliticised nature of NGOs in democratisation is further explained with an 
emphasis on social class of their professionals. According to another academic research 
participant, since most of these individuals belong to the middle class, their progressive 
causes are closer to the ideals of the middle class. Middle class in Pakistan, the 
academic asserts, “[S]hies away from politics”: 
 
They hate politicians. They hate political class. They think of them 
as corrupt, mostly illiterate, landed elite etc. They [NGOs] are 
gentlemanly and lady-like. They are ‘moral’. Middle class in their 
own view, is morally superior. They think that politicians are thieves. 
In Pakistan, it is the middle class vs the political class. Who 
dominates? The middle class. The middle class [in Pakistan] has been 
the recruitment area for the army and bureaucracy. The tribal and 
feudal classes or the tribal and the landed elites are typically involved 
with political parties. [Today, professionals in] NGOs, if you 
individually look at their fathers’ careers, they are bureaucrats or 
have military backgrounds……. Their [senior NGO professionals] 
children are World Bankers or those who have links with the World 
Bank, etc………… leading NGO members have an upper middle 
class or middle class background. Therefore, there is a disjuncture in 
the political community and them. It was easier for them [NGOs] in 
1999 to go to Musharraf because actually they have their own 
critiques of how politicians operate. They [NGOs] are socially 
progressive because of their middle class urban background. But 
they are politically conservative. They don’t belong to the political 
community. Nor do they support it. I think they are depoliticised 
which comes from their class background.18 
 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Interview 18, 10 May 2015 (My emphasis). 
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These are critical assertions. The divergence for NGOs in democratisation – from 
having a political standpoint against the dictatorship during 1980s to supporting 
Musharraf’s autocracy in late 1990s – is analysed through the lens of the social class 
which dominates NGOs, especially in urban areas in Pakistan.  In 1999, most NGOs 
welcomed General’s Musharraf’s dictatorship. Only a few NGOs opposed his 
autocracy openly.19  
 
To learn whether the assertion of middle class being depoliticised has any currency, a 
deeper investigation into the class profiles of NGO professionals, during 1980s and in 
late 1990s, is needed. However, this assertion is also echoed in the following dialogue 
between the staff members of an NGO in democratisation and myself. They are a group 
of younger, foreign educated, urban middle-class NGO professionals.  
 
Staff member A: We take our watchdog role very seriously. Also, we 
are not a political institution. At [name of the organisation], we 
provide a balanced and professional view. What I have seen in the 
past one year working here is that we don’t favour political parties or 
governing elites. When we worked on governance, we did not favour 
PML-N or ignored PTI. We are doing an apolitical job.  
 
Staff member B: We meet people. We meet politicians. We have 
these workshops. We try to look at the situation on the ground. We 
interact with all kinds of legislators. I believe we are raising the right 
questions which should be asked. 
 
Me: I understand. But if you were to critique on your work on 
democracy or the nature of democracy in Pakistan, what would that 
be? Do you feel satisfied with the work you are doing? 
 
Staff member B (with a mocking tone): There is hardly any 
democracy in Pakistan. 
 
Staff member D (nodding to agree): Democracy in our country is just 
on paper.  
 
Me: Please explain. 
 
Staff member D: There are historical reasons. Generally speaking, we 
have a propensity for shortcuts and quick fixes. This is my take. I 
                                                 
19 A detail account of NGOs supporting Musharraf is provided in Chapter VI. 
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think it is simply because the system has not been able to take roots. 
Our governance is particularly bad. Leadership has always been a 
problem. 
 
Staff member E (with a mocking sigh): And the promises that they 
[political leaders] make! 
 
Staff member D: Yes, we have been stuck with the same corrupt 
leaders. You see, in Pakistan, you [politicians] are not looking after 
the concerns of the common man who is a victim of abject poverty 
and whose basic rights are not being met. They don’t even know what 
democracy is. These politicians and their families cannot provide for 
that. What we need is a system of good governance. At [name of the 
organisation], we focus on this. We work to improve parliamentary 
processes and systems in political parties so that they [politicians] 
learn to improve their role in governance, in the parliament, and in 
their political parties.20  
 
Staff member A: We try. But the fundamental problem is that 
Pakistan is ruled by patronage. What actually happens is that 
politicians take up our work and basically use it to further their own 
political means. If a report favours PTI, then PTI will pick it up and 
promote it and since it is going against PML-N’s workings, PML-N 
will try to discredit it. Our message does go through to the 
policymakers but it depends on their political interests what they 
choose to highlight and what they choose to ignore.  
 
Me: Do you feel frustrated when that happens? 
 
Staff member A: Yes, often I do feel as if we are failing. But we 
cannot do more. In Pakistan, politics is a dirty business. Politicians 
need to be sober, educated to a certain degree, and apt in 
policymaking. Our politicians have none of that. Most are meagrely 
educated. They belong to landed or business aristocracy who get 
votes because of our patronage system.21  
 
This dialogue illuminates the negative perceptions of the urban middleclass 
professionals of politicians, their ways of doing politics, and democracy in general in 
Pakistan. It also highlights that this particular NGO, admittedly, has a depoliticised 
approach.  The depoliticised professionalism is also justified on the basis of acquiring 
economic benefits and projects for delivering services, even if it is a dictator who 
provides for it: 
                                                 
20 My emphasis. 
21 A group discussion with NGO personnel, 14 April 2015. 
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NGOs also supported Musharraf because he said that he would 
bypass political actors and will make them [NGOs] service providers 
and get them to do service delivery. International donors, whose 
governments supported Musharraf, brought in quite a bit of money 
that was then used through local NGOs after the devolution. This is 
why, Musharraf suited them [NGOs]. There were material, economic 
interests; it was simply economically good for them [NGOs]. They 
[NGOs] supported Musharraf’s apolitical or depoliticised 
decentralisation. In 80s and early 90s, many organisations had a big 
political role. They were involved in social protests or progressive 
protests for women or minorities. They used to protest outside the 
parliament. In the 2000s this did not happen. They [NGOs] were 
turned into service deliverers or champions of democracy without 
political mission.22  
 
It emerges that democratisation through NGOs is no longer an ideological commitment. 
It is depoliticised. It is a process which does not always involve or work with the 
masses. It does not need to appreciate the political society either. The divergence from 
political to depoliticised, movement to projects, volunteerism and committed leadership 
to middle class professionals with high salaries and posh offices, and self-financed to 
lucrative funding for NGOs in democratisation, has been gradual and illustrates a 
change in time from 1980s to 1990s onwards. We now turn to the consequences of this 
divergence, which help us further to explore the meaning and nature of democratisation 
in Pakistan and the role of internationally funded NGOs in it. 
 
The disconnect  
Out of a sense of frustration, many research participants judged the democratisation 
programmes of internationally funded NGOs as alien to the local contexts in Pakistan. 
They felt that the divergence from democratisation as a fight to projectised 
democratisation has extended the social and political disconnects at multiple levels in 
Pakistani society. These disconnects denigrate any meaningful possibilities for 
democracy in Pakistan. Socially, there now exists a deepened disconnect between 
citizens and the civil society and between the civil society and internationally funded 
NGOs. Politically, citizens are disengaged from political parties; political parties’ 
involvement with the parliament remains patchy; and the divisions between the 
parliament and the state have widened.  
 
                                                 
22 A second group discussion with NGO personnel 08 May 2015. 
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Referring to the social disconnect, research participants observed that NGOs in 
democratisation are increasingly detached from citizens and the wider civil society 
which includes community based voluntary organisations and traditional welfare 
organisations. Community and welfare organisations have existed historically in 
Pakistan mostly providing support in education, health and poverty alleviation. This 
detachment is worse in rural and northern areas as a research participant points out: 
I was conducting a research with a colleague. We went to Chitral. 
Everyone there criticised NGOs especially women for ruining their 
culture. We asked them what NGOs are? They said NGOs 
represented the West and its culture. They did not know what NGO 
meant but its bad profiling had reached them. NGOs do not have mass 
support.23  
 
These groups [NGOs] - their role is basically to make educated elite 
conscious of what is democracy. They do not reach the lay person.24  
 
For meeting project and programme outputs which often involves reaching and 
influencing local communities, NGOs claim strong links with local voluntary groups. 
International funding agencies (in theory) seek local reach and impact. However, 
according to a research participant, there is a set of local voluntary groups that operate 
at village and tehsil levels and claim to represent most localities. They are ready to do 
everything, as long as, there is a grant/funding for it: 
 
They (local groups) do everything. They are in retail development. 
They will distribute condoms for an HIV or AIDS programmes (on 
the one hand) and they will do advocacy for the local government 
project for (another internationally funded) programme. [We] could 
have a project or programme with these groups in which they will 
become institutions working for electoral reforms. They are basically 
retailing their services for us (NGOs). In this they have a structure, 4 
mobilisers, 1 finance and accounts person and 1 CEO or manager. 
They say they will do community meetings. They even have a ready-
made group for that! They provide services to NGOs and use their 
name. For instance, we can say that we work in 64 districts and 
another NGO can say that they work in 45 districts. But if you go into 
Gujranwala, then we will have the same person acting as local 
implementer as for the other NGO. Now these groups are not civil 
society that NGOs claim to be connected with. They are a service 
sector that caters to the project needs of big NGOs. They have no 
                                                 
23 Interview 24, 30 June 2015. 
24 Interview 15, 30 April 2015. 
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connection with the community. A big problem here is that people 
are shy of admitting to these contradictions.25  
 
In the academic literature, Pakistani civil society and NGOs have been traditionally 
considered as the strong, resilient and transformative force to challenge dictatorships, 
their oppressive laws and restricting the civil and political rights.26 Welfare NGOs for 
women topped the list.  Furthermore, as alluded in Chapter II, in democratisation 
studies, NGOs’ links with and influence over the wider civil society is often presumed 
positively. However, this presumption is challenged by the above assertions. As it 
stands now, Pakistani NGOs’ connection with the wider civil society in the context of 
democratisation, is complex.  
 
Understandably then, there is a need to re-examine the structure and agency of civil 
society itself. Whether NGOs are the face of civil society and represent its interests, is 
contingent to this re-examination. An academic who also runs a research NGO 
observed:  
I say that in post-colonial societies like ours, we need to theorise civil 
society differently. We simply don’t have a civil society which 
converges to liberal democracy with capitalism as its base. We have 
not evolved the way other countries have. There are civil societies of 
multiple systems here and they overlap, too. Which combination of 
civil societies is pro-democracy depends on the class interests and 
which classes want that democracy. We are basically maintaining a 
fiction that there is one civil society that according to some theory 
may be pro liberal democracy.27  
 
Thus, the connection between internationally funded NGOs in democratisation and the 
so-called civil society in Pakistan, is experienced as distant at best and made-up at 
worst.  
 
The divergence from resistance and movement to projectised democratisation has not 
helped with lessening the existing political disconnect. Despite NGOs’ training 
programmes for parliamentarians and political parties’ reform, the engagement and 
influence of parliamentarians in the parliament remain patchy. Furthermore, the extent 
                                                 
25 Interview 7, 10 April 2015. 
26 See Chapter IV.  
27 Interview 21, 20 June 2015. 
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of any improvement in citizens’ political participation due to NGOs mobilisation 
programmes, is difficult to discern.  
 
They [NGOs] are engaged in this futile debate about how to reform 
political parties and train politicians, hoping that there can be 
improvements. Why are they not looking at the weaknesses of 
political parties, parliament and the parliamentary system in relation 
to society? If feudalism and tribalism are intact, we are not bringing 
any social reforms in this country. Our society remains stagnant; it 
could not possibly improve politically. Most of their efforts [NGOs] 
are implanted. They have not been internally generated. There exists 
a significant disconnect between our society and our so-called 
democratic institutions.28 
 
Democracy entails an active citizenry not just at the time of elections. 
This should be the focus of NGOs. They should spread consciousness 
of citizenship rights and privileges. NGOs that work on citizenship 
education better serve democratisation then those who focus on 
“capacity building of parliamentarians”.29  
 
Parliamentarians themselves are profoundly critical of NGOs’ capacity building and 
the training programmes. They believe that NGOs’ hardly contribute in strengthening 
democracy or building democratic institutions. Their training programmes are 
“essentially a hit and run exercise”30 without any substance or connections with the 
local ways in which parliamentarians and the parliaments actually work. Most 
importantly, unlike in the past where women’s NGOs were particularly effective in 
bringing about law reforms or lobbying for constitutional change, “the influence and 
contribution of the internationally funded NGOs at present is almost minimal”31:  
 
Majority of them (NGOs), I won’t say it is a rule, but majority carry 
a significant agenda of maximising earnings for their NGOs and 
justifying it by holding various seminars, workshops etc. Whether the 
content of these workshops carry any long-lasting effect is, according 
to me, least of their concerns. Particularly NGOs that are lucratively 
funded by international agencies including UN and EU. They follow 
their [donors] agenda. They have a number of programmes which are 
essentially very high sounding – assistance to parliament, building 
capacity of parliamentarians etc – but when you look at them in their 
                                                 
28 Interview 19, 19 June 2015. 
29 Interview 25, 2 July 2015. 
30 Interview 15, 30 April 2015. 
31 Interview 27, 5 July 2015. 
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nitty-gritty or the results that have come out of them, it is a big fat 
zero. I am saying this as a senator of the national assembly.  
 
Explaining further with an example of the drafting of laws in Pakistan, a Senator stated: 
 
Take law-making for example. The drafting of laws in the UK or the 
US is a different cup of tea as compared to drafting of the law in 
Pakistan…… The basic concept of the law being home-grown or 
adaptable to Pakistan’s conditions is alien to them [NGOs] from the 
get-go. I cannot be expected to learn drafting, no matter how bright I 
may be, in three days. We have asked them to kindly bring their 
experts, mesh them in with local experts, so that the basic principles 
of drafting I can learn from them but the nitty-gritty of Pakistani 
drafting, I can learn from my own people. This, they are not able to 
do. They say this is what we can provide, this is the manner and style 
they will be held in, take it or leave it. Mostly, we take it for the 
simple reason that much of our bureaucracy and political class is very 
fond of small perks that emanate from it……………..As a 
participant, I go and take part and have a nice cup of tea and lunch at 
a five-star hotel. I get a nice pen, a dairy or a bag and I come back 
home without learning anything.32  
 
Using law-making and the roles of NGOs in it as an example, the Senator asserts that 
in the provisions of developing skills in the drafting of law, the internationally funded 
NGOs are insensitive to the local dynamics. It seems that the Senator is pointing out 
the insensitive approach with which NGOs offer their training programmes. There is 
frustration in his statement about disconnect in the ways in which NGOs try to ‘train’ 
parliamentarians. Parliamentarians’ learning styles, capacities and preferences might be 
different from how they are perceived or assessed by the foreign experts. Yet, NGOs 
do not accommodate these nuances. This approach to the provision of training is 
ultimately fruitless. More importantly, as the statement suggests, NGOs providing such 
training workshops (guided by their funded outcomes) are not willing to accommodate 
parliamentarians’ needs. To what extent this ignorance is deliberate, should be a matter 
of concern for democratisation and supporting democratic institutions. It is evident 
however, that NGOs’ plans are based on agreed deliverables for the received funds. In 
this sense, democratisation is driven by funds whereas funds are available for the agreed 
sets of formulations only. However, given the lack of political maturity, possibly due 
to the historical democratic deficit in Pakistan, more than often, parliamentarians attend 
these workshops for the ‘small perks’.  As a result, NGOs get away with demonstrating 
                                                 
32 Ibid. (My emphasis). 
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to their funders that they have achieved the legislative strengthening programme 
outcomes. Reality is most certainly, the opposite. 
 
The senator posited further that the problem of this mismatch between the trainings 
offered and the context, lies in the NGOs compulsion to their donors. “They [NGOs] 
themselves may understand, but the donors do not. They cannot convince their donors. 
We, as the parliament are unable to convince the donors.”33 Another parliamentarian 
agreed with the senator without being sympathetic of NGOs: 
The disconnect of NGOs’ democracy programmes with the way 
things work here is due to the indifferent attitude of their donors. That 
is the truth. They [donors] are so comfortable with the perks. They 
think they have a nice office, a Pajero (a large vehicle), a house and 
servants (something which they don’t see in their own countries) so 
why should they go the extra mile? This is what they are expected to 
do, hold trainings and workshops. They do it and send their reports 
back and say I was given X amount of budget and this budget was 
utilised to do blah blah blah. That similar attitude sinks into local 
NGOs. They think they are getting part of the kitty which will keep 
them going and their NGO going. Fair enough. Why go into hassle 
with principles? Why get into a hassle with the parliament? Let’s just 
have a workshop at Serena or Marriot (five-star hotels). Get it over 
with. Have a nice glossy report printed subsequently. Circulate that 
to a limited number of people, majority of whom won’t even read it. 
The work is done and contractual obligations met.34  
 
This ignorance of the political context on part of NGOs and international donors – 
intentional or unintentional – does not help with minimising the perpetual disconnect 
that exists between the parliament and parliamentarians in Pakistan. An NGO 
professional in Islamabad observed: 
 
If we look at the legislation in the parliament from 2008 – 2015, 134 
of 139 laws have been passed in the 13th or previous National 
Assembly and 5-6 have been passed in the last year. A bulk of the 
legislation, more than 90% of legislation, has been in response to the 
demands of the state institutions, such as making the FIA (Federal 
Investigating Agency) Deputy Governor a chairman, so and so 
institute needs an expansion in its mandate and scope etc. How much 
legislation has been done in response to the demands of the people? 
There was one on acid throwing in which existing laws were 
improved and punishments were increased. There was another on 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Interview 24, 30 June 2015. 
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women’s rights. There are only a few bills 12-14 in which we can say 
that the source of the bill is perhaps due to the demands being raised 
by the civil society or citizens. In the architecture of this state no one 
is aggregating the demands of the citizens or converting them into a 
legislative product. Political parties are responsible for doing this. 
But political parties have their own disconnect from the parliament 
and from the people. Manifestos are not followed in the parliament. 
State does not follow the direction of the parliament, rather the 
parliament follows the directions of the state. Even the 18th 
Constitutional Amendment, in which we tried to change the entire 
architecture of our state. The demand for it was essentially rooted 
among the political elite. NGOs like ours with so-called training 
programmes have failed to lessen this disconnect.35  
 
The political and social disconnects, that existed historically in Pakistan’s politics for 
many reasons, have been expanding despite large-scale democratisation programmes. 
Informed by the observations above, it seems that the depoliticised and projectised 
democratisation in the recent years has not been sensitive to the local context. Echoing 
the Senators quoted above as referring to the context-blind, technical, formal, and 
corporate approach of NGOs, a long-time activist and lawyer disdained: 
 
I often meet NGO professionals who think they know better than 
everyone else. I have people come to my office and say they want to 
train lawyers. I simply laugh at them. They are not lawyers 
themselves and yet they want to train lawyers. They have no idea that 
people get best trained by their own seniors. (I ask them) How are 
you going to train lawyers? What is that extra thing you have to train 
them in? Is it your command in English language? They feel that 
simply because they have command on the English language, they 
can train lawyers! This is the kind of strangeness that I find in them. 
They want to train the police without having read the police laws. 
They want to train the politicians without knowing the realities that 
politicians operate in. Contesting elections by itself is a great 
experience. NGOs don’t have to go through it. That lack of respect 
for politicians is visible in their [NGOs] approach.  
 
So in my opinion, where they (NGOs) claim all-round expertise is 
very problematic. These people are not lawyers, but they are 
pretending to be super jurists giving critiques to legislation. This is 
not fair. This is like me telling journalists how to run their shows on 
their television stations. I am not trained to do that. They feel 
parliamentarians need training! Parliamentarians need space. The 
way parliamentarians passed the 21st Amendment on military courts 
shows they do not have space. Don’t go on the surface. You have to 
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dig deeper to the root causes of what is going on here. Obviously, this 
government – not just this government – this country, is being 
controlled by the military. Parliamentarians know everything that is 
happening. Do they dare say anything? No, they cannot. So you want 
to train them to do what?36   
 
Table 2 illustrates the basic features of democratisation as a fight and movement and as 
a projectised and corporate model. Multiple interviews with NGOs’ professionals, 
politicians, academics and journalists, as well as my interpretation of their experiences, 
have informed this table. In other words, some of the listed ‘terms’ were employed by 
the research participants whilst I have added others as my interpretations. My aim at 
presenting this table is to provide a visual comparator for understanding the shift in the 
nature of democratisation, as the central concern for this chapter.  
 
  
                                                 
36 Interview 8, 15 April 2015.  
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Table 2: Democratisation as…………. 









with specific skill-sets 




High salaries and perks/ International 
travels 
 
Prolonged campaigns Short-term projects 
 
Guided by principles 
 
Guided by material and economic interests 
Visible leadership Dispersed professionals 
 
People led - Of and for the masses Middleclass, foreign educated 
professionals - a service sector for the 




to the social and political context 
Oblivious 
of the social and political context 
 




The divergence from democracy as a fight to projectised democratisation has evidently 
been taking place. Internationally funded NGOs with their corporate style democracy 
programmes, are implicated. They are implicated both by their own reflections on their 
lived experience in democratisation, and in the accounts of concerned observers. But is 
this charge absolute? Or are there caveats in these claims that we must be mindful of? 





The dispute   
A political activist in the past who is now the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a 
prominent NGO in democratisation is rather optimistic of projectised democratisation. 
For him, though it is hard for most NGOs to stand firm on principles and volunteerism 
in the face of funding requirements, “all is not lost.”37 International donors for human 
rights and democracy projects including USAID, DFID and/or UN and EU agencies 
and others are increasingly “trying to follow the wave that human rights activist 
organisations initiated in Pakistan.”38 For example, his own NGO has been successfully 
funded by USAID but he claims that the objectives of the funded programme were 
derived from the organisation’s core objectives formed thirty years ago. In this sense, 
projectised democratisation is not always driven by funding. It can retain the aspects of 
driven by values and keeping to the original mission depending on the NGOs that are 
negotiating funds. 
They are funding us and our goals match with theirs. Sure they 
[donors] have foreign agenda. But if they are saying something which 
make sense to us, what can you do………[but to accept funds]. What 
we ought to do is that in ten to twenty years, we and other NGOs 
become self-sustainable encouraging volunteerism and community 
development with minimal external input. This is what we must do 
for future.39   
 
But a CEO of another NGO, also a political activist in the past, disagreed:  
This culture of working for money has spoiled things. Especially 
USAID funding has turned NGOs into contractors. It has become a 
mockery of the entire civil society. How did you run schools? We 
just had students. USAID started to pay parents to send their children 
to school. Then in other education projects, parents started asking for 
money. We said no, we are educating your children and training you. 
We do not offer money for that. The difficulty was created by NGOs 
funded by USAID. It has all changed for worst. I think for NGOs to 
be autonomous, dynamic and organic, they need to keep working on 
few resources and funds and set small priorities. But they have been 
turned into mercenaries who look at funding plans of the donors and 
have experts sitting in their offices with high salaries, who will be 
surfing the net and finding things they can apply to and they will 
apply everywhere… from child rights to democracy to environment 
to microfinance and what not.40  
                                                 
37 Interview 10, 20 April 2015. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Interview 13, 28 April 2015. 
40 Interview 4, 21 March 2015. 
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The extent to which the international funding presents itself as a problem in 
democratisation is discussed in a subsequent theme. The purpose of this argument here 
is to show that the opinions on the nature and purpose of projectised democratisation 
are disputed. There are also inconsistencies in the arguments of research participants of 
NGOs, which illuminate a struggle within themselves - a struggle concerning whether 
to regard their experience of projectised democratisation as positive or detrimental to 
meaningful possibilities for democracy in Pakistan.  
 
Similarly, on the technical nature of projectised democratisation, a CEO of a large 
democracy promotion NGO focusing on parliamentary accountability and election 
observation stated: 
 
When you ask about our role in democratisation, our framework is 
very conservative in the sense that we are talking about the legal and 
constitutional framework of rights. We are not going beyond that. If 
you want a revolution or rebellion, go and join a political party or 
form a political party. You don’t see DFID or any other donor, 
funding for revolution. Our role is to advocate and spread awareness 
of rights enshrined in the constitution. We do quite a bit of technical 
research work. It is very important to point out that we are purely a 
technical organisation. We are not an activist organisation. And we 
see value in it to gradually support democratic practices based on 
evidence.41  
 
Being technical with specific skills and project focused is considered imperative for 
democratisation. NGOs in democratisation are not seen as the spaces for revolutions. 
Besides, there is no funding available for this. But there is also a contrary stance. A 
director of an NGO promoting human rights and democracy stresses on the 
revolutionary aspects of democratisation: 
 
Just like dictatorship has a history in Pakistan, stiff resistance to 
dictatorships also has a history. NGOs role in this resistance has been 
prominent. Activists led and formed NGOs played a significant 
political role. We cannot deny their contribution. People have died 
for it. People went to jail for it. There has to be an element of dissent 
in our work. What’s happening to us? As NGOs, we have developed 
a sort of fungiblity – we are ready to even support a dictator! None 
of our NGOs has any consistent devotion or commitment to 
                                                 
41 Interview 17, 4 May 2015. 
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democracy, except HRCP. What then is the significance of our claim 
that we are promoting democracy?42   
 
Opinions of research participants clash when the usefulness of internationally funded 
democratisation programmes and projects is debated. However, it is clear from the 
reflections on the lived experience of NGOs’ professionals that NGOs, involved in 
democratisation with large programmes and presence, international funding and profile, 
are not the spaces for dissent and rebellion. The perceptions that a divergence from 
democratisation as a movement to projectised democratisation, is widespread and 
strongly argued amongst the research participants. 
 
Concluding reflections 
Through the lived experiences of the research participants, in this chapter, I have 
studied a shift in NGOs’ approaches to democratisation. It has been shown that until 
1980s, NGOs approach to democratisation involved resistance, fight and movement. 
Despite limited funds and structured organisational setups, NGOs were able to gather 
global support for their issue based advocacy for human rights and democracy. They 
were defiant even against the dictatorships. However, in the late 1990s, NGOs 
developed a strong focus on projects and programmes. With the help of international 
funding, large projects on parliamentarians training and capacity-building were focused 
on neatly defined outputs and outcomes. Corporate style organisational structures were 
introduced with city based posh offices for NGOs. Volunteerism and commitment for 
the cause were replaced with highly paid professionals with technical skills. In other 
words, approaches to democratisation diverged from movement and resistance to 
projectised democratisation. I concluded the theme with opening a dispute amongst the 
research participants as to what constitutes projectised democratisation. 
 
In Chapter VI, this dispute is discussed in detail. It is argued that the nuances of 
projectised democratisation cannot be understood without carefully considering the 
context in which NGOs in democratisation operate in Pakistan. Thus, the multiple 
dimensions of the context are explored, followed by an analysis of the roles of NGOs 
                                                 
42 Interview 1, 3 March 2015. 
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in the specified context of democratisation. The following quote from one of the 
research participants neatly connects the two chapters: 
The basic flaw is that whether their (NGOs in democratisation) 
understanding of democracy is procedural or political. If it is 
political, then the basic contest is between one institution that is 
powerful beyond its constitutional mandate and asserts that power 
(referring to Pakistani army). To maintain constitutional democracy, 
you have to understand the politics. If it is purely procedural then you 
are concerned about electoral procedures, elections within political 
parties etc. There is a link between these two that is claimed. If you 
fix the procedural issues, they say, then you will also win the political 
battle. This is a view. But in my view, this is the basic problem in 
their theory of change. The politics of democracy or the political 
conflict of whether there should be democracy or not is not being 
understood as a fight anymore. It is possible that the solution to this 
fight is procedural. But it is only one solution. And you have to 
acknowledge that this is a fight.43  
 
 
                                                 
43 Interview 21, 20 June 2015. 
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Chapter VI: The Imperfect Necessity 
In which ‘projectised democratisation’ reveals itself and the roles of NGOs are 
examined. 
 
So far, in the thesis, I have observed that democratisation, as experienced by NGOs in 
Pakistan, signifies a projectised development of democracy. In its essence, it is 
depoliticised, professional, technocratic, funding driven, distant from the masses, 
middle-class led, urban, alien to the context, and possibly guided by material and 
economic interests. However, in closing the previous chapter, I also noted that though 
the research participants agree that democratisation - as a process – does not (anymore) 
involve dissent, fight or a movement for democracy, their opinions differ on what 
constitutes the projectised democratisation: its nature and purpose. In this chapter, the 
Imperfect Necessity, as the second essential theme, unpacks the phenomenon of 
projectised democratisation. In so doing, it illuminates the milieu in which NGOs 
operate and how this circumscribes their roles in democratisation in distinct ways.  
 
I begin this theme with a vignette about the 1999 Military Coup in Pakistan. The 
narrative illustrates NGOs’ unprecedented assertion and support for the dictatorship, 
and thereby, puts into perspective the changing roles of NGOs in democratisation. Next, 
I bring together rich empirical insights to understand the social and political context in 
which NGOs operate. The insights of NGOs unpack the inherent challenges of the 
historical democratic deficit in Pakistan, as they face them and within which they 
navigate a space for themselves. The final section explores the roles NGOs play in 
specified political and social context and discusses what might be the opportunities – if 
any – for a sustainable transition to democracy in Pakistan.     
 
The big shift 
The roads felt silent, almost too silent. In the evening hours of 11th October 1999, my 
car was heading towards the diplomatic enclave area in Islamabad. I had been invited 
for dinner at a friend’s house in the Sector F-6/3. It is often unsettling how beautiful 
trees of the day light look mysterious and dark at nights. The diplomatic enclave was 
situated next to the Parliament House. Surrounded by trees, despite the soft lights on 
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the pavements and well-lit official buildings, the roads were overwhelmingly dark and 
silent. Earlier that day, I had heard rumors about an imminent coup d'état. Perhaps, it 
was due to my anxious state of mind that the surroundings felt like the ‘silence before 
the storm’. There was, however, nothing observably strange or different to suggest that 
an event, that big, was about to happen. Or maybe, I wanted to believe that it wasn’t 
going to happen. The banality of the 1999 coup surprised very few of us in Pakistan.1 
It was, as if, the coup was almost expected, rather desired.  
 
The next morning, on October 12, I picked up the newspaper and the headline read, 
‘Army moved in as last resort to save country, says Musharraf – Nawaz government 
dismissed.’2 In the early hours of that morning, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Committee and Chief of the Army, General Parvez Musharraf had dismissed the 
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In addressing the nation on the national 
TV and radio, General Musharraf claimed that the “country was perfectly calm, stable 
and under control.”3 Over the next few days, the electronic media reported that the 
Constitution was held in abeyance; parliament and other official buildings were sealed; 
and the prominent politicians of the outgoing regime were being arrested. On Oct 17, 
in a television and radio address, General Musharraf assured the people of Pakistan that 
there was no martial law in Pakistan.” He promised “to give true democracy”.4  
 
Over the next few days, my friends and I talked about the unfolding political events. At 
our regular evening gatherings, the coup remained the topic of our discussions. 
Working for NGOs in Islamabad, most of us had family members or friends working 
for the government. We all had ‘insider’ information. None of us, however, knew what 
directions the coup would take. We all expected that the dictatorship would unfold 
much like the previous ones did. We all expected that despite promises, Musharraf’s 
coup would stay. But, some of us secretly and others openly, accepted Musharraf. He 
was unlike Zia-ul-Haq. We talked about his liberal ‘look’ as the newspapers carried 
                                                 
1 For a detailed academic discussions on the reasons behind the coup, Ishtiaq Hossain (2000), Pakistan’s 
October military coup: its causes and consequences Asian Journal of political science; PTV 
Documentary  12 Oct 1999 -- The Story of a Coup -- a documentary by Asghar Abdullah 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYADmJ6B4Gw ; See also Shah, A. (2014) The Army and 
Democracy. Harvard University Press. 
2 Dawn newspaper front page Wednesday October 13, 1999.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Dawn front page Oct 17 1999. 
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photos of him in civilian clothes, holding a poodle and playing with his granddaughter. 
Besides, we were for long unhappy with Nawaz Sharif’s soft Islamisation of Pakistan’s 
politics! There were no voices of dissent; no calls against the dictatorship. Secretly, 
perhaps, all of us were relieved. We kept quiet. Some of us subsequently, supported 
Musharraf. The silence and the dark evening of 11 October 1999 lasted for years to 
come.  
 
In the thick of contestations 
Over the course of many years, there has been a systematic 
undermining of people who have progressive views. It has not just 
happened by the by. You look at the bar room – you had a promising 
young man, left-leaning – today he is brief less. You look at poets, 
writers, etc. All these people have been marginalised. The right wing 
is soaring. You opposed the military but your children did not 
disappear. Now children disappear. Human rights activists and 
journalists get killed. It is a very violent place. Those people who 
have been the blue eyes of the establishment, the sky is the limit. The 
rest of us have struggled all our lives. I have not known a day in my 
life when I have not struggled. There is a lot of disparity. How will 
you empower the progressive thought again? It’s not just people, it is 
the thought and ideas that have been systematically marginalised.5  
 
In this statement, a human rights activist and a trustee for a human rights NGO, reflects 
on her struggles against the odds of unfavourable political and social settings in which 
NGOs have operated in Pakistan. With a sense of despair for the rising right-wing 
extremism, she is concerned about the systematic weakening of the progressive (liberal) 
political thought and ideals. The activism of civil society – including human rights 
NGOs, poets, writers and lawyers – has been undermined by the coercion of the state 
(particularly the army) and the right-wing extremists. Activists’ and their families’ lives 
are at stake. For her, struggle has been the only way of living. The statement paints a 
picture of an obstinately hostile and aggressive environment for NGOs in 
democratisation.  
 
Reflecting on the big shift, it could be that NGOs’ recognition of General Musharraf 
and their support for his dictatorship was a consequence of systematic undermining of 
a progressive and active civil society. In other words, it is plausible that owing to the 
                                                 
5 Interview 8, 15 April 2015. 
 172 
recurrent suppressive dictatorships and civilian rules; restrictions on freedom of speech 
and association; (c)overt violence and state’s hostility for human rights activists as well 
as its support for religious extremism in the name of national security, that, over time, 
civil society and NGOs had to first compromise and then gradually lose their ‘radical 
progressiveness’. On the other hand, supporting Musharraf might also be understood as 
an opportunity that arose for NGOs, where they could support instituting liberal 
practices in the face of mounting religious extremism. Whatever the reason, in 1999, 
the big shift in NGOs’ approach to dictatorship did take place. This event and the above 
statement call for a study of the nuances of the social and political context in which 
NGOs operate and where their ethos and roles are contested.  
 
Through the lived experiences of NGOs and other research participants, this section 
comprehends the nuances of this contested environment. From Pakistan army’s 
historical influence over politics to the rising religious extremism and hostility towards 
civil society and NGOs, the environment has multiple tones, creating a web of 
contestations for NGOs.   
 
One such tone is the hostility of the state towards the civil society and NGOs in 
Pakistan. Research participants disdain the fact that that this hostility has not reduced, 
even though, many NGOs today promote and support democracy by working directly 
with the government and political parties. They view this hostility as a legacy of the 
state’s historical insecurity to allow mass political participation, in cracking down 
dissent for democracy and calls for the majority rule, and army’s direct role in politics 
and frequent martial laws.6 A senior human rights activist and director of an NGO 
states: 
 
Historically, our state does not recognise civil society. During Ayub 
Khan’s era, there was regulated effort to hegemonise civil society. 
All institutions were required to be under the control of the state. 
They had radio. They began television. They made their own new 
rules for cinema – for here and for East Pakistan. They made a 
writer’s guild for writers. Bar councils were made for lawyers and 
the chairpersons were attorney generals and the provincial bar 
council’s chairmen were advocate generals……………………..This 
experience became a part of the state’s psyche………… As a result, 
                                                 
6 See Chapter IV for a historical discussion on NGOs in democratisation in Pakistan. 
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governments of today think the same way. Rights-based NGOs are 
negatively perceived by the government and lack the resources to 
operate. Many of them have made agreements with foreign 
organisations. Some are good, some are bad. Some have their own 
agenda, others follow donors’ agenda. But the government looks at 
all of them in the same way.  
With their democracy programmes, NGOs are trying to help the 
government, but their interaction is limited to government officials – 
it is not an interaction with the state.7  
 
This statement also speaks for the times when the fieldwork for this research was on-
going. During April and July 2015, the government of Pakistan imposed harsh 
restrictions on many international and national NGOs. There were police raids and 
NGOs’ offices in Islamabad were clamped down. A few of the research participants 
were working from home as their offices were closed. A government bill had recently 
been introduced in the parliament entitled ‘The Foreign Contributions Regulation Act, 
2015.’ The bill aimed at putting in check ‘the constant unchecked flow of foreign 
funding taking place without the consent of the government.’8 The justification given 
by the government was that the Bill would regulate and monitor foreign funding, 
including funding for madrassas. However, many research participants speculated that 
the proposed Bill was actually about putting stringent restrictions on NGOs and their 
partner international NGOs (INGOs) as well as to introduce cumbersome reporting 
procedures. “In this hostile situation”, an NGO personnel stated, “the interaction 
(between government and civil society) is greatly reduced, which has become worst in 
the last 20 years.”9 Another NGO participant asserted: 
NGOs are going through very rough times right now. In fact, we have 
always been under threat. Government in the name of national 
security, is imposing all sorts of restrictions. They can come to our 
offices and look at everything. Nobody can stop them from doing 
that……………. And let me tell you, government is not doing it for 
national security; they want to harass us. Under this new Bill, we will 
only be able to work on their ‘approved list of areas’ and with their 
‘approved international NGOs’. Who funds national NGOs? It’s not 
our government. It is our partner International NGOs who fund us. 
They are being harassed.10  
 
                                                 
7 Interview 2, 4 March 2015. 
8 Bill’s reference http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/pakistan.html.  
9 Interview 12, 22 April 2015. 
10 Interview 15, 30 April 2015. 
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Consequent to the hostility of the state towards NGOs, a prolonged and intense mutual 
distrust has developed between NGOs and the political society. In the previous Chapter, 
NGOs’ negative perceptions for politicians were considered. Similarly, politicians’ 
distrust on NGOs’ approaches to capacity building of parliamentarians and political 
parties was also illuminated. It is useful to reiterate the perceptions of the research 
participants – representing both NGOs and politicians – to distil the elements of the 
mutual distrust.  
 
As discussed above, most participants from NGOs were of the view that once in power, 
politicians perpetuate state’s historic hostility towards NGOs. NGOs are also deeply 
apprehensive about politicians’ abilities to represent and govern. Referring to 
politicians’ intentions and ability to make laws as well as the role of the parliament as 
the supreme legislature, a CEO of an established democracy promotion NGO stated: 
What kind of representation? As a matter of fact, they [politicians] 
are not representing anyone. They do not come to the assembly and 
say this is the opinion of people in my area. Even if they did it would 
not make a difference……We have a rubber-stamp parliament…… 
Decisions are made between parliamentary leaders. It is not as if the 
law comes into the parliament, it is debated and then it is passed….. 
Nothing can be presented, debated or passed in the assembly until the 
top man [heads of political parties] does not decide it to be so. Look 
at the 18th Amendment? How long was the debate for it in the 
assembly?............. I think hardly 45 minutes or an hour. The 19th, 20th 
and 21st amendment have been passed in a few minutes. Prior to being 
passed, they were decided upon. There was an APC (All Parties 
Conference) prior to it being presented in the parliament where party 
leaders decided upon it. Then to complete the formalities because the 
constitution says that to be so, they brought the bill and passed it in a 
few minutes. Each party leader told their members that you have to 
vote on this. The members do not even question the vote. They have 
no idea what this law states. They do not even have the aptitude to 
read the law much less form an opinion and analyse it……Opposition 
does them (APCs) and government does them, too. Decisions are 
made in APCs. ……………[E]veryone knows the people in the 
parliament are good for nothing.11  
 
This statement illuminates the perceptions about politicians, shared by most NGOs’ 
personnel. In NGOs’ experiences of engaging with politicians on daily basis, politicians 
are seen as not only lacking the will and skills for making laws, but also as disregarding 
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the parliament as the supreme law-making institution. As the statement suggests, law-
making takes place outside the parliament as negotiated compromises; getting these 
laws vetted through the parliament appears to be a formality. Many NGO research 
participants blame politicians for disrespecting and misusing the parliament, thereby 
weakening the democratic practice.  
 
On the other hand, a significant aspect of politicians’ distrust for NGOs relates to 
NGOs’ support for Musharraf’s government and their newly found appetite for 
competing in the mainstream politics. During Musharraf’s government, many NGOs’ 
activists and civil society representatives put themselves forward as advisors to the 
government and were nominated to serve in the government. An NGO personnel 
himself was critical about this “out-of-place” political interest in the NGO sector.12 He 
asserted that in their support for Musharraf, NGOs claimed a direct political role to an 
extent that a group of NGOs activists and professionals set up a political party to stand 
for the elections.13 A senator disdained that in the past, NGOs were involved in advising 
governments and parliaments but only at the level of appearing or sitting in government 
committees or advisory bodies; “never did four organisations get together and decided 
to form a political party.”14 NGOs were giving a direct competition to the political 
society. Furthermore, NGOs are accused of using foreign funds and infrastructural 
resources for their political ambitions.15 The distrust followed, and NGOs’ foreign 
connections were vehemently criticised by the political society. Though the NGOs-led 
political party never came to fruition, the distrust continues to exist and is “unlikely to 
end in the near future.”16 
 
The profound mutual distrust between the political and civil society and the historic 
hostility of state towards civil society, are reflective of the political culture in Pakistan, 
which is engrained in patronage politics of the social elite and the bureaucracy-army 
establishment.17 Many research participants perceive that the political culture in 
Pakistan does not “value merit and qualifications. It values biradiri (kinship), influence 
                                                 
12 Interview 7, 10 April 2015. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Interview 3, 15 March 2015. 
15 Interview 27, 5 July 2015. 
16 Interview 2, 4 March 2015. 
17 See Chapter IV. 
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and money spent on elections and campaigns.”18 Furthermore, NGOs that have been 
working closely with politicians believe that political parties are formed and function 
largely as ‘family enterprises’; dynastic politics of a few powerful families is deep-
rooted and is one of the key aspects in Pakistan’s political culture. These dynastic and/or 
family enterprise type political parties are mostly led by one person in a fairly top-down 
manner. As a result, political parties lack democratic structures and are controlled by 
the party leaders. The lack of democracy or membership based progression and 
decision-making structures also exist in other political parties that may not be run as 
family enterprises but are led by a popular leader (often also the founding member). 
The director of a democracy promotion NGO, who has been long engaged with 
developing political parties as democratic organisations observed: 
Political party has no organisation or structure at a local level. The 
machinery doesn’t work on its own. The leader presses the button 
from the top and it works for as long as they are pressing the button. 
The political party is a very controlled instrument of the party leader. 
That is not by coercion, but it is our culture………….. [Party leader’s] 
source of strength, the reason which makes him the dictator of his 
party, is usually his personal popularity. It is not party popularity.19 
  
A senior political analyst and the CEO of an NGO shared similar concerns: 
Parties are not democratic, they are darbars………… there is no 
democracy in parties. A small group of courtiers around the leader 
are controlling the party. Tickets are granted to people who are yes-
men or who have big money and resources. This is increasingly 
becoming an unrepresentative system by virtue of this party system 
which are essentially feudal darbars……20  
 
Consequently, political parties are not generally concerned about appealing to the 
masses or engaging in policymaking for the public benefit:  
‘[T]hey [politicians] ask for votes but they don’t tell us why they 
want our vote. They don’t say we will change policy or do this or do 
that. They get their votes on family lineages or by patronising the 
social, business and political elite. They make promises for big 
benefits to their supporters………….. In turn, they also get 
influenced by these elite. That is the context of Pakistan. The trouble 
is that our democracy support is meant for these politicians and 
                                                 
18 Interview 25, 2 July 2015. 
19 Interview 13, 28 April 2015. 
20 Interview 4, 21 March 2015. 
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bureaucrats who do not need to believe or practice democracy within 
their own parties or the ways in which they engage in politics.21  
 
The culture of dynastic and patronage politics affects parliamentary democracy in 
distinct ways. For example, many research participants point to the persistent failure on 
part of the civilian governments to establish a functioning local government system. It 
has been a political irony in Pakistan, that, for vested political interests, dictatorships 
legislate and put mechanisms in place for local governments whereas the civilian 
democratically elected governments delay establishing local governments as they lack 
the political will in instituting devolved governing structures. Consequently, the 
“parliament fulfils a formality.”22 This senior NGO personnel posited further:  
It is a very natural thing for an MP (member parliament) to be 
discussing and debating policy. [But] our MPs are seldom asked to 
speak on policies. They are not even interested themselves. The 
whole trend is to do some patronage work in their constituency – try 
to help their people getting jobs, help them facilitated with local 
police office or DCO, to resolve their problems, getting help with 
transfers and promotions, etc……………..They don’t do anything in 
the assembly which is the text book definition of the role of an MP – 
to legislate, to participate in the oversight of the executive, to address 
public policy debates in the house. ……………… As a result they do 
not even come to the assembly. …………………. What impresses 
their constituents is that they were there to do something personally 
for constituents’ families. ……………. 
[Consequently]……………..traditionally, local governments have 
not been able to function. They are either not formed or if they are 
formed, they are used by military governments to legitimise their 
stay. By holding local government elections the military 
governments demonstrate to the world that they are holding elections. 
Local people are no challenge to their authority ……………. 
However, such local governments have questionable legitimacy. [On 
the other hand] elected governments do not let local governments 
establish because of power grabs. If local governments are elected, 
they would share powers with the provincial governments. Provincial 
governments do not want to part with their powers. Most of these 
functions which I say MPs are fulfilling should actually be fulfilled 
by local government, councillors or nazims (mayors or chairman of 
the union council). Most of these problems are local. They deal with 
local administration, local judiciary, local police station and local 
development issues like water supply, roads and schools. …………. 
MPs of only those type get elected who are fond of becoming keepers 
of their area, ……………interested only in wielding influence, 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Interview 16, 2 May 2015. 
 178 
throwing their weight and getting things done. ………… They do not 
like that tomorrow an entity forms that takes away their authority.  
 
Another significant dimension to the political and social context for democratisation in 
Pakistan is the army’s direct and indirect control over politics and society. Research 
participants perceive it as the dominant political legacy in which Pakistan army’s 
growing influence has impeded democratic culture to take roots. Many believe that 
military rule is by nature ‘coercive’: rights-based NGOs’ historical struggles in Pakistan 
against the dictatorships of General Ayub and General Zia have resulted in Pakistan 
army’s constant scrutiny of NGOs and human rights activists to this day.23 Discussing 
the weaknesses of democracy in Pakistan, an academic in Karachi stated that the army 
and its Inter-Services Intelligence body (ISI)24 form a significant part of the state 
establishment which benefits from the ills of patronage-based political culture; 
reprimands dissent in the name of protecting national-interest; and constantly monitors 
the civil society with all its military might and privilege.25 The gravity of coercion is 
such that whilst in conversations, most NGOs discreetly referred to the army and ISI 
out of fear. A few, however, were unbounded. Below, I provide a couple of 
observations: 
The right-wing factions are very strong…….. in my view, religious 
groups and political parties have power. If you speak against their set 
of values, they will get to you. Behind them are their militant 
organisations. Behind these militant organisations, are our agencies 
who are fighting the US War on Terror. Behind that is our military 
intelligence and the so-called National Action Plan. This right-side 
always expands when there is war, jihad, India and Afghanistan 
politics……. Our army elite is corrupt to its core and our judiciary 
too. Imagine working for human rights and democracy in this 
context. People disappear from Balochistan and Swat on regular 
basis. Nobody can question the army and its agencies….It is a 
complete state within a state.26  
 
We are essentially ruled by the army. [On surface] we might have 
civilian government, but in reality the transfer of power has not taken 
place to the civilian leadership in certain key areas including external 
                                                 
23 See Chapter IV. 
24 The Directorate-General for Inter-Services Intelligence or Inter-Services Intelligence (abbreviated ISI) 
is the premier intelligence agency of Pakistan, responsible for providing critical national security 
intelligence assessment to the Government of Pakistan. It comprises primarily of serving military officers 
drawn on secondment from the three service branches of the Pakistan Armed Forces; namely the Pakistan 
Army, the Pakistan Air Force, and the Pakistan Navy although it also includes civilians.  
25 Interview 24, 30 June 2015. 
26 Interview 12, 22 April 2015. 
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and domestic security and foreign policy. Even in our economy, the 
army is the largest stakeholder. However civilian and popular our 
prime ministers are …….they do not have the public support to stand 
up to the pressure of the army. They make plans, sometimes brave 
plans…, but then they receive thrashing of the army. The army 
destabilises these people and then the government ducks……[with a 
sarcastic grunt]. Army is only tolerating democracy because its 
purpose is being served. Their interests are being met so why should 
they come and enter civilian business for 5 to 8 years, become 
unpopular and then leave………they have nothing to lose.27  
 
Why then, did most NGOs welcome General Musharraf’s dictatorship and join hands 
with his government in instituting ‘liberal democracy’? NGOs in democratisation have 
conflicting responses to this fundamental question which challenges their ethos and 
roles. For some, it was a ‘significant drift from liberal democratic ideology’ and ‘the 
biggest blunder’ on their part to strengthen and legitimise authoritarianism in 
Pakistan.28 For others, it was a ‘strategic choice’ between a moderately liberal dictator 
(whom they believed they can work with and influence) and ‘an increasingly religious 
and right-wing democratic government of the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif.’29 This 
complexity illuminates another dimension of the political culture which has been 
surged by rising religious extremism. 
 
Religious extremism surfaces as the most substantial concern for all research 
participants. Rising militancy and sectarian politics led by the religious political parties 
with their militant wings and the local offshoots of Taliban have, overtime, gained 
strength in resources and social acceptance. NGOs in democratisation, especially the 
rights-based NGOs, are particularly vulnerable to the violence instigated by these 
forces. The following assertions illuminate the gravity of these concerns as NGOs 
referred to the killings of their activists and the feat of the violent religious extremism:  
We [NGOs] try to protect a liberal space, for ourselves and for others. 
But this space is very limited……….. there has been a gradual 
collapse of the left and liberals….. [S]tate is by nature coercive. So 
far, we were only in conflict with the state. Now we have so many 
non-state actors that are more dangerous. All of our people recently 
murdered – Sabeen, Parveen, Rashid Rehman30 – they were all my 
                                                 
27 Interview 4, 21 March 2015 (My emphasis). 
28 Ibid. Interview 8, 15 April 2015. 
29 A group discussion with NGO personnel 08 May 2015. 
30 Sabeen Mehmood and Parveen Rehman led NGOs in Karachi. Rashid Rehman was a prominent lawyer 
by profession and Co-ordinator at HRCP. They were all murdered between 2014-2016. 
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friends….. all killed for doing what we do. We know that they were 
not killed by the state. They were killed by previously kept lapdogs 
of the state with justifications. One of them was killed for supporting 
[the victim of] blasphemy.  In the past, we used to fight the state. 
There was a way to do it. How can we fight this? They are shadows. 
They are terrorists. This is a mind-set which is spreading everywhere. 
They can kill for any reason……….. they have justifications in the 
name of religion.31  
 
Ideologically, the civil society is defeated. The religious extremist 
narrative has won. [Recently] with the turn of the army against some 
sections of terrorists, it has created an atmosphere and the need for 
an alternative narrative. But if you ask me, religious ideas have 
hegemony. There is no secular, liberal alternative at the mainstream 
political level. There are certain elements of it in PPP and ANP 
sometimes, but they are also very contradictory. Other mainstream 
political parties are openly religious and critical of the liberal and 
western values in the society.32  
 
The establishment in Pakistan is not the only front where NGOs and 
civil society in Pakistan fight for their space. We also have to fight 
religious extremism…………for our own survival. We have to 
realise that if we do not bring democratic culture, democracy will not 
amount to much without it…………….The extremists do not forgive 
anyone. They killed Sabeen and they tried to kill Malala and many 
others. They kill Ismailis (religious minority) for no other reason 
except that they are soft targets……33  
 
A significant element of religious extremism is felt as taking roots in society, enrolling 
NGOs and the wider civil society within it. This is not surprising as NGOs and the 
wider civil society reflect the overall character of the society. But this emerges as a 
huge concern for NGOs as they now have ‘adversaries within our space’:34  
Once I was visiting an NGO/CBO in KP (Khyber Pakhtoonkhuwa 
province) working for human rights and democracy. All the posters 
on their office walls were Jihadi. I said what is this? They said we 
have to do this to survive here. But really, it means that somewhere 
deep down your heart is connected to these beliefs. How will your 
analysis be free of these influences? Unfortunately, much of our 
criticism and analysis gets influenced by extremist forces. They 
appear innocent to us. Just like the army appeared innocent to us. This 
is my concern. Civil society or NGO professionals are not all at the 
same wavelength when it comes to a coherent and collective position 
                                                 
31 Interview 11, 21 April 2015. 
32 Interview 4, 21 March 2015. 
33 Interview 12, 22 April 2015 
34 Interview 11, 21 April 2015. 
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towards army or the extremist forces. There are deep divisions, 
beginning with NGOs’ acceptance of Musharraf.35  
 
Divisions within NGOs in democratisation is another factor that unquestionably affects 
the environment in which they operate. That ‘NGOs are not united’ and do not stand in 
support of each other, is a concern which is shared by research participants from NGOs: 
[W]hen Save the Children was shut down (in Islamabad June 2015), 
did anyone speak up? Did any UN or INGO speak up? No one spoke 
against the government from the development sector………….. I 
heard that the US Ambassador got involved because if Save the 
Children gets shut down, the US government will have lawsuits in 
America about how the public funds are being used. To avoid that, 
the Ambassador pushed the government of Pakistan not to close it 
but just to curtail it, check and monitor it. Most NGOs are being 
pushed to the margins……and not a single word is being uttered 
against this within the wider civil society.36  
 
Besides ideological divisions and scant mutual support, NGOs blame their sector for 
overlapping and duplicating projects in a bitter competition for development funds.37 
Furthermore, there are concerns about the undemocratic culture within NGOs. 
Women’s organisations are particularly concerned. A senior NGO personnel who heads 
a democracy promotion NGO with an internationally funded programme for women’s 
empowerment and political participation, observed:  
We (women’s organisations) are doing it because we believe in 
democracy………… Many new NGOs mushroomed only to utilise 
funding. You will be amazed at the kind of people doing projects that 
have to do with democracy. I am leading a grant-making programme. 
We receive funding applications in the name of women’s 
participation in politics. We ask for CVs because we want to know if 
women are employed. When they [the recipient NGO] start the 
project, all the women disappear and men run the project. They have 
only men on their boards. All their employees are male. The so-called 
people working on democracy are so distant from it. They don’t 
believe in democracy – they are just using it as a means to get money 
or to strengthen their power. When there is an NGO formed in this 
country, one person remains the head for all of his life or the 
organisation’s life as the paid director. So I ask them, what kind of 
democracy can they deliver? If democracy is not in our culture, how 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
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will it come to our NGOs? Our NGOs are also reflective of our 
culture.38  
 
Out of anguish, NGOs feel that the right-wing extremist thought has also penetrated the 
mainstream media, from TV channels to the newspapers – particularly the Urdu 
newspapers. This adds another significant tone to the contested context for NGOs. 
Whilst NGOs and other research participants appreciate the increasing plurality of 
private media enterprises – both in electronic and press media – they worry about the 
soaring trends in political sensationalisation, politician and NGO bashing and the lack 
of social accountability and responsibility of the media: 
Our activists are maligned by the media and social media. Just see 
how Malala is maligned and how Asma is insulted on daily 
basis……the right-wing forces are very strong. They have their own 
people in the media too. They speak on script given to them against 
NGOs. We were giving trainings to young people including visits to 
the US. They were also interns at the Senate. The media reported that 
we interfere with state policy as our “agents” were working in the 
Senate! Most of our media malign NGOs….it talks about NGOs’ 
salaries and foreign funding only, all because of agencies feeding 
them with scripts….39  
 
In this statement, reference is made to the ‘right-wing forces’ and ‘given scripts’. In 
common parlance, the right-wing forces include religious extremist groups, the army 
and ISI. ‘[G]iven scripts’ specifically refers to the latter pressurising media for the right-
wing forces’ vested power interests.  Another statement affirms this observation: 
There was a time when GEO TV – Hamid Mir – spoke critically in 
favour of the Baloch. They [Jang media group] picked a fight with 
the agencies [ISI]. He was attacked and just managed to escape a 
violent death. GEO had to apologise. They remained shut down… 
Jang is such a large media organisation with contacts everywhere, 
but when the agencies put their pressure, even they could not bear 
it.40  
 
Media, as part of the civil society should (in theory) partner with NGOs and support 
them in their progressive causes against the state. But most NGOs perceive the 
mainstream electronic and print media in Pakistan as part of the establishment; 
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39 Interview 12, 22 April 2015. 
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‘representing lies’ and promoting a ‘fake discourse’.41 Furthermore, NGOs are often 
presented as the only face of the civil society in the mainstream media; “which is a fact 
that makes us [NGOs] more vulnerable:”42 
If they [media] stand with us, then we will be stronger. We try to 
make them stand with us but they run away. In Urdu newspapers, 
there is often a headline which states that ‘protests were attended by 
political parties, media representatives, lawyers and the members of 
civil society’. When we ask them what do you mean by civil society, 
who do you count? They say NGOs. So even if one or two people 
from NGOs show up, they are considered as civil society.…………43  
 
However, in response, media organisations argue that the diverse nature of rising 
privatised media should be carefully scrutinised as not all media is ignorant of the good 
work NGOs do.44 On the other hand, a senior journalist in the mainstream Urdu media 
has his own critique on NGOs. He observes that allegations of sensationalisation and 
generating fake discourses do not only apply on media; these allegations could equally 
be placed on NGOs.45 Whilst some media groups and journalists support NGOs in 
democratisation and human rights by acting as trustees on their boards, speaking at their 
events, and giving them coverage in their papers or programmes, there is a significant 
perceived distrust amongst them against NGOs:  
Their [NGOs] activities remain suspicious. They have many agendas. 
In the Shafqat Hussain death sentence case, NGOs raised the issue 
that he was underage when he committed the murder…………. This 
case went up every level in the judiciary up to the Supreme Court 
which ruled that this issue should have been raised during various 
trials at the lower judiciary…………… [but] this was not done. Noise 
was only made after the punishment was given………. The 
investigations were done [on NGOs demands] and it was found that 
the boy was not underage. These are the issues that give people the 
opportunity to say that they [NGOs] have to create such issues in 
order to justify their funding. There are many issues in Pakistan – 
minorities, blasphemy law etc. But the cultural context or sensitivities 
are ignored when [NGOs] take up these issues…… [because] of their 
disconnect from society……………We have members of civil 
society, some NGOs, who encourage separatist movements or those 
movements fighting armed battles in Balochistan………… how can 
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42 Interview 10, 20 April. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Interview 20, 19 June 2015. 
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we support that? This creates difficulties in our response to NGOs 
and civil society.46  
 
A final significant challenge to NGOs is marked by their dependence on international 
funding. There is an infamous charge against NGOs in Pakistan that since they are 
foreign funded, they must work on foreign agendas. However, in research participants’ 
observations, the nuances of international funding for NGOs are complex. In the 
context of Pakistan, where there is no financial support available from the state and 
public charity is almost always directed to the community welfare work, funding for 
human rights and democracy programmes is only obtained from international sources 
including the development agencies of the Western states and the international NGOs 
in their support for the global civil society. Cognizant of this fact, most research 
participants believe that ‘the foreign tag is not a fatal thing as such.’47 They do however 
strongly dispute the degree of its impact on NGOs’ approaches to work – ethos and 
roles. As seen previously, from corporatisation to depoliticisation of NGOs, excessive 
salaries and fading volunteerism, NGOs’ ethos to upholding the principles of 
independence, fairness, grass-roots connections, representation and accountability is 
critically questioned.48 However, it is imperative to reiterate that though international 
funding is taken to contribute to such shifts in NGOs approaches, it is itself appreciated 
in the absence of domestic support and for the causes that NGOs endorse: 
We have overseas funding from Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, etc. 
But we set and control our agenda - we do not toe anyone else’s line. 
In a way, foreign funding is helpful to our watchdog role against the 
government. We are not against the government [in Pakistan] but we 
do want to keep a distance from it…………. [so we can] make 
demands from it……..and we [can] reserve the right to criticise. By 
distance I mean that we do not take any concessions or financial help 
from government… neither do we take dictation. Our funding base 
gives us the resources and independence we need for our work.49  
 
NGOs in democratisation observe that whilst NGOs and civil society groups do get 
entrapped in funding and shift agendas, they are usually small NGOs for whom survival 
is a big concern. NGOs that have the resources to sustain, relevant networks and 
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reputation, often set their own agendas even if it they are pushed by the donors to 
diverge:  
We were running a large project funded by USAID. We completed 
it. We were one of the two Pakistani organisations…………..that 
were to hold such a large financial portfolio. USAID requested us to 
work on FATA reforms. We said, yes as we needed to work on it. 
They also said that as part of the programme, they need profiles of 
prisoners in FATA. We wrote to them and said we cannot do 
espionage work and that they have come to the wrong place for the 
wrong information. The problem is that very few organisations can 
take this kind of stand against their donors. Most break.50  
   
Despite the fact that funding itself is appreciated, and besides the critique that has been 
already noted, international funding brings other intractable challenges for NGOs. A 
recent but significant trend in international funding for NGOs in Pakistan is the arrival 
of global companies in the development sector that work as intermediary fund and 
programme managers, worldwide. This presents a big challenge to even established 
NGOs who can otherwise resist donors’ pressures. Development Alternatives Inc. 
(DAI), for example, is one such global company which is being contracted by 
international development agencies including DFID and USAID to manage national 
level governance and development programmes on their behalf. For most programmes, 
national NGOs are now having to agree contracts with DAI, instead of directly 
partnering with DFID or USAID. This complexity adds to the problem of 
corporatisation of development dynamics as the disconnect between funding agencies 
and grass-roots NGOs widens:   
In 2000, NGOs had greater say to organise and spend their funds. 
Now the international business model has completely transformed 
this. Now a donor is not even willing to give $ 50,000 to local NGOs. 
They give it to DAI. Most domestic NGOs are sub-sub-recipients of 
funds. Donors fund DAI, who give it to someone else and then who 
give to someone else. Funds are being channelised in this way…….. 
this funding model requires you to bring the best business/corporate 
models. If you don’t, how will you reduce costs. Anyone with a 
complete corporate mind-set would run this system more effectively. 
It won’t be a social activist like me, who lacks this mind-set. All of 
us now have a fixed obligation price. We all must have a politically 
correct approach when our obligation prices are agreed upon before 
signing the funding contract with companies in development.51  
                                                 




Another significant aspect to international funding is donor agencies’ relationship with 
the state. Often international donors, especially the state supported agencies in the West, 
fund governments in Pakistan to develop and deliver social development and good 
governance projects. For example, various education support programmes in Sindh and 
Punjab are being delivered through provincial governments who sub-contract the 
projects to NGOs. These multi-level partnerships bring distinct challenges as 
international donors act diplomatically to work with the state. A Director of an NGO 
based in Karachi with projects across Sindh observed: 
International donors do not want to come across as the bad guy to the 
state. They want to build systems, give trainings and establish proper 
protocols. They have money and very good programmes, but they are 
no use to NGOs and communities when our government demands 
(international donors) to make funding and programme decisions on 
the basis of its own interests. For example, on girls’ education 
programmes, they [donors and state] make decisions politically. State 
decides which districts to enter…………. Let me give you an 
example. We were running a project in early 2000’s. It was a primary 
education project. The project was already delayed for over a year 
because of the change in the government. New government wanted 
to select districts to which they [their supporters] belonged to. Okay, 
it was done. No issue (to international donors). Then, there was a 
secondary school education project. Logically, the plan was to work 
on secondary education where primary had already been fixed. But 
when the time came……….. some other districts were selected on 
the government’s intentions, because they wanted to distribute 
benefits to more areas without thinking about the logic of the 
programme………… the international donor accepted that. This 
reconciliation or compromise policy of donors……….. to avoid 
stress, nobody is getting any benefits in the end. I think, they also 
have targets and have to respond to Congress. They want their 
projects implemented and outputs counted. They say, okay tell us 
which districts and we will go there. As sub-recipients of funds on 
that programme, we tried to alert the donors…….but government’s 
acceptance is far more important than our cries. And to the 
intermediary development companies, the programme management 
and implementation is everything. They are least bothered about the 
small but significant changes for communities.52  
 
An important nuance related to external support and influence is the diversity in the 
availability of foreign funding for social and political development programmes. This 
nuance points to the heterogeneous nature of development dynamics in a given local 
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setting. On one hand, political parties in the Western countries have their international 
chapters in Pakistan to promote their values and aims. They work with national political 
parties and NGOs to galvanise global political support in favour of their political 
visions. On the other hand, there is funding available for reforming madrassas that 
NGOs are particularly critical of:  
[Supporting faith based organisations to generate progressive 
dialogue] This approach is completely wrong and it will backfire. …. 
Faith based in the European and British contexts is different. 
Alcoholics Anonymous is a faith-based organisation. That is their 
[funders] understanding. Our faith based organisations are armed to 
the teeth and their job is to kill. These guys have no idea what they 
are playing with when they say faith based. Most madrassas here are 
not just religious schools, they are part of a whole, horrible set up of 
extremism. They made this mistake before. They supported the 
mujahedeen and saw the consequences of it. They supported Taliban. 
Now they are saying let us support those who are better or moderates 
out of these groups. There are no moderates here anymore. It is a 
complete divide in Pakistan. You either have people like me who are 
considered Western, liberal or agnostic which is a tiny minority and 
everyone else is completely religious. There is no middle ground.53  
 
The above accounts of lived experiences of research participants from NGOs set out in 
detail the complexity and contested nature of their environment. This is imperative to 
comprehend prior to any in-depth exploration of their roles in democratisation. In a 
visual manner, I see this environment forming a web of contestations within which 
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Figure 1: NGOs in Democratisation 
 
Figure 1 captures the eight dimensions of the contested environment within which 
NGOs in democratisation operate. The dynamic interaction between the eight aspects 
is shown through the small arrows. The two big arrows, in and out of the octagon, 
demonstrate the co-constitutive and reciprocal nature of the context and NGOs. In this 
flow, the political and social environments shape and constitute NGOs and in response, 
NGOs constitute their environment. As one whole, this becomes the context of 
democratisation in Pakistan, as experienced and understood by this research.  
 
I now turn to describe and illuminate the roles of NGOs in the thick of contestations.  
 
The Imperfect Necessity  
Research participants’ lived experiences of democratisation in Pakistan illuminate a 
contested environment for NGOs. This environment profoundly circumscribes NGOs’ 
roles in democratisation – to promote democracy and establish a democratic culture. To 
sustain, NGOs adapt and modify their roles. In so doing, they conversely shape their 
environment. In this reciprocal process of engaging, responding and shaping of the 
environment, NGOs’ are not passive agents, neither is their environment inert. They 
play an active role in shifting the bounds of the environment, hence generating distinct 
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ways of being. This mutual and dynamic relationship between NGOs in 
democratisation and their environment becomes the context of democratisation in 
Pakistan.  
 
The final section completes this chapter with a discussion on the roles of NGOs in 
adapting to their environment. In so doing, it underscores the phenomenon of 
‘projectised democratisation’ and develops the concept of NGelites (a portmanteau of 
elite-NGOs).54 As NGelites, NGOs in projectised democratisation become the elite 
within the wider civil society. The internationally funded and supported NGelites, take 
the position of influence to discreetly join the political elite, push the democratic 
transition and establish a procedural democracy. Thus, in playing the following roles, 
NGelites become central to the phenomenon of democratisation in Pakistan – they 
become the Imperfect Necessity.  
There is a large void which we [NGOs] are trying to fill. The void 
was in engaging and informing people or making them part of the 
mainstream processes. In our society, everything is controlled by the 
state from media to curriculum. State dictates people……human 
rights and democracy do not get mentioned. To break all this and 
explain to people that you have rights and entitlements, water is your 
entitlement, once you pay taxes, school, health centres become 
entitlements – has been our effort. We make people conscious of their 
entitlements…………… This is our contribution. If there are 
elections, we work on that. We are working on the upcoming local 
government elections to include the excluded i.e. minorities, women 
etc. Obviously, it will take time to assert itself. But there are 
indicators that it is [our effort] reaching somewhere. You will now 
see many women who are standing up as councillors and 
nazims…………If the meaning of democracy is voice, then we have 
to give voice to the people. We have given that voice. We have made 
a process. We are now trying to systematise it.55   
 
The contribution of NGOs in democratisation; in developing democratic institutions 
and embedding a democratic culture where human rights are entitlements, is being 
claimed in this assertion. It also emerges from this assertion that NGOs in 
democratisation play a dual role. Firstly, NGOs are the educators: they inform citizens 
about their entitlements including their right to political participation. In so doing, they 
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‘give voice to the people’ and promote civic education. Secondly, NGOs are enablers: 
they enable institutions and actors for an effective functioning of democracy. For 
example, in this statement, NGOs support the local government electoral system by 
developing prospective councillors and nazims (district administrators). 
Notwithstanding the prevalent critique noted in the previous chapter – including the 
self-critique by NGOs on their roles – most NGOs as research participants, assert that 
they play this dual role in democratisation. This dual role however is heavily 
circumscribed by the contested environment discussed above. This leads to the question 
of how do they play this dual role in midst of contestations and in what ways they 
navigate a space for themselves? This section illuminates responses to this question.  
 
NGOs as educators  
As educators, NGOs in democratisation ‘make citizens conscious of their entitlements.’ 
In so doing, they remain within the constitutional framework which guarantees 
fundamental rights and demands duties. Head of Programmes at a large democracy 
promotion and civil society infrastructure support NGO, observed: 
Citizens should know their rights and duties enshrined in the 
Constitution. They should have knowledge about democracy and the 
democratic setup………. We sometime romanticise the public and 
consider them to be filled with wisdom. But the public live in our 
social pattern where they are simply not able to ascertain what their 
rights and duties are. They are set in their ways. It is not a question 
of illiteracy…. For long our relationship with the state has been a 
subservient one….. citizens are completely unaware of municipal 
laws (etc)………[W]e need prolonged civic education to end age old 
traditions. We need this for democracy.56  
 
NGOs’ role(s) in educating the public on constitutional entitlements must be considered 
in the contested environment where the state is hostile to NGOs; recurrent dictatorships 
and the dynastic and patronage politics have eroded meaningful political participation 
and religious extremism is intensifying. There is no financial support available for such 
projects at the local level. International funding from the West (e.g. USAID, DFID, EU, 
DANIDA etc) for democracy and human rights programmes is mostly directed at 
supporting political participation for the general elections. Limited funds are available 
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for building social and political consciousness on a long-term basis.57 Some NGOs use 
funds from democracy programmes to build public consciousness on rights and 
entitlements alongside delivering agreed outputs for funded programmes.58 They make 
use of the opportunities provided to them to expand reach and influence – as much as 
possible – for the activities that are needed in the context of democratisation in Pakistan. 
Others share their disappointment for not being able to work on this much-desired task 
due to lack of financial and human resources.59 There is however a shared 
acknowledgment amongst NGOs, and between them and other research participants, 
that civic education, particularly about political engagement, rights and obligations of 
citizens vis-à-vis the state, is essential for sustained efforts for democracy. An 
established NGO’s director gave an example of how they focus on building civic sense:  
The primary premise should be that citizens interact with the state. 
They don’t know that they have rights and entitlements….. To this 
day in Punjab, the Deputy Commissioner is considered as the final 
authority of the state…..the patwari is also very influential. We are 
trying to encourage people to claim their rights… (For example) we 
made a checklist of things that should be present in a primary 
healthcare centre or a primary school………….. By law these things 
should be there. We did research, made checklists, and gave some 
citizens very basic training. We call them barefoot researchers. They 
go to these places and fill out the checklists. We told them use your 
right to know. It is very public, basic information. Every citizen has 
a right to know. The data came to us. We did a basic analysis of it 
and sent it back to them. They would then go to the relevant 
authorities. We encourage them don’t go to the press or the MP but 
use the process. The existing process should be exhausted first before 
we make demands for changes or new procedures. Right now, we do 
not exhaust the process. If there is no teacher, people go to the MP. 
They must understand that it is not the role of the MP. It is okay to 
criticise the process but do that after you have exhausted it. It can 
only be changed when you know what problems it has. This is what 
we did with elections. We never said that elections were rigged. We 
said that this is the way elections should have been conducted by 
law….60  
 
There is a strong emphasis on citizens’ rights to information and on operating within 
the system of governance to claim their entitlements. The focus on ‘the existing 
processes’ should be noted here for a subsequent discussion in this chapter. Suffice to 
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note here that projectised democratisation deliberately engages with working within the 
constitutional framework and utilising existing processes. I say deliberately because it 
looks to be a conscious choice on their part to establish approaches to democratisation 
based on evidence and support for the community. Projectised democratisation appears 
to be concerned with a sustained long-term change unlike democratisation through 
politically sensitive, momentary and issue-based advocacy which used to be the 
characteristic of democratisation as dissent.    
We are talking about citizen’s rights and entitlements guaranteed in 
the constitution and legal framework. Our role is to advocate and 
spread awareness. We have decided not to be an activist organisation. 
Our advocacy is based on technical evidence and information that we 
gather. We do not say that people should have blanket rights for 
whatever reason. We say your constitution guarantees these rights, 
these are the legal provisions and this is what’s happening on the 
ground. This is our evidence.61  
 
Evidence based advocacy through civic education is perceived as the premise for 
projectised democratisation. In playing this role, NGOs face serious challenges not only 
because of the social and political contestations, but also because of their limited reach 
and resources for such activities.  An NGO professional whose organisation focuses on 
the provision of human rights education shared her concerns: 
When this organisation was started in 1994, the idea was to work on 
education about human rights and democratic norms at a larger level. 
When I say education, I mean awareness and non-formal education. 
We designed a course with an all-inclusive human rights 
framework……… there were nine themes in the course including 
civil and political rights, right to development, economic, social and 
cultural rights, women’s and children’s rights, and so on…. We 
began teaching kids in 7th and 8th grades because we knew that at 
these grades, the state curriculum was feeding them anti-democratic 
agenda. The problem is that we cannot work across all institutions. 
Not all NGOs together can work across all institutions in Pakistan. 
We can only work in selected organisations so scale is a big 
constraint……….but we still try to do it at small level. In our society, 
many people have lost hope for any change for the better. They think 
much of it is engineered. They don’t think vote is important so most 
don’t vote. We try and train the kids so as future voters, they know 
how political parties are formed, how manifestos are made, and how 
to campaign and contest elections……………We do peace dialogues 
with children at schools…. We talk about accountability in public 
offices. We are trying to contribute to other NGOs’ work on voter 
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education. But our limited scale and lack of resources remain a big 
constraint.62  
 
It is a shared claim amongst NGOs that their contribution to civic education is paying 
off. They have been able to encourage and support an ordinary person from even the 
minority communities – such as Bheel or Kohli communities63 – to contest elections.64 
Western support has been more than valuable in this, particularly in the context of 
dynastic and patronage politics. In this regard, NGOs blame political parties for ‘not 
doing enough’ for the inclusion of minority communities in their ranks. Promoting civic 
education is another area where political parties have let down the masses. “What they 
[political parties] were supposed to do – training of cadres, voters’ education, 
sensitisation, telling people that their votes and views matter – has been done by 
NGOs.”65 The following quotes from senior NGO personnel suggest how NGOs have 
been pushing for a gradual change and must continue to build public consciousness: 
The consciousness of free and fair elections – we worked on it and 
other NGOs did too. People have become very aware. They have also 
become keen to argue.  But this consciousness has not fully taken 
roots. We have to keep pushing.66  
Before our problem was that we did not have elections – our first 25 
years. Now we have decided that elections are unavoidable regardless 
of martial law. No dictator could say that he is anti-democracy… or 
anti-constitutional or against human rights…… this is one thing that 
we have ensured. Then the problem was that the parliament was 
prevented to complete its term. Now we are celebrating that we had 
our first democratic transition. The next issue is that the ingredients 
of a functioning democracy are missing. For example, the Prime 
Minister said that he will not go to the Senate and he did not go. 
…….. The functioning of democracy and building the consciousness 
of citizens through which the character of politicians is formed, must 
be our goal now. Putting pressure on the government is necessary and 
this is part of our technique. But our real audience is the public.67  
 
NGOs as enablers  
As enablers, NGOs in democratisation develop institutions and actors for an effective 
and sustainable democratic practice. They build the capacity of the parliament and 
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parliamentarians; government departments and bureaucrats; political parties and 
politicians; media and journalists; academics and NGOs. They work with political 
party-leaders and senior party members; parliamentary staff and departmental 
secretaries; members of provincial assemblies and provincial governments; councillors, 
nazims and others in local governments; members of parliamentary committees; the 
office of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), the National Commission for 
Human Rights Pakistan (NCHR), and the National Accountability Bureau (NAB).  
 
The capacity-building involves performing various functions including conducting 
research for evidence-based law and policymaking; publishing research and briefing 
papers on parliamentary procedures and on the regional-global best practices in 
parliamentary processes; holding briefing sessions, seminars, roundtable dialogues, and 
conferences on political and parliamentary issues; organising study visits to the 
exemplary democratic parliaments elsewhere; providing evidence on social and 
political issues to parliamentary committees and other platforms; and providing be-
spoke training sessions for all stakeholders to boost their performance according to 
democratic principles and the Constitution of Pakistan.  
 
A distinct area in capacity-building of parliamentarians and government departments 
involves developing long-term contacts and establishing trust with politicians, 
parliamentarians and bureaucrats to inform and influence policymaking, law-making 
and law-reforms. This is also imperative to persuade them to attend training sessions 
for skill development. In this area, particularly, a shift in approaches to democratisation 
– from movement to projectised democratisation – has evidently taken place.  
We are trying to develop a culture of evidence based advocacy. This 
is a new thing for most of us. Before (in the past) advocacy was done 
on the whims of an individual and research data was collected after 
that. Now research is conducted first and then on that basis, policy 
recommendations are made. This is a good change.68  
 
Most research participants from NGOs are reflective of what does and does not work 
when it comes to capacity-building institutions and actors. They try and adapt to the 
context in which they face distinct challenges. These challenges differ between 
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institutions and actors. I will illustrate this point through couple of examples. First, to 
influence law-making and policymaking, most NGOs believe that their indirect 
informative and advocacy role to enable the parliament and politicians, is the only way 
to establish democratic norms and practices. Some of them are aware of the trends in 
the West in involving the civil society by giving it a more direct and institutionalised 
role in informing law and policy. However, they do not see it worth pursuing in 
Pakistan. This is because of the multiple contestations concerning the hostility between 
state, political parties and NGOs; dilemmas related to international funding; NGO’s 
own limited technical capacities; and simply because of their normative stance which 
considers it as the right of elected representatives to make law and policy. A senior 
manager at the Punjab office of an NGO working on democratisation observed: 
We already have a role in this (in making laws and policies). The 
rules of the assembly (being amended in Punjab) state that NGOs and 
civil society has a status in standing committees. There is also 
international pressure to involve civil society and the government is 
bound to comply in certain areas for example in reporting on 
international conventions etc. When the Punjab assembly passed the 
domestic violence bill, they added a note saying that drafting of this 
bill had an input from civil society, specifically Aurat Foundation and 
Shirkat Gah have been part of this…………. It’s not a decision-
making role, nor should we have it. This right must be reserved for 
the elected representatives. There is space for us in the system but it 
doesn’t always get utilised.69  
 
Another NGO personnel had this to say about NGOs’ role in law and policymaking: 
An institutional improvement is that we are trying to go towards a 
responsible standing committee system. The public accounts 
committee’s chairman belongs to the opposition. This is very healthy 
convention. Standing committees invite NGOs and other civil society 
organisations in their deliberations. This is becoming more usual than 
it used to be…….. Another good change that has happened (which is 
beneficial for NGOs) is that the private members bills in the 
parliament can now be supported by the government if it wishes to 
do so. In the past, only the bills introduced by the government MPs 
received its support to make laws. Now it will be easier for NGOs to 
lobby and support individual MPs to present progressive private 
members bills…. If these things become conventions, NGOs role in 
law-making will be strengthened.70    
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Furthermore, the nuance of developing capacities of institutions also involves 
understanding how parliamentary system works. Often, it is not just about influencing 
politicians or political parties, but working with the parliamentary staff and government 
departments, which delivers the desired results. NGOs’ capacity-building programmes 
are increasingly focusing on training provisions for politicians and NGOs in 
understanding parliamentary systems e.g. rules of procedures, prerogatives and duties 
of the government departments etc. However, the challenges of the contestations 
remain. A research participant from an NGO which specifically targets politicians to 
provide training and support stated: 
Their (politicians and government departments) behaviour is very 
indifferent to the provision of technical assistance… I mean to our 
trainings. They say they have all the skills already and they are fine. 
Some might say yes, we need skills but majority will demand and 
focus on getting infrastructure support. They ask for laptops, cars, 
international tours, etc. So there is resistance which is not easy to 
tackle. Then there are sensitivities involved in letting outsiders in and 
observe the workings of the government departments or political 
parties……. It took us a long time to work with the Punjab Assembly 
to break these barriers. We worked with politicians and NGOs to help 
them understand how assembly works and which government 
departments are the key to develop contacts. We recommended them 
to work with four departments essentially – Finance, Law, Planning 
and Development and the issue-based department of their interest. 
These departments introduce legislation, finance it as they work with 
the budget. Some politicians and NGOs think that all their demands 
will be met through agitation or putting pressure on the government. 
It is not the case………………………………………… It is easy to 
sit outside the system and hold government or parliament 
accountable. But if you want them to improve, then at some stage you 
have to sit with them, hold dialogues and identify where you can 
work with them to help them establish democratic processes.71  
  
Another example relates to the capacity-building of parliamentarians and political 
parties. In the early 2000s, NGOs in democratisation focused primarily on building the 
capacities of parliamentarians in the newly elected parliament. Since then, however, 
they realised that they ought to give priority to developing democratic practices and 
building skills at the level of political parties. This has its own challenges. Reflections 
below by the director of an NGO in democratisation illuminate this stance: 
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[In the context of patronage politics] [P]arliamentarians have no drive 
of their own to debate policy whether it is within political parties or 
in the parliament. This is why our emphasis has shifted…… we had 
a realisation that some things are important before other things. Back 
when we had the military government (Musharraf’s time) our entire 
focus was to bring democracy and remove dictatorship (however 
indirectly it was) …... This finer point of lack of democracy in 
political parties could not be raised then. That would have been a fatal 
attack on them. They were already being victimised…….Now since 
2008, we have been focusing on democracy in political parties. Only 
now we have a space to initiate this debate within political parties, 
not before. We feel that since democracy is somewhat gaining 
ground, this is the time to ask questions.72  
 
Enabling the institution of political parties emerges as a substantive and shared 
objective amongst NGOs in democratisation. Other research participants also share this 
objective by assigning priority to the development of political parties. For some, despite 
recurrent dictatorships, political parties’ survival over the years manifests their 
resilience and periodic returns of democracy in Pakistan against all odds.73 For others, 
democratisation depends on the ‘scope and scale’ of democratic institutions to have the 
legitimacy and reach to sensitise the public for democracy.74 It is unanimously 
understood amongst the research participants that political parties are the only 
institution with such scope and scale, whereas NGOs lack in this considerably. It was 
also accepted that the prolonged dynastic and patronage politics has had negative 
impact on the functioning of political parties. Nonetheless, political parties are the 
institution which need strengthening for any sustained efforts in democratisation. There 
is a recognition that instead of feeling ‘frustrated about the undemocratic practices in 
political parties’, NGOs should ‘continue to focus’ on developing democratic culture 
and practices in political parties and must see it as ‘a gradual change’ and ‘a historical 
process through which change takes place.’75   
 
NGOs in democratisation also have a fundamental (rather internal) role in enabling the 
wider civil society to advocate, educate, and establish democratic culture in the society. 
This is the area known as ‘capacity-building of the civil society’. A somewhat common 
approach is that relatively large and established NGOs provide skills training and 
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infrastructure support, including sub-grants, to small NGOs based in local areas. Such 
support includes providing training sessions on developing human resources; writing 
funding proposals; establishing board of trustees; promoting linkages and partnership 
funding bids; collecting basic data in the areas of health and education provisions; and 
promoting civic and human rights education. One Head of Programmes at the 
infrastructure support and democracy promotion NGO referred to these smaller NGOs 
and civil society groups as ‘islands of democracy’ and therefore the role of NGOs in 
democratisation must include supporting partner and smaller NGOs to become “strong 
institutions…….that are active, aware and dynamic.”76    
 
Finally, enabling institutions for democratisation demands political acumen and 
sensitivity with regards to the institutions involved and the ‘timing’ of the issue 
concerned. One of the NGOs discusses this in light of their work on electoral processes 
and institutions. In their role of advocacy for electoral reforms, they take it very 
seriously to conduct rigorous research and to collect data as widely in the society as 
possible. The “kind of data which we have now, even the ECP [Election Commission 
of Pakistan] does not have it’” they claimed.77 In utilising this data, however, they keep 
the context of historically weak electoral politics in sight. They abstain from going to 
media with their research findings, which they believe is like “giving more fire to the 
claims of inconsistencies during elections (e.g. rigging)………to destabilise the already 
fragile system.”78 They have been building good working relationships with the ECP 
and the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Election Reforms. They present 
the research evidence and make recommendations for a stronger and sustainable 
electoral legal system, “which is not an easy or straight-forward exercise given the 
political fragility of democracy in Pakistan.”79 
 
That NGOs as educators and enablers are absolutely necessary and important in 
democratisation, has been claimed by most research participants. However, considering 
the contestations, these roles are essentially supportive in nature. In the context of 
Pakistan, there is an undisputed recognition amongst the research participants, that the 
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political society has the utmost potential as a proactive agency for the consolidation of 
democracy in Pakistan.  
Yes, there is fragmentation…… there are tensions between NGOs 
and the political society. But it will improve with political 
agreements. Apart from all the procedural stuff they (NGOs) do, if 
there are individuals in them who understand the long-term politics, 
they can help with that. If not, then that’s not an issue. Political 
society will find a way. Change comes out of political negotiations. 
The influence they can have on legislation or lobbying is important. 
But they (NGOs) cannot take up an active role in law-making yet. 
These issues will be picked up by the political society. NGOs will 
legitimise liberal democratic issues and de-legitimise opposing 
issues. I see their role in filling the gap in liberal values. They are the 
ones who are free from constituency politics and are technically 
able…………..But nobody is going to tolerate a seat for NGOs in 
every parliamentary committee or forum. These are legitimate 
limitations.80  
 
In their supporting role to the institutions and actors, NGOs in democratisation are 
illuminated as increasingly focusing to establish and strengthen processes. I now turn 
to this ‘procedural focus’ which underpins the phenomenon of projectised 
democratisation and reveals a significant nuance. 
 
NGOs as processors  
Through their lived experiences, I see NGOs in democratisation as essentially playing 
a role of processors; working cautiously and continuously on a series of actions to 
achieving a desired end.  Establishing a liberal, representative and democratic 
parliamentary system in Pakistan is that desired end. As processors, most NGOs in this 
research are aware of the contested context in which they act, and in making of which 
they also contribute. Their supportive roles as educators and enablers of institutions 
and actors are heavily circumscribed in the contested context of dynastic and patronage 
politics; hostility of the state and the army; international funding dilemmas; and 
religious extremism among other factors.  In such conditions, most NGOs – reflectively 
– act to strengthen the parliamentary processes through purposefully designed projects 
and programmes. I would argue that the projectised democratisation, as the 
consequence of NGOs’ actions, is included in the actions itself. It cannot be any other 
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way. Within it, NGOs build on the existing positive assets of the democratic 
constitutional framework and the multiparty political system and strive for finer 
improvements in democratic structures of political parties, assemblies, local 
governments and other institutions.  As processors, they also need to be discreet: they 
must not present themselves as competitors to the political society, nor should they stir 
the hostility of the state and the army to ‘disrupt the already fragile democracy’. They 
sensibly decide when, where and how to act; what interventions to make; and who 
should they approach, influence and work with. This includes a choice of their donors 
and negotiating agendas. Procedural gains will slowly but surely achieve the desired 
end, it is believed:   
If procedural connectedness leads to political democracy then what 
could be better than supporting regular elections and calling for the 
transition of power, etc. In KP, local elections were held and the KP 
government will have to tolerate district governments composed of 
opposing political parties. This is a landmark. Procedurally, we are 
trying to do everything that needs to be done…………… 
International pressures for these procedural shifts, is also a good 
thing. Yes, procedural things and political things will sometimes 
appear out of balance, but the theory is that eventually we will win. 
We must also recognise that procedures sometimes help and 
sometimes hinder…….. Our balancing act is different. For instance, 
the previous elections had procedural flaws but the politically wise 
thing to do was not to disturb things. In terms of purely maintaining 
procedures, this may not have been a good thing. In terms of long-
term fight, this was the wise thing to do. Managing these 
contradictions is also a kind of politics that NGOs practice. We 
understand it better now than we did before…..81 
 
It is this ‘balancing act’, which NGOs ‘understand better than before’, that underpins 
their roles as processors and distinguishes them from NGOs in the past. The milieu of 
multiple contestations requires multiple actions. In doing so, NGOs face serious 
challenges in establishing their credibility as technically capable organisations, to local 
institutions as well as to their donors. For instance, whilst international funding is not a 
problem per se (for example in election monitoring), the claims made by NGOs are 
often ‘undeliverable’ in local settings:  
To determine the credibility of elections process we refer to EU 
monitors and international observers. So if NGOs get DFID or 
USAID money, it is not a big deal. The bigger problem is for NGOs 
when they claim big things and promise more than they could 
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possibly deliver. Their credibility gets placed at stake. The political 
economy of foreign funding is damaging from this point of view.82 
 
The utmost dimension to this balancing act is the army’s direct and indirect influence 
in politics. NGOs believe that by focusing on strengthening the processes of democracy, 
they have been able to limit army’s direct control over politics. For example, focused 
and sustained actions on the election monitoring and advocacy for regular, free and fair 
elections are paying off as holding elections has become a norm. An NGO personnel 
proudly claimed:   
We have made a deterrent. If there is a martial law in Pakistan – note 
that there won’t be a martial law, but even if there is – it will be short 
lived. The space for it has reduced. People will not accept it 
anymore………… We are developing a constituency for democracy. 
People who have come through local government elections, nearly 
150,000 elected, they are not going anywhere. They will want a 
future election………… There is a constituency of elections 
now…….Even the worst dictatorship, cannot survive without 
elections. We have created a force and a demand. This is 
expanding…. Now military generals and their supporters will think 
twice……….. We are producing an electoral political system. ….. 
Never in the past would these buggers with their chips on their 
shoulders come to us asking for advice. Now they do.83  
 
Limiting the army’s direct control – as the balancing act – also requires NGOs to 
pragmatically accept its long-term institutional influence. Pakistan’s army is the only 
institution in Pakistan with a coherent organisational structure based on ample financial 
and human resources. Its influence and indirect control over politics and society is 
undisputed. There is thus a consciousness that in “the power equation of Pakistan’s 
institutions, army is the most significant actor” and NGOs in democratisation must not 
only accept this fact but also consider its significance in the context of rising religious 
extremism and its threats for NGOs.84   
In the country that we live in, if you want to have a role in the power 
equation then you should go to the GHQ (General Head Quarters of 
the Army). They are an actor in the ways the state works and delivers 
for the people of Pakistan.85  
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This assertion illuminates another significant dimension to the ‘balancing act’ which 
underpins the phenomenon of projectised democratisation: a desire to have ‘a role in 
the power equation.’ In conversing with the research participants, through 
understanding and interpretation, I believe that a shift in democratisation from 
movement and resistance to projectised democratisation is a manifestation of the 
balancing act of NGOs in a contested context. NGOs’ actions in projectised 
democratisation are process oriented, elite, urban, professional, and depoliticised 
because this is the only way through which they can narrow the gap that exists between 
them and the power elite consisting the army, the bureaucracy and the political elite. 
This is how NGOs in democratisation develop as NGelites of projectised 
democratisation. Without having a somewhat equal role and recognition in the elite 
workings of politics, NGOs cannot possibly achieve their desired end. Projects oriented 
democratisation is the answer to the contested context of democratisation in Pakistan. 
In this sense, if democratic consolidation is a necessity, it is imperfectly contingent to 
NGOs’ navigating a space in the power equation and operating as NGelites – one of the 
power elites. This balancing act is the imperfect necessity. Lived experiences of the 
research participants illuminate that there is enough evidence – in the contested context 
of Pakistan’s politics and society – which justifies the imperfect necessity of projectised 
democratisation. Consequently, NGelites themselves become the imperfect necessity: 
as NGOs, they might have lost their ideal appeal of employing radical approaches to 
democratisation, but as NGelites, they feel that there is enough evidence to justify that 
they are necessary for the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan.  
 
I understand further that in projectised democratisation, there exists a reciprocal link 
between the agency of NGOs and the structure of their environment. They influence 
and constitute each other. As discussed above, the octagon of contestations – as the 
dynamic and reciprocal link between NGOs and their environment – becomes the 
context of democratisation. In this way, the charge on NGelites for being ‘oblivious to 
the local context’ seems to be assumed. The ‘local’ context of Pakistan cannot be 
understood in the binaries of local vs Western. It is much more complex and involves 
myriad of factors. It reveals that the potential for democratisation as resistance and 
movement is no more a possibility in the context of Pakistan where politics is an elite 
practice amongst the elitist social and political groups. NGOs in democratisation are 
navigating a space to join in this group, constructing a compromise which not only 
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benefits the political system by establishing a basic democratic political set up, but also 
entitles – however limited – the citizens with fundamental rights. A CEO of a 
democracy promotion NGO stated: 
The system (of democracy) has to continue. There should not be 
military interventions…. Democracy as a process takes time to refine. 
People who get elected might remain the same in the short-term, but 
they will be refined. State and religion should be kept separate. NGOs 
will now continue to strengthen this process. Our work is not 
restricted to civic education for the citizens. We also need to work 




[A]nd that those that pretend to lead may at least be imbued with a 
modicum of common sense.87  
 
Departing from chapter five in which a shift in NGOs’ approaches to democratisation 
– from resistance to projectised democratisation – was revealed, in this chapter I have 
observed the nuances of the phenomenon of projectised democratisation. In so doing, 
through the lived experiences of NGOs’ personnel, I have shown the complexity of 
social and political context in Pakistan, which circumscribes the roles of NGOs in 
democratisation. In such context, NGOs ascribe a dual role for themselves in furthering 
democracy – i.e. as educators and enablers. I additionally understand that in projectised 
democratisation, NGOs, in fact, are processors; working cautiously and continuously 
on a series of actions to support the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan. Through 
purposefully designed projects and programmes, most NGOs act to strengthen the 
parliamentary processes. They also perform a balancing act vis-à-vis the army and the 
political elite of Pakistan. In so doing, NGOs become elite themselves. I have called 
them NGelites. They perceive to have contributed to limiting the direct control of the 
army over politics. At the same time, they pragmatically accept the organisational 
strength and influence of the army, and desire to navigate a space in the power equation 
of the traditional political actors including the army, bureaucracy and the political elite. 
Being elite, urban, professional, depoliticised and process oriented is the only way 
through which NGOs can narrow the gap that exists between them and the power elite. 
                                                 
86 Interview 18, 10 May 2015. 
87 Ardeshir Cowasjee, ‘Winding Down’ DAWN, December 25, 2011, available at 
https://www.dawn.com/news/683117. 
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In this sense, this balancing act is the imperfect necessity, perhaps infused with ‘a 
modicum of common sense’ which Cowasjee – a famous political and social 
commentator in Pakistan – hoped for, albeit in a much wider political context.  
 
However, I still feel the need for a deeper, somewhat personalised look, into the 
phenomenon of democratisation. This will allow me to acquire a profound and thicker 
interpretation of the conceptual structures – informed by their experiences – of the 
research participants. To illuminate such conceptual structures and cohere the two 
themes, in chapter VII, I present a final vignette. Written as an autobiographical account 
of my meeting with an NGO personnel, this vignette is adapted from a number of 
interviews transcriptions. As “symbolic expressions of lived experiences”, the vignette 
brings me, as a researcher, into the lived experience of democratisation. The main 
character is developed as a ‘composite character’ to combine the views expressed by a 
number of NGOs’ personnel. Thus, the character and setting of the vignette is 
fictionalised to imaginatively capture ‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ (theories) of the 
research participants. More importantly, the vignette, provides ‘a gaze’ into the nature 
of democratisation as it is lived by its actors. 
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Chapter VII: Reflective Summary  
In which the uncertainty of democratisation in multiple contexts is conceded. 
 
 
By way of reflecting on the key insights into the nature of democratisation and the roles 
of NGOs in it, in this chapter I conclude this research. For this purpose, I bring the 
theoretical discussions and empirical insights together to emphasise the theoretical, 
methodological and empirical contributions that this research makes in the academic 
literatures on democratisation. I revisit the main arguments, presented earlier, to first 
summarise them reflectively and then draw a conclusion. This revisiting does not follow 
the sequence in which the arguments are presented in the previous chapters. Rather, it 
narrates the analysis in a manner by which the essence of democratisation is 
illuminated.   
 
Having observed NGOs in democratisation and the challenges they face in the context 
of Pakistan, I situated this research into the procedural and minimalist conceptions of 
democracy, constitutionalism and democratisation as advanced by O’Donnell and 
Schmitter within the transition theory paradigm. By using this standpoint, I argued that 
the understanding of the nature or agency of NGOs, one should observe in its context 
– such a context is shaped by internal and external influences including the constraints 
of structures of power inherent in the practice of international aid and associated 
conditionality. I have argued that this contextual approach contests the liberal 
benchmark of a ‘good’ civil society and its critiques because the ‘normative framing’ 
of NGOs does not help with examining the ways NGOs do things in the global South. 
For example, in Pakistan, as I have mentioned, NGOs, as organisations are promoting 
democracy by shaping government policy and legislation, are recognised for advancing 
public interest and related causes including human rights, minorities and women’s 
issues; and are engaged in election monitoring; legislative strengthening and 
accountability support; anti-corruption research; citizenship education, and other “good 
things” that contribute to promoting democracy.  
 
These activities make more sense when we place them in the historical and socio-
political context which I categorised in four distinct waves of democratisation: ‘testing 
democracy’ (1947-1958), ‘idealising democracy’ (1972-1977), ‘personalising 
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democracy’ (1989 – 1998) and ‘re-constitutionalising democracy’ (2008-). I have 
argued that (a) despite its failure, the first wave of ‘testing’ democracy itself was crucial 
in establishing a polity in which democratic principles were debated, fought for, 
repeatedly ignored, altered and negotiated as compromises. Had Pakistan begun with 
autocracy, there would have been no such avenues; (b) the second wave of ‘idealising’ 
democracy was a lost opportunity to establish representative democracy in the broken 
Pakistan of post 1971. Though initially Bhutto fostered the popular support, idealised 
parliamentary representative democracy with an ideological preference for socialist 
democracy, in the end he failed to deliver a liberal state owing to his intolerance for a 
legitimate political opposition; (c) the third wave of democratisation was driven by 
‘personalised’ politics in the sense that despite the opportunity for the civilian 
governments, the major political parties failed to establish stronger democratic 
institutions and continued to undermine  public’s trust  in democracy by following 
personalised leadership. In this sense, though crucial constitutional gains were made, 
they were mainly used to exercise ‘parliamentary dictatorship’; and finally given the 
recent political developments in Pakistan, the current state of (d) the fourth wave of 
democratisation is uncertain – despite the efforts into ‘re-constitutionalising’ 
democracy, the future of a continued civilian rule is still an open question.   
 
In discussing the history of democratisation in waves, I noted that Pakistan’s beginnings 
with the British bureaucratic and administrative state structure; elite-led edifice of 
Pakistani movements; identity crises of the nascent state on the basis of religion and 
language; negation of the Bengali majority in organising national governance and the 
centralisation of state at the expense of provincial authority; development of the 
‘establishment’ and its influence on politics; Islamisation of the state laws; and external 
influences from Cold War to the War on Terror, have all contributed to the perpetual 
democratic deficit in Pakistan. However, I also noted that despite these factors, 
democracy continued to aspire the imagination of many of its believers. Thus, I have 
argued that the question of the resilience of democracy despite formidable recurrent 
dictatorships, is significant.  I explored the factors behind the resilience of democracy. 
I suggested that the development and survival of political parties and their resistance 
against the dictatorships as well as the repeated rejection of the personalised rule of the 
leaders at the expense of isolating other political actors have been the significant 
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reasons behind the resilience of democracy. I concluded that one of the main reason 
behind the resilience has been the role of civil society and NGOs in democratisation.  
 
However, upon reflecting on the nature and role of civil society in Pakistan’s 
democratisation, I have argued NGOs in Pakistan are the ‘historical product’, embedded 
in the edifice of Pakistan’s politics and its democratic deficit as well as a force of 
resilience. In this sense, the civil society and NGOs mirror Pakistan’s political 
development in its making. They are neither good nor bad. They are constituted by the 
socio-political culture in which they operate and they also constitute it. They shift their 
approach to democratisation in response to the changes in the social and political 
environment. Until 1980s, NGOs approach to democratisation involved resistance, 
fight and movement. Despite limited funds and structured organisational setups, NGOs 
were able to gather global support for their issue based advocacy for human rights and 
democracy. They were defiant even against the dictatorships. However, in the late 
1990s, NGOs developed a strong focus on projects and programmes. With the help of 
international funding, large projects on parliamentarians training and capacity-building 
were focused on neatly defined outputs and outcomes. Corporate style organisational 
structures were introduced with urban centred offices for NGOs. Volunteerism and 
commitment for the cause were replaced with highly paid professionals with technical 
skills. In other words, approaches to democratisation diverged from movement and 
resistance to projectised democratisation.  
 
I have argued that the nuances of projectised democratisation cannot be understood 
without carefully considering the context in which NGOs in democratisation operate in 
Pakistan. NGOs in Pakistan have ascribed a dual role for themselves in furthering 
democracy – as educators and enablers. In projectised democratisation, NGOs, in fact, 
are processors; working cautiously and continuously on a series of actions to push the 
transitional democracy in Pakistan towards consolidation. Through purposefully 
designed projects and programmes, most NGOs act to strengthen the parliamentary 
processes. They also perform a balancing act vis-à-vis the army and the political elite 
of Pakistan. In so doing, NGOs become elite themselves. I have called them NGelites. 
They perceive to have contributed to limiting the direct control of the army over 
politics. At the same time, they pragmatically accept the organisational strength and 
influence of the army, and desire to navigate a space in the power equation of the 
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traditional political actors including the army, bureaucracy and the political elite. Being 
elite, urban, professional, depoliticised and process oriented is the only way through 
which NGOs narrow the gap that existed between them and the power elite. In this 
sense, this balancing act is the imperfect necessity. 
 
Going back to O’Donnell and Schmitter’s transition theory I have argued that contrary 
to how the roles of NGOs are conceptualised as generating norms for liberalisation; 
condemning and exposing regime’s corruption; and creating a general climate of 
rejecting the authoritarian regime, NGOs with international, financial and ideological 
support in democratic transitions might in fact emerge as the elite of civil society. Yet, 
similar to the ways in which bourgeoisie political and economic elite act in democratic 
transitions, NGOs may also – for vested interests – support the political elite and push 
the processes of transition by advocating for a less radical and more procedural 
transition to democracy.  
 
In interpreting the nature of democratisation as ‘projectised’ and the role of NGOs as 
‘NGelites’, I have offered the main contributions of this research. However, I still feel 
the need for a deeper, somewhat personalised look, into the phenomenon of 
democratisation. I realise that in researching through exploring the lived experiences of 
others, I have also been living the experience of researching democratisation. The act 
of researching and writing has fundamentally transformed my orientation to 
understanding NGOs in democratisation as my assumptions have been exposed and 
challenged. Thus, narrating my own experience of meeting and discussing 
democratisation with the people in NGOs, may help with revealing a little more about 
democratisation. It may also cohere the lived experiences of the people in NGOs with 
my experience of researching. With this in mind, I now present the final vignette which 
captures the experience of my research. In this sense, the act of writing creatively will 
help me transcend from being a researcher into the domain of the people experiencing 
democratisation in NGOs in Pakistan.  
 
The vignette is set as an event in which I meet with a known human rights and 
democracy activist at an NGO. This setting is fictionalised to present one of the ‘many’ 
sites of democratisation in Pakistan. Similarly, the lead character in this vignette 
presents one of the multiple facets of experiencing democratisation. This character is 
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also a composite character; this means that in making this character, I have used 
multiple interview transcriptions. Therefore, the identity of this person that I meet in 
this vignette reflects a composite identity of a few people who have informed this 
research.  By way of narrating my experience of researching democratisation, in a 
manner similar to other vignettes, I focus on presenting the ‘symbolic expressions of 
lived experiences’. Finally, though the vignette is based on interviews, I have adapted 
the text of transcriptions creatively.  
 
The Dissenter 
[Jahan leads an NGO in Lahore, focused on providing legal aid to the destitute people. 
She has for long fought for instituting the culture of democracy, human rights and 
equality. She believes that though dissent is dead, the dissenter spirit must be kept alive 
for the sustenance of democracy in Pakistan. Jahan’s tale represents those research 
participants whose perception of NGOs in democratisation is that of ‘a fight’. They stay 
true to liberal ideology, local(ness), values and morality. Jahan, as a character, 
manifests a crucial aspect of the phenomenon of NGOs in democratisation, and of 
democratisation itself.] 
 
It was the midst of June. Nearly four in the afternoon but the heat and humidity of 
Lahore was still intensifying. Standing outside a modest commercial building in 
Lahore, I felt smothered, not because of the heat, but because I was finally going to 
meet Jahan.  
 
It took me over a month to set up a meeting with her. Her office assistant kept 
apologising for making and then cancelling the appointments mainly for the unexpected 
turn of events and commitments that Jahan had to attend. At last, there I was, hot and 
nervous as I entered the building. Having no idea which floor of the building the office 
was situated, I kept going up the stairs. Besides, no lifts were in sight in that narrow 
and old fashioned concrete structure. Upon noticing the board with Jahan’s name, I 
pressed the buzzer. The door was opened by a middle-aged, modest looking tallish man, 
wearing worn grey trousers and a blue-grey lined shirt. Like his clothes, he also looked 
worn. His face was made prominent by his thick glassed black framed specs. Looking 
exhausted (perhaps after working all day or because of the airless office), he politely 
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welcomed me with a busy and quick smile. He went behind the counter labelled 
‘Reception’. Before I said anything, he asked, “are you Arjumand?”  I nodded as he 
busily affirmed my appointment in a ledger. “I am Mushtaq, Jahan’s assistant” he said. 
“You have been conversing with me for this appointment. I am sorry about all the 
cancellations. Can I get you a glass of water?” It was an unexpected offer. In the month 
of Ramzan, when most people in Pakistan were fasting, the offer was unusually fresh. 
I wasn’t fasting but politely refused the offer as it is commonly expected in response. 
He then set off to guide me to Jahan’s office.  
 
Following him through a small hall, I felt a sense of urgency in the averagely furnished 
office. There were three smaller rooms and a big common room, all visible through 
cheap glass doors. There were people in all rooms, some conversing with each other in 
a more client-officer look, whilst others busy taking phone calls.  There were some 
destitute looking people – men but mostly women – sitting on a few seats in the hall. 
They looked like they were waiting to be seen. As we approached the end of the hall, I 
saw Jahan, behind the glass door of one of the smaller rooms. Mushtaq opened the door, 
softly announcing “Arjumand is here”.  
 
“I am Jahan” a petit woman promptly stood up behind a busy and messy looking work-
desk, warmly offering a handshake. Dressed in an inexpensive shalwar-qameez with a 
dupatta casually held across her neck, Jahan could be described as any other Pakistani 
urban woman in her late 50s. With her short hair loosely tied at the back, she was 
wearing a small chain with a single pendant. Her small and feeble looking hands had a 
few rings, with a wristwatch visible at the end of her left hand. What made her unusual 
however, was her pensive eyes behind her thinly framed glasses.   
 
While greeting her with a handshake, I seated myself on the chair across her. The busy 
and messy looking work-desk separated us. The room felt even smaller with a tall 
bookcase filled with books and files. Next to a small window, covered with blinds, was 
a table with a desktop. There was also a carry-along suitcase (as if she was or will be 
travelling) and large handbag filled with papers. “Arjumand, your research looks 
interesting” she remarked in Urdu in a direct and swift manner. “I read through the 
description you sent through email. How can I help?” I was a bit astonished. I was not 
expecting such a candid, welcoming and direct response from one of the most known 
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human rights activists, for whom I always held high respect and considered as a role 
model. Not being able to confirm my appointment with her, I disappointingly assumed 
that she must be difficult to approach, perhaps even a little arrogant. But her presence 
felt contrary to my assumptions. Feeling a bit relaxed, I began with thanking her for her 
time to which she reacted quickly and said “no need”. I explained that my research was 
about exploring the roles of internationally funded NGOs in democratisation. Since she 
was leading an NGO with an aim to promote democracy and human rights, and had 
long been involved in pro-democracy resistance movements, I wanted her to share her 
observations and concerns as she experienced them over the years.  
 
“The role of NGOs in the context of Pakistan has been extremely positive and 
important” she began, only this time conversing in English. “Civil society has always 
been here in Pakistan before the conventional kind of NGOs that have come in now. 
These were introduced in the 80s. One of the reasons that in a Muslim country, 
dogmatic Islamic discourse has been resisted, is because of this civil society. What I 
call civil society, are poets, writers, union of journalists, trade unions, legal community, 
people who are liberal in their thought, who may or may not get together to form certain 
organisations. Even political parties are part of civil society in Pakistan. Pakistan has 
survived because it has political parties. But our state has never recognised this civil 
society. Nor do they recognise us now. They tolerate us because of international 
pressures. For example, they are compelled to involve us in developing the progress 
reports to the CEDAW Committee at the UN. But by and large, since the Ayub era, 
there has been a regulated effort to hegemonise this civil society including curbing the 
development of political parties. So to this day, state does not communicate with us. It 
makes laws and introduce policies without any consultation, so we have been 
essentially kept at a distance. In a democracy, it is important that everything done in 
terms of the law and law-making, should not just be thoroughly discussed in the 
parliament, but also outside the parliament. In the colonial times, people were asked to 
give their opinion and the same should happen now. But, except for the businessmen 
who are consulted discreetly before the budget is announced or a finance bill is 
introduced, nothing else is done. Laws are made without consultation of lawyers; 
education policy is made without consulting with educationists and so on. So, we are 
kept at the margins.” Suddenly the door opened with a knock and Mushtaq entered with 
a serving trolley carrying covered food trays. Jahan slightly nodded and began to clear 
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her desk making space for food. “You will have to excuse me. I have not had any lunch. 
And I am advised that I must not miss my meals. Are you fasting?” I shook my head 
and said “please have your lunch”.  
 
Jahan resumed talking as Mushtaq laid the table. “So, I was saying that despite this 
discouraging, in fact hostile attitude of the state, we kept demanding to be heard. We 
kept scrutinising them, even the dictators, for failing to deliver basic needs and security 
for our people. Women’s rights organisations have, in particular, played a laudable role. 
Thank you Mushtaq” Jahan broke the conversation as Mushtaq left the room. “I 
remember that back in 80s, the chaddar and chardiwari was an ascending slogan in 
Pakistan under the rule of Zia-ul-Haq. But we broke down the framework that they were 
creating for women. We were few of us as a network, but we managed to jolt people 
not just in Pakistan but even the international community started asking questions in 
their capitals against Zia’s Islamisation laws. Much credit should be given to the 
feminists of the West. They came to our rescue defying their own governments who 
were supporting Zia’s jihad in Afghanistan. A global pressure was generated and a 
public outcry compelled the dictator to back off. In this way, the Western civil society 
played a significant role. We have had people like Habib Jalib and Faiz among others 
who are institutions in themselves. They have given life, thought and progressive mind-
set to many of us. They too were sheltered by the West and its civil society, when placed 
in exile by our state. So, for me, civil society in Pakistan has been organised, dynamic 
and daring. It has been guided by the values of democracy, participation, fundamental 
freedoms for citizens, protection and advocacy for the rights of minorities.” While 
speaking, Jahan began to unimposingly share food, serving me everything that was 
there at the table. I gestured to politely refuse, which she swiftly ignored and kept 
serving. I noticed, it was home-cooked simple lunch in small portions. Only much later 
in time I came to know that at the time of our meeting, Jahan was undergoing medical 
treatment for a serious illness. I still wonder how she did it, taking time for activism 
and fulltime work despite being seriously ill. But that was Jahan. A usual looking, but 
an unusually strong woman. 
 
“What do you think of these new NGOs that are internationally funded for defined 
projects and programmes? Do you think they are doing what you as an activist used to 
do or still do?” I asked as I nibbled on the mixed seasonal fruits. “I consider them non-
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conventional NGOs as they are different from NGOs in the past” Jahan continued. “I 
am not against international support. Western civil society has always supported our 
civil society for pursing democratic aims. They also pressurise their governments so 
their governments are compelled to support us and pressure our state to have a 
democratic set up. I am also not denying that the West is often guided by its own vested 
strategic interests. True that the West had supported the most formidable dictatorships 
in Pakistan. Nonetheless, their financial and issue based support is extremely valuable 
for our civil society to make even little stiches in the torn fabric of our socio-political 
experience. It has to be our own judgement with which we should balance our priorities. 
Our organisation is funded by the Western partners – both by the state and civil society 
institutions. But we set our own agendas. I would not say that all NGOs set their own 
agendas. Some may have their funding agencies’ agendas, I cannot deny that. But that 
doesn’t just happen in the civil society. Our state – including government and the army 
– follows foreign agendas when compelled to in exchange of financial rewards, so how 
can they blame us? Just because they have been given legitimacy by their institutions 
doesn’t mean they are beyond the bounds of scrutiny. It is all because of this historical 
hostility against the civil society that we face the charge of following foreign agendas. 
I simply laugh at these charges. As if our society and state is completely innocent of 
not taking any external influence. But I do think that present day NGOs should have a 
common sense and not poor-judgements. They must understand that in Pakistan, the 
work they do is political to its core. And they should openly accept that. They should 
work alongside political parties to develop a critical mass but keep their distance from 
them by not directly engaging and playing a political role. They must work collectively 
and develop what I call ‘collective wisdom’ for liberal values. There must be deep 
knowledge: I think that an NGO that does not have deep knowledge of its own society 
is not helpful to democracy. I’ll give you an example. When General Musharraf came 
to power, if you look at the newspapers of those days, and I wish you would, apart from 
the HRCP, not a single NGO opposed the military dictatorship. The reason being that 
they thought liberalism can spring out of the barrel of a gun. There is the contradiction. 
The people at HRCP have for years stood up against dictatorships. They have spent 
years in jail. They had taken the beating on streets and their members were killed by 
the establishment. They know what the barrel of a gun is like. So, we must learn from 
them. NGOs should be able to differentiate myths from reality. I would say that what 
is most important for an NGO is to gain respect of the public that they are addressing. 
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To find such respect in a society in which NGOs are under attack is not easy. But who 
said our work was supposed to be easy! A few welfare organisations in Pakistan 
managed to achieve this status such as Edhi. HRCP is also respected to a certain extent. 
But the rest of NGOs, I don’t see them taking positions as openly as they should.” 
Jahan’s voice was evenly paced, with clear sentences in sequence. So far. her 
expression kept a sustained tone.    
 
“Where do you get your funding from?” I asked having been given a chance to speak. 
“We have overseas funding from Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, EU and other 
European countries. But we set the agenda. We do not take funding from the US – 
directly or indirectly. We don’t even take funding from the private citizens of America. 
We have a distinct worldview. Many NGOs in our community do not subscribe to our 
secular liberal worldview and keep their distance from us. That is all fine. We have 
nothing against them. But I do believe that civil society is only civil if it does not have 
criminal aims. Our society is fast becoming a violent place. Dissent is not accepted 
here. The right wing is soaring. We all have to fight religious extremism together for 
our survival. I have to say that in a culture where tolerance, equality, and freedom of 
expression are heavily restrained, NGOs have taken up important issues to advocate. If 
they were not there, there would be no freedom of expression and no talk of taboos in 
this country. I believe, in fact I know, that there is no option for this country’s survival 
but democracy. There has never been a moment in time when even 200 people got 
together to bring in military. If military has ever been called in, it was done by our weak 
civilian governments, not by the citizens of Pakistan. This is where NGOs should direct 
their efforts to. To keep in check the governments that they do not resort to calling for 
the military rule.” 
 
“What makes your or your NGO’s approach different from other NGOs in 
democratisation?” I probed further. 
 
“We make demands from the government and if the government asks us to come 
anywhere to speak or inform their approach, we never refuse. We reserve our right to 
criticise, as we should do. Our work is primarily awareness and advocacy for the people 
who cannot speak for themselves. We also do not ‘train’ parliamentarians or do leg-
work for them. We consider this service delivery, and we don’t have resources for it. 
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For example, in the making of the 18th, 19th and 20th Constitutional Amendments, we 
advised when consulted upon. Most of our demands were not addressed. For example, 
on judicial appointments, we pushed for the parliamentary oversight. The CJP refused 
to accept this and now the Chief Justice is the sole authority for the appointment of 
judges. This is why, historically our justice system has been influenced by the 
establishment.”  
 
By now, I have gathered that Jahan was a reflective sole with a fire burning in her heart 
to bring about social change for democracy and human rights.  She was rooted in local 
culture and history of resistance against anti-democratic forces – including the 
establishment (the army and bureaucracy) and the extremists. She was not apologetic 
for her secular liberal beliefs. Neither did she mock international funding but recognised 
its positive support. She was also critical of NGOs that stay at margins and only engage 
when they have projects relevant to the issue.  
 
In response to my question on NGOs’ role in law-making, Jahan sneered “I don’t think 
NGOs can be given a formalised role in law-making. There should always be input 
from them and there are ways for doing that. You have to lobby and ensure that your 
input is considered. When there was the draft going around of the 18 Constitutional 
Amendment Act for consultation, to my utter surprise, only a handful of NGOs 
responded. The idea that you should be given a formal role is absurd. Why should you 
be given a formal role if people have not elected you? Whom do you represent? If you 
represent an idea then give that idea and let the parliament decide. With all my respect 
to those NGOs who do the leg-work for politicians in drafting laws, I would say please 
have those laws vetted by lawyers. You simply cannot be experts in everything that you 
manage to get funding for. Just because you can speak English, you cannot understand 
the legal system of this country. This naivety or opportunism – whatever you want to 
call it – takes its toll as laws get drafted which contradict the previously made 
progressive laws. Who suffers – it is the public and those progressives who struggled 
to lobby for those laws. This is why I say that NGOs’ poor judgement is dangerous.”  
 
“What do you say about volunteerism that’s is disappearing fast and is a big concern 
for our NGOs? This would be my last question. I have already taken plenty of your 
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time.”  We were now being served fresh tea and it was nearly time for me to leave. I 
thought I must try to add just a few more questions before my 1 hour was up.  
 
“Don’t worry about time. You are always welcome to contact me again should you need 
to. I am happy to help.” Jahan smiled and then mocked herself to adding, “Certainly 
you had quite the opposite experience of approaching to me. But in my defence, I can 
only say that my days are often frantically and randomly organised. That’s another thing 
about NGOs that I do not understand. Since when have we turned into these 
bureaucratic bubbles which are required to have three to five years strategic plans? If 
you have too much bureaucracy you cannot work in a country like Pakistan where there 
is crisis every day. I will not be able to tell you today what I am going to do tomorrow 
because I am not a master of things. Plus NGOs should stop thinking that they know 
everything. That they can train the police without reading the police laws! And finally 
on volunteerism, I strongly believe that NGOs should nurture it and the conventional 
tutorship from senior NGOs’ experts to young volunteers and staff members must 
continue. There has to be some commitment to what we do and stand for. The amount 
of money NGOs’ personnel are paid these days, breeds corruption and opportunism in 
my opinion.” 
 
With the close of her sentence, I took my leave and thanked her. I left Jahan, a petit, 
humble but an incredibly strong woman in that very standard small third floor office 
with cheap glass doors. But Jahan did not leave me. Her reflective rebelliousness had 




I began this research by asking how do NGOs constitute democratisation in countries 
where democracy and constitutionalism have for years struggled to take root? In their 
struggles for democratisation, what becomes of NGOs? Investigating this dynamic and 
mutually constitutive relationship between NGOs and democratisation has been my 
intellectual preoccupation for the last four years. That I have finally come closer to 
understanding the nature of democratisation, is because I engaged closely with how it 
is lived. In doing so, I met some extraordinary individuals who have spent their entire 
lives, ‘living’ democratisation in a politically dangerous environment.  
 
Simone Beauvoire was of the view that one can only have a relationship with life.1 It 
is, indeed, only through reflecting on the lived experiences of a phenomenon, that we 
find its essence. However, such a reflection must first expose and contest our 
assumptions or else we do not see, as we must. Before I began my research, I believed 
that international funding to few NGOs in Pakistan has significantly undermined their 
radical edge and dampened the revolutionary spirit of the wider civil society. I assumed 
that NGOs in democratisation compete against each other to win maximum funds, 
mainly to keep their urban elite presence and protect their financial interests. I assumed 
that the ‘NGOisation’ of social movements had taken place and reduced the possibilities 
for strengthening democratisation in Pakistan. My assumptions were challenged as I 
gradually immersed myself in the field. I began to listen and reflect upon the variety of 
experiences of the people involved in NGOs.  
 
I realised that one only makes choices in one’s context, and that shaping and advancing 
democratisation as ‘projectised’, elitist and procedural, has partly been a reflective and 
deliberate choice of the people in NGOs. In Pakistan’s elite-led politics – in which the 
militant right-wing forces have increasingly risen and become part of the mainstream 
politics – NGOs perceive that they must also navigate a political space to continue to 
realise democracy. The ways to do it might not be normatively ‘perfect’, but they are 
                                                 
1 Bakewell, S. (2016) At the Existentialist Café: Freedom, Being, and Apricot Cocktails with Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Edmund Husserl, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Others. New York: Other Press. p. 299 
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necessary. Strengthening the parliament and other institutions for democracy by 
conducting rigorous research about social and political determinants of democracy; 
educating school children in human rights; organising seminars and conferences to 
convene the political elite on platforms where they interact with the wider civil society 
including academics and journalists; organising foreign tours of parliamentarians so 
that they learn how democracy works in other countries; lobbying politicians for 
bringing about constitutional and law reforms; and making in-roads into Pakistan’s 
mainstream politics without openly challenging and criticising the political elite, might 
not be the ‘ideal radical’ ways to demand democracy and human rights. But, by 
establishing processes, projectised democratisation works to develop the foundations 
for a system of democratic governance. It may be valid that such choices also create 
opportunities for these individuals to lead mega development and democratisation 
programmes and enable them to protect liberal spaces, for themselves and wider 
society. However, choices made in this manner, open crucial avenues for political 
engagement. The way I see it, projectised democratisation does not depoliticise NGOs. 
Rather, NGOs in democratisation remain inherently political without being openly 
radical. It is just so, that, their roles have changed from radically realising democracy 
in the authoritarian rule to procedurally and gradually transforming the system of 
governance as a democratic system. That international funding (mostly) enables them 
to play these roles, is a fact that they have no qualms about.  
 
Thus, the strength of this research lies in its methodological approach to understanding 
democratisation, as lived and experienced from the perspectives of the people involved 
in it. In narrowing our gaze into the phenomenon, crucial insights can emerge as the 
assumptions get exposed. With its focus on the ‘situated-ness’ of research in its context, 
for some, it invites readers to decide whether the description is authentic, and in so 
doing, the reader extends it generalisability. This brings us to the significance of the 
reader. I have written parts of this thesis creatively with vignettes, autobiographical 
tales and dialogues with composite characters ‘to bring the reader into the situation’.  I 
have tried to bring to life, the lived experience of the people in NGOs. Following 
Gadamer, I have also come to understand that language reveals being and the meaning 
of a text, which goes beyond its author. Thus, throughout this thesis, I have written ‘to 
make contact with the things of our world’ and to present observations in a language 
that communicates to its readers. In this act of reflection, the text transcends from my 
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observations into the domain of the reader who may find new meanings. Thus, this 
research offers new interpretations while inviting the reader to arrive at theirs. 
 
The nuances developed in this thesis do not just offer empirical insights and contribute 
to the theories of democratisation, they also provide lessons for the international 
democracy promotion agencies. As I see it, the international financial and ideological 
support provide the necessary resources for NGOs to continue to push democratisation 
towards democratic consolidation and that this fact is acknowledged and appreciated 
by most people in NGOs. Elite politicians and academics criticise and doubt the 
effectiveness of such support. However, as pointed out by many people in NGOs, in 
Pakistan, the state itself is internationally funded but the questions about its political 
independence and partiality hardly get raised. Besides, state or other philanthropic 
institutions do not provide funds for instituting democracy. This dependence on funds, 
however, should not mean that NGOs stop reflecting on their core purpose. They 
should, as they do, continue to assess the pros and cons of international funding in the 
wider context of the necessity of their contribution and negotiate the parameters of the 
projects and programmes. In the present right-wing political context of Pakistan, 
international funding for advancing human rights and supporting democratic systems 
is not considered a ‘bad’ thing. To their part, the international funding providers must 
also trust in NGOs’ approaches to democratisation and enable them to play multiple 
roles at multiple levels in democratisation – as educators, enablers and processors.  
 
If the strength of this thesis is its methodological approach to understanding 
democratisation, it is also its limitation. Whether the central thesis of ‘projectised 
democratisation’ is generalisable is an open question with no definitive answers. 
Without undermining the specific qualitative contextual insights into the role of NGOs 
in democratisation in Pakistan, a way forward can be to undertake more research in this 
manner and to then compare and draw lessons that expand the theoretical landscape of 
democratisation and begin to inform policy and action. Even if the lessons learned are 
dissimilar – which is plausible – the role of NGOs in democratisation in varied political 
contexts will be qualified. Such comparative research will tease out the antecedent 
conditions and strategies that facilitate or stifle democratisation. There has been 
increasing demands for inter-subjective qualitative research studies to know more about 
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the ethnographic dimension of democratisation,2 to which I have responded by 
presenting this thesis. However, the debate must continue if democracy promotion in 
the global South continues to be desired by its people as well as by the global civil 
society.                 
 
 
                                                 
2 Teorell, J. (2010) Determinants of democratization: Explaining regime change in the world, 1972–
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